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AbstractThis essay outlines an empirically grounded account of normative political legitimacy. The main idea is to give a normative edge to empirical measures of sociological legitimacy through a nonmoralized form of ideology critique. A power structure's responsiveness to the values of those subjected to its authority can be measured empirically and may be explanatory or predictive insofar as it tracks belief in legitimacy, but by itself it lacks normative purchase. It merely describes a preference alignment, and so tells us nothing about whether the ruled have reason to support the rulers. I argue that we can close this gap by filtering the preferences of the ruled through a form of nonmoralized epistemic ideology critique, itself grounded in an empirical account of how belief in legitimacy is formed.

In the last two decades, Anglophone political theory witnessed a renewed interest in social-scientific empirical findings – partly as a reaction against normative theorising centred on the formulation of abstract, intuition-driven moral principles. This brief article begins by showing how this turn has taken two distinct forms: (1) a nonideal theoretical orientation, which seeks to balance the emphasis on moral principles with feasibility and urgency considerations, and (2) a fact-centric orientation, which seeks to ground normative conclusions in empirical results. The core of the article then compares and contrasts three variants of fact-centric political theory: normative behaviourism, grounded normative theory and radical realism. The upshot: normative behaviourism achieves focus on observable behaviour at the cost of status quo bias, grounded normative theory achieves radicalism at the cost of endorsing an activist orientation to theorising and radical realism combines a non-activist orientation with the potential for far-reaching critique of the status quo.

Is there more to the recent surge in political realism than just a debate on how best to continue doing what political theorists are already doing? I use two recent books, by Michael Freeden and Matt Sleat, as a testing ground for realism's claims about its import on the discipline. I argue that both book take realism beyond the Methodenstreit, though each in a different direction: Freeden's takes us in the realm of meta-metatheory, Sleat's is a genuine exercise in grounding liberal normative theory in a non-moralistic way. I conclude with wider methodological observations. I argue that unlike communitarianism (the previous contender for the discipline's renewal), realism has the potential to open new vistas, though their novelty is to a large extent relative to the last forty years or so: realism is best thought of as a return to a more traditional way of doing political philosophy.