Suchergebnisse

Introduction: Medicaid, federalism, and policy feedback -- The birth of Medicaid: 1965 -- The sleeping giant awakens: 1966-80 -- Retrenchment and repudiation in the Reagan era -- Options and mandates in the 1980s -- Creative financing mechanisms in the Bush era -- Waivers in the Clinton era -- Block grants and the 1994 Republican revolution -- Health care reform in the 2000s -- Conclusion: the future of Medicaid

This article analyzes state legislative and ballot measure activity related to the minimum wage between 2003 and 2020. The analysis distinguishes proposals to raise the minimum wage from those to index it to the annual rate of inflation, and examines the proposed dollar amount, the process used (legislation vs. ballot measure), and the measure's success or failure. The analysis suggests that state activity tends to increase when the minimum wage rises on the federal policy agenda, and that partisanship and ideology also play a central role in efforts to raise and index state minimum wages.

AbstractAs the list of Republican-led states participating in the Medicaid expansion grows, it is becoming increasingly clear that partisanship and ideology alone cannot fully explain states' choices. This paper examines the political and practical dynamics influencing state Medicaid expansion decisions. Whereas resources and history have served to reinforce the effects of partisanship and ideology, several countervailing forces – including public opinion, interest group pressure, budgetary considerations, and need – are pushing even the reddest states toward expansion. The relative force of these competing pressures within a state can help explain not only whether or not the state expands Medicaid, but also the manner in which it does so, such as through a waiver or executive action. I present five case studies – Nevada, Arizona, Ohio, Arkansas, and Tennessee – to illustrate how these various dynamics are shaping states' decisions.

AbstractAnecdotal evidence suggests that U.S. state politicians manipulate rainy day funds for political purposes, but such claims remain untested in the literature. This article finds that lawmakers withdraw nearly three times more funds in response to a deficit shock of a given size if it occurs in an election year rather than in a non-election year; this occurs despite the fact that the magnitude of shocks does not vary over the electoral cycle. This effect is stronger when incumbents are eligible for re-election than when they are term-limited. When it comes to preventing political manipulation of funds, rainy day fund rules that increase the number of veto players who must approve of withdrawals seem to be more effective than rules that specify the economic conditions under which funds may be withdrawn.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that U.S. state politicians manipulate rainy day funds for political purposes, but such claims remain untested in the literature. This article finds that lawmakers withdraw nearly three times more funds in response to a deficit shock of a given size if it occurs in an election year rather than in a non-election year, this occurs despite the fact that the magnitude of shocks does not vary over the electoral cycle. This effect is stronger when incumbents are eligible for re-election than when they are term-limited. When it comes to preventing political manipulation of funds, rainy day fund rules that increase the number of veto players who must approve of withdrawals seem to be more effective than rules that specify the economic conditions under which funds may be withdrawn. Adapted from the source document.