Suchergebnisse

This study is inspired by a theory-driven expectation of a co-author of Why Nations Fail Daren Acemoglu in regard to fostering inclusive political institutions in post-Euromaidan Ukraine despite the armed conflict in Donbas. I examine how appointing a civil society activist – the one who used to help the Ukrainian Army during the security operation in Donbas – for a position of a regional executive in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast affects regional governors' approaches towards the key conditions of inclusive political institutions: state capacity and power distribution. State capacity, namely its key dimension of monopoly over violence, is operationalized as control over the contact line in the armed conflict in Donbas. Power distribution is operationalized as holding democratic elections. I compare the approaches of three regional executives, including the one who was the civil society activist, towards state capacity and power distribution. I find that appointing the civil society activist for a position of a regional executive in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast affects regional governors' approach towards control over the contact line, but not towards holding democratic elections. The study contributes to literatures on inclusive political institutions by analyzing new empirical data in line with the conceptual framework of Acemoglu and Robinson tailored for its application in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast.

This study is inspired by a theory-driven expectation of a co-author of Why Nations Fail Daren Acemoglu in regard to fostering inclusive political institutions in post-Euromaidan Ukraine despite the armed conflict in Donbas. I examine how appointing a civil society activist – the one who used to help the Ukrainian Army during the security operation in Donbas – for a position of a regional executive in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast affects regional governors' approaches towards the key conditions of inclusive political institutions: state capacity and power distribution. State capacity, namely its key dimension of monopoly over violence, is operationalized as control over the contact line in the armed conflict in Donbas. Power distribution is operationalized as holding democratic elections. I compare the approaches of three regional executives, including the one who was the civil society activist, towards state capacity and power distribution. I find that appointing the civil society activist for a position of a regional executive in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast affects regional governors' approach towards control over the contact line, but not towards holding democratic elections. The study contributes to literatures on inclusive political institutions by analyzing new empirical data in line with the conceptual framework of Acemoglu and Robinson tailored for its application in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast.

This study is inspired by a theory-driven expectation of a co-author of Why Nations Fail Daren Acemoglu in regard to fostering inclusive political institutions in post-Euromaidan Ukraine despite the armed conflict in Donbas. I examine how appointing a civil society activist – the one who used to help the Ukrainian Army during the security operation in Donbas – for a position of a regional executive in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast affects regional governors' approaches towards the key conditions of inclusive political institutions: state capacity and power distribution. State capacity, namely its key dimension of monopoly over violence, is operationalized as control over the contact line in the armed conflict in Donbas. Power distribution is operationalized as holding democratic elections. I compare the approaches of three regional executives, including the one who was the civil society activist, towards state capacity and power distribution. I find that appointing the civil society activist for a position of a regional executive in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast affects regional governors' approach towards control over the contact line, but not towards holding democratic elections. The study contributes to literatures on inclusive political institutions by analyzing new empirical data in line with the conceptual framework of Acemoglu and Robinson tailored for its application in post-Euromaidan Luhansk oblast.

This article describes the results of a regional-level study of Ukrainian political parties' interactions. The study sought to identify the congruence or incongruence of the party affiliationof the regional executives and the heads of regional assemblies across Ukraine when Ukraine's democratic performance rose and fell. The study found that when democratic performance rose, so did regional-level, party-affiliation incongruence, with the greatest ideological incongruence occurring in regions with special institutional arrangements, such as Kyiv and Sevastopol. WhenUkraine's democratic performance fell, the number of ideologically congruent regions rose. These shifts occurred because a decline in democratic performance leaves little institutional room for statewide opposition, and the main competitors of the ruling party in regional bodies of power are non-statewide parties and blocs. Thus, this article argues that political cleavages in a regionally diverse post-communist state do not automatically mirror the statewide party competition.

This article describes the results of a regional-level study of Ukrainian political parties' interactions. The study sought to identify the congruence or incongruence of the party affiliationof the regional executives and the heads of regional assemblies across Ukraine when Ukraine's democratic performance rose and fell. The study found that when democratic performance rose, so did regional-level, party-affiliation incongruence, with the greatest ideological incongruence occurring in regions with special institutional arrangements, such as Kyiv and Sevastopol. WhenUkraine's democratic performance fell, the number of ideologically congruent regions rose. These shifts occurred because a decline in democratic performance leaves little institutional room for statewide opposition, and the main competitors of the ruling party in regional bodies of power are non-statewide parties and blocs. Thus, this article argues that political cleavages in a regionally diverse post-communist state do not automatically mirror the statewide party competition.

This article describes the results of a regional-level study of Ukrainian political parties' interactions. The study sought to identify the congruence or incongruence of the party affiliationof the regional executives and the heads of regional assemblies across Ukraine when Ukraine's democratic performance rose and fell. The study found that when democratic performance rose, so did regional-level, party-affiliation incongruence, with the greatest ideological incongruence occurring in regions with special institutional arrangements, such as Kyiv and Sevastopol. WhenUkraine's democratic performance fell, the number of ideologically congruent regions rose. These shifts occurred because a decline in democratic performance leaves little institutional room for statewide opposition, and the main competitors of the ruling party in regional bodies of power are non-statewide parties and blocs. Thus, this article argues that political cleavages in a regionally diverse post-communist state do not automatically mirror the statewide party competition.

The principle of cyclicality in the leading theory of multi-level voting -- second-order election theory -- assumes that simultaneous multi-level voting should be congruent and that regional electoral contests should have no second-order election effects: regional turnout should not decrease, parties in office should not lose support, while opposition, small and new parties should not attract more votes. This article tests the principle of cyclicality of second-order election theory against a set of simultaneous multi-level elections in order to explain why second-order election effects rise and fall. Adapted from the source document.

The principle of cyclicality in the leading theory of multi-level voting – second-order election theory – assumes that simultaneous multi-level voting should be congruent and that regional electoral contests should have no second-order election effects: regional turnout should not decrease, parties in office should not lose support, while opposition, small and new parties should not attract more votes. This article tests the principle of cyclicality of second-order election theory against a set of simultaneous multi-level elections in order to explain why second-order election effects rise and fall.