Suchergebnisse

1. Kantian provisional duties -- 2. Provisional protection : the responsibility to protect as a provisional duty -- 3. Kant's permissive laws -- 4. Permissible coercion -- 5. Provisional to peremptory : institutionalizing a duty to protect -- 6. Conclusion : the Responsibility to Protect and the real world - Libya and Syria.

"This book provides an innovative contribution to the study of the Responsibility to Protect and Kantian political theory. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine has been heralded as the new international security norm to ensure the protection of peoples against genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet, for all of the discussion, endorsements and reaffirmations of this new norm, R2P continues to come under fire for its failures, particularly, and most recently, in the case of Syria. This book argues that a duty to protect is best considered a Kantian provisional duty of justice. The international system ought to be considered a state of nature, where legal institutions are either weak or absent, and so duties of justice in such a condition cannot be considered peremptory. This book suggests that by understanding the duty's provisional status, we understand the necessity of creating the requisite executive, legislative and judicial authorities. Furthermore, the book provides three innovative contributions to the literature, study and practice of R2P and Kantian political theory: it provides detailed theoretical analysis of R2P; it addresses the research gap that exists with Kant's account of justice in states of nature; and it presents a more comprehensive understanding of the metaphysics of justice as well as R2P. This book will be of much interest to students of the Responsibility to Protect, humanitarian intervention, global ethics, international law, security studies and international relations (IR) in general."--Publisher's website

AbstractTo adequately estimate the beneficial and harmful effects of artificial intelligence (AI), we must first have a clear understanding of what AI is and what it is not. We need to draw important conceptual and definitional boundaries to ensure we accurately estimate and measure the impacts of AI from both empirical and normative standpoints. This essay argues that we should not conflate AI with automation or autonomy but keep them conceptually separate. Moreover, it suggests that once we have a broad understanding of what constitutes AI, we will see that it can be applied to all sectors of the economy and in warfare. However, it cautions that we must be careful where we apply AI, for in some cases there are serious epistemological concerns about whether we have an appropriate level of knowledge to create such systems. Opening the aperture to include such questions allows us to further see that while AI systems will be deployed in a myriad of forms, with greater or lesser cognitive abilities, these systems ought never to be considered moral agents. They cannot possess rights, and they do not have any duties.

Fifteen years on, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine is still facing questions over its content, scope and attendant obligations. Recent conflicts in Syria, Ukraine and Iraq show, how, when and if states intervene is a matter of political will and calculation. Yet the question of political will remains largely unaddressed, and many ignore the conceptual and practical distance between stating that the international community should encourage and assist states to fulfill R2P obligations and requiring third parties to use diplomatic, humanitarian or 'other' means to protect populations when states fail to do so. I propose we acknowledge this distance and minimize it through covert action. Embracing the reality that some states cannot intervene due to political constraints entails that we can theorize about other ways to uphold R2P. Moreover, covert action involves a range of means and types of targets and is a flexible option for R2P.