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Having Too Much is the first academic volume devoted to limitarianism: the idea that the use of economic or ecosystem resources should not exceed certain limits.

This concept has deep roots in economic and political thought. One can find similar statements of such limits in thinkers such as Plato, Aquinas, and Spinoza. But Having Too Much is the first time in contemporary political philosophy that limitarianism is explored at length and in detail.

Bringing together in one place the best writing from key theorists of limitarianism, this book is an essential contribution to political philosophy in general, and theories of distributive justice in particular. Including some of the key published articles as well as new chapters, Having Too Much is necessary reading for scholars and students of political theory and philosophy, as well as anyone interested in questions of distributive justice.

This paper provides a defence of a lifetime limit on how much a person can receive in the form of gifts and inheritances, that is, a person's accessions. I argue that any accessions above that limit should be taxed at a rate of 100%. The analysis shows how this proposal can bring into equilibrium the core values and other goals at stake in the design of taxation on inheritances and gifts. To counter the low level of support for inheritance taxation in general, the analysis must include a proposal concerning what will be done with the tax revenues. I propose turning the accession tax revenues into an unconditional citizen's stake that is granted to young adults. Such an institutional design would create additional value by reducing unfair inequalities between age groups.

This article discusses 'limitarianism', which in its most general formulation is the idea that in the world as it is, no one should have more than a certain upper limit of valuable goods, in particular, income and wealth. What, if anything, does 'limitarianism' add to normative political philosophy? In Section I, I describe the context in which limitarianism has been introduced. Section II will provide a more detailed statement about limitarianism, including some more recent contributions to and developments in the literature. In the next two sections, I discuss egalitarianism (Section III) and sufficientarianism (Section IV) and ask whether they can do what I envision to be the task of limitarianism. Section V argues that within theories of distributive justice, limitarianism is best seen as part of a pluralist account. This is illustrated by sketching the proposal of a pluralist account combining sufficientarianism, opportunity egalitarianism, and limitarianism. Section VI concludes by pulling everything together, and will give an answer to the question of what limitarianism contributes to normative political philosophy.

This paper proposes a view, called limitarianism, which suggests that there should be upper limits to the amount of income and wealth a person can hold. One argument for limitarianism is that superriches can undermine political equality. The other reason is that it would be better if the surplus money that superrich households have were to be used to meet unmet urgent needs and local and global collective action problems. A particular urgent case of the latter is climate change. The paper discusses one objection to limitarianism, and draws some conclusions for society, as well as for the human development paradigm and the capability approach.

"Notions such as wellbeing, freedom, and social justice are integral to evaluating social progress and developing policies. One increasingly influential way to think about these concepts is the capability approach, a theoretical framework which was pioneered by the philosopher and economist Amartya Sen in the 1980s. In this book Ingrid Robeyns orientates readers new to the capability approach through offering an explanation of this framework. Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice also endeavors to resolve historical disputes in the literature and thus will be equally engaging to those familiar with the field. The author offers a novel and illuminating account of how the capability approach can be understood in a variety of academic disciplines and fields of application. Special attention is paid to clarifying misunderstandings that have been caused by different disciplinary assumptions and the interpretive consequences they have for our consideration of the capability approach. Robeyns argues that respecting the distinction between the general capability approach, and more specific capability theories or applications, helps to clear up confusion and misinterpretation. In addition, the author presents detailed analyses of well-known objections to the capability approach, and also discusses how it relates to other schools of analysis such as theories of justice, human rights, basic needs, and the human development approach. Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice offers an original and comprehensive account of the field. The book will appeal to scholars of the capability approach as well as new readers looking for an interdisciplinary introduction."