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Abstract EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the risks related to a possible reduction of the waiting period after rabies antibody titration test to 30?days compared with 90?days of the current EU legislation, for dogs moving from certain non-EU countries to the EU. This Scientific Report assessed the probability of introduction of rabies into the EU through commercial and non-commercial movements of vaccinated dogs with a positive titration test (≥ 0.5?IU/mL) if the waiting period decreases from 90 to 30?days. Assuming that all the legal requirements are complied with, the risk of transmission of rabies through the movement of a vaccinated dog is related to the risk of introducing an animal incubating rabies that was infected before the day of vaccination or shortly after vaccination but before the development of immunity (21?days post-vaccination). Using published data on the incubation period for experimental and field cases in dogs and considering the rabies incidence data in certain countries, the aggregated probability for the annual introduction of rabies through dogs was assessed. Considering the uncertainty related to the duration of the incubation period, the number of imported dogs, and the disease incidence in some countries it was concluded with a 95% certainty that the maximum number of rabies-infected imported dogs complying with the regulations in a 20-year period could increase from 5 to 20 when decreasing the waiting period from 90 to 30?days. Nevertheless, the potential impact of even a small increase in probability means the risk is increased for a region like the EU where rabies has long been a focus for eradication, to protect human and animal health.

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for peste des petits ruminants (PPR). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. The monitoring period of 21 days was assessed as effective, except for the first affected establishments detected, where 33 days is recommended. It was concluded that beyond the protection (3 km) and the surveillance zones (10 km) only 9.6% (95% CI: 3.1–25.8%) and 2.3% (95% CI: 1–5.5%) of the infections from an affected establishment may occur, respectively. This may be considered sufficient to contain the disease spread (95% probability of containing transmission corresponds to 5.3 km). Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad-hoc requests in relation to PPR.

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW). ; The AGRI committee of the European Parliament requested EFSA to assess the welfare of rabbits farmed in different production systems, including organic production, and to update its 2005 scientific opinion about the health and welfare of rabbits kept for meat production. Considering reproducing does, kits and growing rabbits, this scientific opinion focusses on six different housing systems, namely conventional cages, structurally enriched cages, elevated pens, floor pens, outdoor/partially outdoor systems and organic systems. To compare the level of welfare in the different housing systems and rabbit categories, welfare impact scores for 20 welfare consequences identified from the literature were calculated, taking their occurrence, duration and severity into account. Based on the overall welfare impact score (sum of scores for the single welfare consequences), obtained via a 2‐step expert knowledge elicitation process, the welfare of reproducing does is likely (certainty 66–90%) to be lower in conventional cages compared to the five other housing systems. In addition, it is likely to extremely likely (certainty 66–99%) that the welfare of kits is lower in outdoor systems compared to the other systems and that the welfare is higher in elevated pens than in the other systems. Finally, it is likely to extremely likely (certainty 66–99%) that the welfare of growing rabbits is lower in conventional cages compared to the other systems and that the welfare is higher in elevated pens than in the other systems. Ranking of the welfare consequences allowed an analysis of the main welfare consequences within each system and rabbit category. It was concluded that for reproducing does, as well as growing rabbits, welfare consequences related to behavioural restrictions were more prominent in conventional cages, elevated pens and enriched cages, whereas those related to health problems were more important in floor pens, outdoor and organic systems. Housing in organic rabbit farming is diverse, which can result in different welfare consequences, but the overall welfare impact scores suggest that welfare in organic systems is generally good. ; Peer reviewed

This opinion on the killing of rabbits for human consumption ('slaughtering') responds to two mandates: one from the European Parliament (EP) and the other from the European Commission. The opinion describes stunning methods for rabbits known to the experts in the EFSA working group, which can be used in commercial practice, and which are sufficiently described in scientific and technical literature for the development of an opinion. These are electrical stunning, mechanical stunning with a penetrative and non‐penetrative captive bolt and gas stunning. The latter method is not allowed in the EU anymore following Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, but may still be practiced elsewhere in the world. Related hazards and welfare consequences are also evaluated. To monitor stunning effectiveness as requested by the EP mandate, the opinion suggests the use of indicators for the state of consciousness, selected on the basis of their sensitivity, specificity and ease of use. Similarly, it suggests indicators to confirm animals are dead before dressing. For the European Commission mandate, slaughter processes were assessed from the arrival of rabbits in containers until their death, and grouped in three main phases: pre‐stunning (including arrival, unloading of containers from the truck, lairage, handling/removing of rabbits from containers), stunning (including restraint) and bleeding (including bleeding following stunning and bleeding during slaughter without stunning). Ten welfare consequences resulting from the hazards that rabbits can be exposed to during slaughter are identified: consciousness, animal not dead, thermal stress (heat or cold stress), prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, restriction of movements, pain, fear, distress and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal‐based measures (indicators) are described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, indicators, origins, preventive and corrective measures are developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are also proposed.

This opinion on the killing of rabbits for human consumption ('slaughtering') responds to two mandates: one from the European Parliament (EP) and the other from the European Commission. The opinion describes stunning methods for rabbits known to the experts in the EFSA working group, which can be used in commercial practice, and which are sufficiently described in scientific and technical literature for the development of an opinion. These are electrical stunning, mechanical stunning with a penetrative and non‐penetrative captive bolt and gas stunning. The latter method is not allowed in the EU anymore following Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, but may still be practiced elsewhere in the world. Related hazards and welfare consequences are also evaluated. To monitor stunning effectiveness as requested by the EP mandate, the opinion suggests the use of indicators for the state of consciousness, selected on the basis of their sensitivity, specificity and ease of use. Similarly, it suggests indicators to confirm animals are dead before dressing. For the European Commission mandate, slaughter processes were assessed from the arrival of rabbits in containers until their death, and grouped in three main phases: pre‐stunning (including arrival, unloading of containers from the truck, lairage, handling/removing of rabbits from containers), stunning (including restraint) and bleeding (including bleeding following stunning and bleeding during slaughter without stunning). Ten welfare consequences resulting from the hazards that rabbits can be exposed to during slaughter are identified: consciousness, animal not dead, thermal stress (heat or cold stress), prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, restriction of movements, pain, fear, distress and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal‐based measures (indicators) are described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, indicators, origins, preventive and corrective measures are developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise ...

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW). ; This opinion on the killing of rabbits for human consumption ('slaughtering') responds to two mandates: one from the European Parliament (EP) and the other from the European Commission. The opinion describes stunning methods for rabbits known to the experts in the EFSA working group, which can be used in commercial practice, and which are sufficiently described in scientific and technical literature for the development of an opinion. These are electrical stunning, mechanical stunning with a penetrative and non‐penetrative captive bolt and gas stunning. The latter method is not allowed in the EU anymore following Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009, but may still be practiced elsewhere in the world. Related hazards and welfare consequences are also evaluated. To monitor stunning effectiveness as requested by the EP mandate, the opinion suggests the use of indicators for the state of consciousness, selected on the basis of their sensitivity, specificity and ease of use. Similarly, it suggests indicators to confirm animals are dead before dressing. For the European Commission mandate, slaughter processes were assessed from the arrival of rabbits in containers until their death, and grouped in three main phases: pre‐stunning (including arrival, unloading of containers from the truck, lairage, handling/removing of rabbits from containers), stunning (including restraint) and bleeding (including bleeding following stunning and bleeding during slaughter without stunning). Ten welfare consequences resulting from the hazards that rabbits can be exposed to during slaughter are identified: consciousness, animal not dead, thermal stress (heat or cold stress), prolonged thirst, prolonged hunger, restriction of movements, pain, fear, distress and respiratory distress. Welfare consequences and relevant animal‐based measures (indicators) are described. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, indicators, origins, preventive and corrective measures are developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences are also proposed. ; Peer reviewed

This opinion describes outdoor farming of pigs in the EU, assesses the risk of African swine fewer (ASF) introduction and spread associated with outdoor pig farms and proposes biosecurity and control measures for outdoor pig farms in ASF‐affected areas of the EU. Evidence was collected from Member States (MSs) veterinary authorities, farmers' associations, literature and legislative documents. An Expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) was carried out to group outdoor pig farms according to their risk of introduction and spread of ASF, to rank biosecurity measures regarding their effectiveness with regard to ASF and propose improvements of biosecurity for outdoor pig farming and accompanying control measures. Outdoor pig farming is common and various farm types are present throughout the EU. As there is no legislation at European level for categorising outdoor pig farms in the EU, information is limited, not harmonised and needs to be interpreted with care. The baseline risk of outdoor pig farms for ASFV introduction and its spread is high but with considerable uncertainty. The Panel is 66–90% certain that, if single solid or double fences were fully and properly implemented on all outdoor pig farms in areas of the EU where ASF is present in wild boar and in domestic pigs in indoor farms and outdoor farms (worst case scenario not considering different restriction zones or particular situations), without requiring any other outdoor‐specific biosecurity measures or control measures, this would reduce the number of new ASF outbreaks occurring in these farms within a year by more than 50% compared to the baseline risk. The Panel concludes that the regular implementation of independent and objective on‐farm biosecurity assessments using comprehensive standard protocols and approving outdoor pig farms on the basis of their biosecurity risk in an official system managed by competent authorities will further reduce the risk of ASF introduction and spread related to outdoor pig farms.

This opinion describes outdoor farming of pigs in the EU, assesses the risk of African swine fewer (ASF) introduction and spread associated with outdoor pig farms and proposes biosecurity and control measures for outdoor pig farms in ASF-affected areas of the EU. Evidence was collected from Member States (MSs) veterinary authorities, farmers' associations, literature and legislative documents. An Expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) was carried out to group outdoor pig farms according to their risk of introduction and spread of ASF, to rank biosecurity measures regarding their effectiveness with regard to ASF and propose improvements of biosecurity for outdoor pig farming and accompanying control measures. Outdoor pig farming is common and various farm types are present throughout the EU. As there is no legislation at European level for categorising outdoor pig farms in the EU, information is limited, not harmonised and needs to be interpreted with care. The baseline risk of outdoor pig farms for ASFV introduction and its spread is high but with considerable uncertainty. The Panel is 66-90% certain that, if single solid or double fences were fully and properly implemented on all outdoor pig farms in areas of the EU where ASF is present in wild boar and in domestic pigs in indoor farms and outdoor farms (worst case scenario not considering different restriction zones or particular situations), without requiring any other outdoor-specific biosecurity measures or control measures, this would reduce the number of new ASF outbreaks occurring in these farms within a year by more than 50% compared to the baseline risk. The Panel concludes that the regular implementation of independent and objective on-farm biosecurity assessments using comprehensive standard protocols and approving outdoor pig farms on the basis of their biosecurity risk in an official system managed by competent authorities will further reduce the risk of ASF introduction and spread related to outdoor pig farms. (C) 2021 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.