Suchergebnisse

Assuming that there is not terminological or conceptual impediment to call social and economic rights "human rights", this paper argues that social and economic human rights are normatively different from classical civil and political human rights, and that this may have some significant institutional implications. Following mainstream opinion, I presuppose that both classical liberal rights and socioeconomic human rights are bundles of negative and positive "incidents" (concrete rights). My first claim is that in both cases negative incidents can plausibly be constructed as "deontological constraints." That means that such constraints must be observed even if infringing them could maximize the satisfaction of the interests those rights seek to preserve. My second claim is that, contrary to classical human rights, the fulfillment of the negative incidents of socioeconomic rights, albeit necessary, does not represent a significant contribution to their fulfillment. Since in the case of socioeconomic human rights positive incidents play such crucial role, there is a relevant asymmetry between classical and socioeconomic human rights. The paper concludes by showing some institutional implications of this asymmetry.

El trabajo discute la justificación moral del uso de drones (aviones militares no tripulados) en conflictos armados, tanto desde el punto de vista de la moralidad profunda de la guerra como desde el punto de vista de cuál es la regulación jurídica moralmente justificable. Desde la óptica de la moralidad profunda, argumento que no es posible dar un veredicto general acerca de la permisión o prohibición moral del uso de drones. Desde la óptica de las convenciones jurídicas para regular los conflictos armados, sostengo que la posición más razonable es la de una permisión fuertemente regulada, más que una prohibición absoluta. ; This paper addresses the moral justification of the use of drones (military unmanned aerial vehicles) in armed conflicts, both from the point of view of the deep morality of war and of morally sound conventions of war. From the perspective of deep morality, I argue that no general verdict about the moral permission or prohibition of drones is possible. From the perspective of the legal conventions of armed conflicts, I defend that the most reasonable position is a strongly regulated permission, rather than a blanket prohibition. ; Fil: Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina