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Abstract
Over the past few years, a significant global debate has developed over the classification of workers in the sharing economy either as independent contractors or as employees. While Uber and Lyft have dominated the spotlight lately, the worker classification debates extend beyond ridesharing companies and affect workers across a variety of sectors. Classification of a worker as an employee, rather than an independent contractor, can carry a range of implications for worker treatment and protections under labor law, anti-discrimination law, tort law, and tax law, depending on the legal jurisdiction. The debates, at least in the United States, have been incomplete due to the failure of policy makers and advocates to consider the scope and interconnectedness of the worker classification issues across the full sweep of legal arenas. There is time, however, to remedy the incompleteness of these policy conversations before worker classification decisions ossify and path dependence takes hold.
Two interacting forces create the most serious risk for inadequate policy formulation: (1) silos among legal experts, and (2) first-mover effects. Both of these factors, silo and first mover, emerge in sharing economy debates in the United States. Tax experts and other legal specialists operate in distinct silos leading to a misunderstanding by non-tax analysts of the tax ramifications of worker classification, and to an under appreciation on the part of tax experts of the potential influence of "modest" tax rule changes on worker classification generally. The risks of such misunderstandings can be amplified by first-mover efforts, such as: (1) platforms' contractual designation of workers as independent contractors to bolster a claim of nonemployer/nonemployee status; (2) platforms' support for proposed tax legislation that would "clarify" the status of sharing workers as independent contractors for tax purposes if they satisfy a multiple-prong (relatively easy) safe harbor test; and (3) sharing economy worker litigation to secure employee status.
This Article identifies the incompleteness in the worker classification debates and argues for the active formulation of policy through a process that looks beyond individual fields. A more complete conversation requires analytical engagement across multiple fields and recognition of the de facto power of reform in one arena to influence others. Moreover, it is by no means clear that just because tax might arrive at the legislative drawing table first (due to first mover effects), that it should drive or shape the broader worker classification debate.

Over the past few years, a significant global debate has developed over the classification of workers in the sharing economy either as independent contractors or as employees. While Uber and Lyft have dominated the spotlight lately, the worker classification debates extend beyond ridesharing companies and affect workers across a variety of sectors. Classification of a worker as an employee, rather than an independent contractor, can carry a range of implications for worker treatment and protections under labor law, anti-discrimination law, tort law, and tax law, depending on the legal jurisdiction. The debates, at least in the United States, have been incomplete due to the failure of policy makers and advocates to consider the scope and interconnectedness of the worker classification issues across the full sweep of legal arenas. There is time, however, to remedy the incompleteness of these policy conversations before worker classification decisions ossify and path dependence takes hold. Two interacting forces create the most serious risk for inadequate policy formulation: (1) silos among legal experts, and (2) first-mover effects. Both of these factors, silo and first mover, emerge in sharing economy debates in the United States. Tax experts and other legal specialists operate in distinct silos leading to a misunderstanding by non-tax analysts of the tax ramifications of worker classification, and to an under appreciation on the part of tax experts of the potential influence of "modest" tax rule changes on worker classification generally. The risks of such misunderstandings can be amplified by first-mover efforts, such as: (1) platforms' contractual designation of workers as independent contractors to bolster a claim of nonemployer/nonemployee status; (2) platforms' support for proposed tax legislation that would "clarify" the status of sharing workers as independent contractors for tax purposes if they satisfy a multiple-prong (relatively easy) safe harbor test; and (3) sharing economy worker litigation to secure employee status. This Article identifies the incompleteness in the worker classification debates and argues for the active formulation of policy through a process that looks beyond individual fields. A more complete conversation requires analytical engagement across multiple fields and recognition of the de facto power of reform in one arena to influence others. Moreover, it is by no means clear that just because tax might arrive at the legislative drawing table first (due to first mover effects), that it should drive or shape the broader worker classification debate.

Without a stable and adequate tax base, countries lose the financial capacity to provide the infrastructure, social services and development opportunities important to their citizens. In response, the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) organized the project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). Much of the project has been focused on substantive law — the rules and practices that can allow the tax base of a country to be eroded and profits to be shifted out of the country. But the project recognizes that improved substantive tax rules alone are not sufficient to guarantee the tax base of a country. Without adequate transparency and disclosure of tax information to the taxing authorities, even the most carefully designed substantive tax rules will fail to protect the base. This chapter explores both the existing mechanisms for transparency and disclosure, and the new developments including country-by-country reporting, automatic exchange of information, beneficial ownership registries, and government exchanges. The primary focus of the analysis is understanding how these various regimes may impact developing countries.

Over the past two and a half years, the international tax community has focused on the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (BEPS project) undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at the behest of the G20. According to the OECD, the resulting 2015 agreement involved the direct participation of more than sixty countries. An additional fifty-nine countries indirectly participated through regional dialogues. Furthermore, numerous international organizations are credited with participating in discussions and contributing to the resulting product. But effective implementation of the BEPS agreement requires domestic action of various types — the domestic side of international agreement. This article makes three points regarding the pivotal domestic side of international tax agreements such as the BEPS project: (1) domestic-level compliance cannot be presumed simply from the existence of some degree of international agreement; (2) international agreements may be stymied on the domestic front for five major reasons; and (3) the BEPS project — which contains multiple issues, types of commitments, and players — presents numerous dimensions on which strategic conduct can be pursued, consistent with a two-level game theory model of international relations. Emphasizing the reality of domestic derailments of international tax agreements, Part I introduces the prominent and recent U.S. domestic failure to secure ratification of U.S. tax treaties to provide a rich sense of the complicated political forces at play on the domestic side when bilateral tax treaties are signed. Part II provides a preliminary review of the international relations literature regarding international cooperation. Part III looks to some of the theoretical work reviewed in Part II to offer preliminary thoughts on a framework for understanding the intersection of international tax and domestic politics. In light of the increasing role that global cooperation and coordination play in the development of successful international tax policy and practice, the article concludes by considering subsequent research steps that could illuminate the domestic side of international agreements.

Who makes international tax policy in today's world? Certainly no single body possesses that power - there is no global tax authority, and states are not capable of achieving all of their international tax policy goals on a unilateral basis. The development of international tax policy is an interactive and dynamic process that involves a wide range of players, most of whom can be characterized as international organizations. Their roles, goals, tools and influence vary by organization and by issue, but their net impact on tax policy is undeniable. If we are to better understand how tax policy is formed, we must examine the role of these organizations. Although the power of international organizations has received significant attention outside the tax field, less attention has been devoted to these mechanisms in tax policy. This article joins a dialogue that seeks to bring the same depth of analysis to the study of international tax policy. Specifically, this article contends that international organizations play different and complex roles in shaping tax policy. First, this article establishes four empirical dimensions along which each relevant organization should be examined. Second, this article moves the analysis to the next level of inquiry by articulating ways to capture the dynamic interactions among these players as they participate in shaping international tax policy. Two case studies provide an initial opportunity to assess those interactions. Finally, the paper offers some preliminary observations about certain types of international organizations and their particular role in tax policy.

This paper considers the question of how sovereignty shapes arguments over the merits of tax competition and how sovereignty influences the design of responses to tax competition. Part I provides a basic overview of sovereignty concepts, in particular their relevance to a nation-state desirous of control over tax policy. Part II defines tax competition, identifies the different kinds of states involved, reviews the emergence of the OECD project to limit harmful tax competition, and traces the EU experience with tax competition. Part III explores the normative grounds for challenging tax competition and the role of sovereignty in shaping and limiting these challenges. Finally, Part IV, working from the practical and theoretical baselines established in Part III, considers how an appreciation of sovereignty claims can facilitate the design of plausible cooperation strategies for states trying to limit tax competition.

The international tax problems of today are typically beyond the scope of a single nation to solve. However, the prospect of multinational problem solving, often under the auspices of an international organization, unleashes objections grounded in sovereignty. Despite widespread reliance on sovereignty arguments, little attention has been directed at what precisely is meant by sovereignty and what place it has in international tax policy. This article contends that a loss of sovereignty undermines both significant functional roles played by a nation-state (revenue and fiscal policy) and important normative governance values (accountability and democratic legitimacy). Whether these limitations are severe enough to demand that a sovereign state recall its taxing powers from an international body (or not surrender them initially) depends on the nature of the powers in question and the necessity for a coordinated global response. Part I develops the basic nexus between sovereignty and taxation. Part II examines the use of sovereignty in the debates and analyses surrounding three international tax case studies. Drawing upon the case studies, Part III considers how sovereignty claims are manipulated in tax debates, how states think about sovereignty in taxation, and what their decisions, in turn, suggest about the future of international tax and the prospects for international cooperation.

From the introduction: Governments rely heavily on taxes to fund their operations. If the business transactions subject to tax are entirely domestic, a country wields considerable power to implement a tax system and collect the designated taxes. But if the transactions cross national borders, who taxes them? Whose rules apply? And, perhaps most important, what happens when countries disagree? Who "prevails" and why? These are serious, critical, and relevant questions for which there are few answers. The dominant focus of international tax literature has been an analysis of substantive tax law and its implications. Receiving much less attention is how countries have come to agree on particular tax rules and practices-the international relations of international tax.

This Commentary examines three issues raised in Professor Thomas D. Griffith's Article on the connection between progressive taxation and subjective well-being, focusing on the selection of happiness as the measure of the gains of redistribution, the ability to measure happiness or subjective well-being, and the implications of using happiness analysis in determining tax policy. After arguing that the progressive taxation debate would benefit from further exploration of why happiness is the appropriate measure of success, this Commentary raises concerns about relying on self-reporting of subjective well-being and how happiness studies should be interpreted and can be improved. Finally, this Commentary notes that studies of income and happiness may inform tax policy design by helping to determine the appropriate balance between taxes and expenditures, outlining a role for the government in informing taxpayers' perceptions of happiness, and focusing additional research necessary for an effective progressive taxation policy.

From the introduction: The past decade has been a tumultuous and energized period in the study of administrative law and regulatory regimes. Debate continues over both positive and normative theories of the administrative state, as well as over the appropriate directions of innovation and "reinvention. Among legislators and the public, the tax system and the Internal Revenue Service have been targets for criticism. This paper outlines a receQt procedural innovation in the tax area, the Advance Pricing Agreement Program ("APA" program), and evaluates its success. Such a case study can play a significant role in linking procedural innovation to the broader issues of administrative law theory and regulatory reform. For example, a working model such as the APA program, built on flexibility and creativity, may support administrative theories advocating discretion, flexibility, and experimentation. Conversely, some interest group theories of regulation (e.g., public choice theory), can prompt critical examination of reforms like APAs that exhibit limited openness to scrutiny. The APA program is an ideal candidate for such analysis because it incorporates multiple factors germane to other fields including cross border transactions, intergovernmental relations, high information costs for regulation, and serious risks to all parties from' uncertainty. Ultimately, detailed understandings of innovations in administrative systems are essential to developing and challenging positive and normative theories of administrative law-and to designing concrete applications of administrative law policy.

The past decade has been a tumultuous and energized period in the study of administrative law and regulatory regimes. Debate continues over both positive and normative theories of the administrative state, as well as over the appropriate directions of innovation and reinvention. Among legislators and the public, the tax system and the IRS have been targets for criticism. This article outlines and evaluates a recent procedural innovation in the tax area, the Advance Pricing Agreement Program, linking procedural innovation to the broader issues of administrative law theory and regulatory reform. Ultimately, detailed understandings of innovations in administrative systems are essential to developing and challenging positive and normative theories of administrative law—and to designing concrete applications of administrative law policy.