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In this paper we propose and analyze a new descriptive model of armed conflicts among N groups. The model is composed of N2 ordinary differential equations, with 3(N2+N) constant parameters that describe military characteristics and recruitment policies, ranging from pure defensivism to pure fanaticism. The results are only preliminary, but point out interesting (though not very surprising) properties: periodic coexistence is possible, and multiple attractors can exist; governmental groups cannot go extinct if they are highly defensivist, and rebels cannot be eradicated if they are highly fanatic. Shocks due to interventions of short duration of an external army can stabilize/destabilize the system and/or eradicate some group, and the same holds true for small structural changes. Other more subtle questions concerning, for example, the existence of chaotic regimes and the systematic evaluation of the role of strategic factors like power, intelligence, and fanaticism, remain open and require further research.

In this paper we propose and analyze a new descriptive model of armed conflicts among N groups. The model is composed of N2 ordinary differential equations, with 3(N2+N) constant parameters that describe military characteristics and recruitment policies, ranging from pure defensivism to pure fanaticism. The results are only preliminary, but point out interesting (though not very surprising) properties: periodic coexistence is possible, and multiple attractors can exist; governmental groups cannot go extinct if they are highly defensivist, and rebels cannot be eradicated if they are highly fanatic. Shocks due to interventions of short duration of an external army can stabilize/destabilize the system and/or eradicate some group, and the same holds true for small structural changes. Other more subtle questions concerning, for example, the existence of chaotic regimes and the systematic evaluation of the role of strategic factors like power, intelligence, and fanaticism, remain open and require further research.

The introduction and analysis of a simple idealized model enables basic insights into how military characteristics and recruitment strategies affect the dynamics of armed conflicts, even in the complex case of three or more fighting groups. In particular, the model shows when never ending wars (stalemates) are possible and how initial conditions and interventions influence a conflict's fate. The analysis points out that defensive recruitment policies aimed at compensating for suffered losses lead to conflicts with simple dynamics, while attack groups sensitive to the damages they inflict onto their enemies can give rise to conflicts with turbulent behaviours. Since non-governmental groups often follow attack strategies, the conclusion is that the evolution of conflicts involving groups of that kind can be expected to be difficult to forecast.

The introduction and analysis of a simple idealized model enables basic insights into how military characteristics and recruitment strategies affect the dynamics of armed conflicts, even in the complex case of three or more fighting groups. In particular, the model shows when never ending wars (stalemates) are possible and how initial conditions and interventions influence a conflict's fate. The analysis points out that defensive recruitment policies aimed at compensating for suffered losses lead to conflicts with simple dynamics, while attack groups sensitive to the damages they inflict onto their enemies can give rise to conflicts with turbulent behaviours. Since non-governmental groups often follow attack strategies, the conclusion is that the evolution of conflicts involving groups of that kind can be expected to be difficult to forecast.

The introduction and analysis of a simple idealized model enables basic insights into how military characteristics and recruitment strategies affect the dynamics of armed conflicts, even in the complex case of three or more fighting groups. In particular, the model shows when never ending wars (stalemates) are possible and how initial conditions and interventions influence a conflict's fate. The analysis points out that defensive recruitment policies aimed at compensating for suffered losses lead to conflicts with simple dynamics, while attack groups sensitive to the damages they inflict onto their enemies can give rise to conflicts with turbulent behaviours. Since non-governmental groups often follow attack strategies, the conclusion is that the evolution of conflicts involving groups of that kind can be expected to be difficult to forecast.

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