Suchergebnisse

Using a newly constructed data set of 443 episodes of legislative bargaining between the president & Congress, we evaluate two game theoretic models of political bargaining: Matthews's coordination model & Ingberman & Yao's commitment model. We empirically test whether political rhetoric (i.e., presidential veto threats) are important in bargaining over public policy in the US between 1946 & 1992. The paper provides empirical insight into presidential power & also addresses some difficult issues in the empirical evaluation of formal models with necessary conditions, sufficient conditions, or no stochastic components. We find that the coordination model does a better job than the commitment model of accounting for the data. 2 Tables, 4 Figures, 1 Appendix, 24 References. Adapted from the source document.

The relationship between unemployment & subjective well-being in social democratic, conservative, & liberal welfare state regimes is investigated. Three hypotheses are tested: (1) Citizens in social democratic regimes perceive unemployment as less threatening than in liberal & conservative regimes. (2) Citizens in social democratic governments demonstrate greater support for state intervention against unemployment. 3) Unemployment will affect citizens' subjective well-being less in social democratic regimes. National & international data, 1972-1996, somewhat support hypotheses 2 & 3; however, no evidence was discovered to support hypothesis 1. It is concluded that the microfoundations of welfare state regime typologies, particularly that introduced by Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990), are problematized by the study's results; consequently, analyses of welfare state regimes should privilege public views, attitudes, & behavior. 7 Tables, 2 Figures, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.