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"Dimensions of Trade Policy collects the author's significant works on international trade policy over almost 30 years of publishing. The articles cover an eclectic range of topics but are grouped into three main areas of concentration — local content protection, the economics of preferential trading areas and the relationship between trade and competition policies — and the book also includes some sui generis topics, such as "fair trade" and "buy local" schemes. An introduction ties the chapters together and indicates their relevance to contemporary matters in trade policy."--Publisher's website

Suitable for managers who need guidance on the people management problems they face on a daily basis. This book takes the form of a clinic, where a people manager asks an experienced management consultant how he should approach particular issues and problems

This paper demonstrates that, when countries individually choose whether or not to prohibit parallel imports, a global Nash equilibrium involves the permitting of parallel importing into all relevant foreign markets i.e. global uniform pricing. This result is sensitive in a straightforward way to the tariff-setting powers of countries and to the specification of a government's objective function (i.e. political economy considerations). We also show that when countries can prevent 'parallel exports' then any Nash equilibrium involves global price discrimination.

This paper demonstrates that, when countries individually choose whether or not to prohibit parallel imports, a global Nash equilibrium involves the permitting of parallel importing into all relevant foreign markets i.e. global uniform pricing. This result is sensitive in a straightforward way to the tariff-setting powers of countries and to the specification of a government's objective function (i.e. political economy considerations). We also show that when countries can prevent 'parallel exports' then any Nash equilibrium involves global price discrimination.

This paper considers the choice between a customs union (wherein partners share a common external tariff) and a free trade area (wherein each partner chooses its own tariff against non‐members). Following the result that a customs union dominates a free trade area, with coordination of domestic tax policies, we show that a free trade area may nevertheless be chosen if tariffs are determined endogenously through industry lobbying. This is so even when the free trade area equates producer prices within its borders and induces tariff revenue competition and whether or not there is domestic free‐riding in lobbying.