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This article defines two new solution concepts for non-sidepayment games - the λ-transfer nucleolus and the λ-transfer disruption value - and reports the results of an experiment testing their predictive accuracy against that of a third solution concept, the well-known λ-transfer value (Shapley, 1969). The test was based on data from a laboratory experiment utilizing five-person, two-choice games that were constant-sum in normal form. Goodness-of-fit results show that the λ-transfer value and the λ-transfer disruption value were about equally accurate in predicting the observed payoffs to players in these games; both of these solutions were more accurate than the λ-transfer nucleolus.

An investigation of theories of payoff allocation in cooperative non-side-payment games -- ie, games where players can form coalitions & coordinate strategies but cannot redistribute payoffs via side-payments. A laboratory experiment consisting of 4-person, 3-strategy games (N = 128 Coll students) was used to ascertain which characteristic function, Va(S) or Vb(S), provides the more accurate basis for payoff predictions from solution concepts. Predictions from each of 3 solution concepts (core, stable set, imputation set) were computed on the basis of both functions, making a total of 6 theories under test. Results show that, for each of the 3 solutions, the prediction computed on the basis of Vb(S) was more accurate than the prediction computed from Va(S), & the b-core was the most accurate of the six theories tested. 15 Tables, 1 Appendix, 29 References. Modified HA