Suchergebnisse

Purpose
This paper attempts to analyze the relationship between the complementarity degrees of imperfect complementary products and sales strategies and give appropriate sales strategies for a two-stage supply chain.


Design/methodology/approach
With respect to two-stage supply chain consisting of two manufacturers who produce imperfect complementary products and one retailer who sells the products, aiming at bundling sales strategy, the authors define complementarity elasticity of products and use it to measure the degree of complementary between two products. Based on Stackelberg game and cooperation, the authors analyze the relationship between the complementarity degrees of imperfect complementary products and appropriate sales strategies.


Findings
As the impact of complementarity degree on sales strategy decision-making is better, the authors can pinpoint out which sales decision-making is optimal and which bundling sales strategy is the best for a two-stage supply chain. Considering that the degree of complementarity has a significant impact on the product sales strategy, the authors can point out which sales decision-making is optimal, that is, which bundled sales strategy is the optimal in the secondary supply chain of selling complementary products.


Practical implications
An innovative bundling can expand the sales of existing products and new products. It helps a retailer transcend and defeat competitors by reducing marketing expenses while increasing profits. Proper use of bundling can improve consumers utility and create an overall positive effect for both the enterprises and consumer.


Originality/value
The research can help some retailers to make many appropriate bundling sales strategies.

Purpose
This paper aims to deal with the coordination problem of the supply chain through cost sharing of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and government subsidy.


Design/methodology/approach
With respect to the coordination problem of the supply chain with CSR, this paper constructs a three-stage game model consisting of a dominant retailer, n suppliers and government. From the perspective of cost sharing and government subsidies, this paper discussed the decentralized and centralized decision-making, respectively. On this basis, this paper designed a coordination mechanism considering both cost sharing and government subsidies and explore the impact of cost sharing rate and government subsidy rate on CSR efforts, members' profits and social welfare.


Findings
CSR can improve the profits of supply chain members and the overall performance of the supply chain. Then the profits of supply chain nodal enterprises will be affected by the fulfillment level of CSR of their partners. Furthermore, excessive CSR will erode the supply chain profits and cause resource waste. High CSR costs often make retailers low CSR effort level, while a high CSR cost sharing rate can reduce the profits of suppliers and the supply chain. In addition, excessive government subsidies will lead to the decline of social welfare. Excessive government subsidies will cause the dependence of enterprises and affect their operating efficiency.


Practical implications
The proposed coordination mechanism can effectively do with the coordination problem of the supply chain.


Originality/value
The proposed coordination mechanism considering cost sharing and government subsidies simultaneously can effectively deal with conflict problems and guarantee the supply chain members and the supply chain to maximize their profits and social welfare.