Suchergebnisse

Ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed, the probability of conflict goes to zero. However, conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender's reservation value. I employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power-centric theories of world politics, balance of power, and power transition theory. The formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity, information asymmetries are greatest, thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict. Uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities. Recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and the uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power-centric explanations of world politics.

The pacifying effect of economic interdependence on conflict onset can be better understood in the context of "noisy" bargaining. Specifically, trading states bargain under less noisy conditions and, as a result, are unlikely to engage in militarized conflict. Noise is introduced into a generic take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game in the form of nonspecific asymmetric information about the defender's reservation value. Comparative statics show a positive monotonic relationship between variance in the noise term and the onset of militarized conflict. The relationships among economic interdependence, variance in the noise term, and conflict onset are evaluated with a Bayesian heteroskedastic probit model. Historical data are used to demonstrate that interdependence and uncertainty are related to each other and jointly related to the onset of militarized conflict. Uncertainty appears to be reduced by economic interdependence, and this leads to an enhanced probability of agreement short of a militarized clash.

Studies of the relationship between the distribution of
power and prospects for conflict or cooperation have a
distinguished history in the field of international politics.
Several competing theories have been offered to explain
variation in foreign policy behavior as a function of power
distributions. Moreover, a wealth of empirical evidence
suggests the crucial role that power plays in international
bargaining. The Origins of Major War is a deeply penetrat-
ing, extraordinarily wide-ranging, and judicious treatment
of the onset of major conflict, and it offers an explanation
and some evidence for the relationship between power
differentials and major power conflict. Copeland provides
a dynamic theory of major power war, building upon
classic realism. In my view, his diagnosis and combination
of prescription are substantially correct.