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Abstract
This paper discusses some of the intertemporal political economy issues that arise in the pursuit of real undervaluation to achieve more rapid development. Policy makers face a trade-off between achieving a capital stock target in a given amount of time on the one hand and boosting real wages in the short-run, on the other. This generates a trilemma whereby development-focused policy makers can choose to pursue two out of three desirables: (1) use the real exchange rate as an instrument of development policy, (2) meet the development target within a politically relevant time frame, and (3) maintain political stability. The optimal path under a policy with "unambitious" aims will resemble the typical electoral business cycle trajectory whereby policy makers maintain real overvaluation over much of the cycle. By contrast, achieving ambitious capital stock/development targets within a relatively short time requires the potentially unpopular strategy of choosing a highly undervalued real exchange rate at the beginning of the planning horizon and gradually increasing the degree of undervaluation thereafter as wages rise. Relevant structural differences between countries imply different initial levels of real undervaluation, distinct optimal trajectories over time, and hence, varying degrees of trade-offs.

Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) has recently received significant attention in academic and policy circles. Critics question the sustainability of MMT-prescribed approaches to fiscal and monetary policy, especially over extended periods of time, in the presence of international financial markets, and for developing country governments that borrow in foreign currency. I formalize some of these arguments using a dynamic, open economy, Tobin-Markowitz portfolio balance environment that takes into account: (1) the role of expectations in the foreign exchange market and the feedback mechanisms between these and the exchange rate and inflation, and (2) interactions between the current account, debt accumulation, and the goods market. I show that continuous monetary accommodation of fiscal policy by a consolidated authority that targets low interest rates is likely to generate instability and make it hard to maintain full employment with stable inflation. Importantly, this is true even in the absence of rational forward-looking expectations or sovereign foreign indebtedness.

AbstractI develop the implications for capital accumulation, the trade balance, and real exchange rate cycles of different policy preferences, focusing in particular on broad stylized features of major Latin American and East Asian economies. Recent development literature has renewed interest in real exchange rate policy and the desirability of avoiding overvaluations. Political science literature, on the other hand, has emphasized the role of factors such as the influence of the manufacturing sector and the nature of the work force in shaping exchange rate policy. I formalize and relate some of these insights in a simple, dynamic, developing country framework with policy makers who intertemporally optimize and voters/audiences that are myopic. Given the choice between assigning greater weight to: (1) raising immediate worker purchasing power or (2) generating wage increases and manufacturing employmentover time, I show that developing countries where policy makers choose the former are more likely to experience cycles with overvaluation, trade deficits, and abrupt (postponed) devaluations. Moreover, these cyclical differences may help explain differences in structural evolution over longer periods of time.

This paper discusses some of the inter-temporal issues that arise in the pursuit of real undervaluation to achieve rapid development. Policy makers face a trade-off between achieving a capital stock target in a given amount of time on the one hand and boosting real wages and output in the short run, on the other. This generates a trilemma whereby development-focused policy makers can choose to pursue two out of three desirables: (1) use the real exchange rate as an instrument of development policy, (2) meet the development target within a politically relevant time frame, and (3) maintain political stability. The optimal path under a policy with "unambitious" aims will resemble the typical electoral business cycle trajectory whereby policy makers maintain real overvaluation over much of the cycle. By contrast, achieving relatively ambitious capital stock targets within a relatively short time requires the potentially unpopular strategy of choosing a highly undervalued real exchange rate at the beginning of the planning horizon and gradually increasing the degree of undervaluation thereafter as wages rise. Relevant structural differences between countries imply different initial levels of real undervaluation, distinct optimal trajectories over time, and hence, varying degrees of political trade-offs.

I develop the implications for real exchange rate cycles of different policy preferences, focusing in particular on broadly stylized features of major Latin American and East Asian economies. Recent political science literature has emphasized the role of factors such as the influence of the manufacturing sector and the nature of labor markets. I formalize some of these insights in a developing country framework with policy makers who inter-temporally optimize and voters/audiences that are incompletely informed. Given the choice between assigning greater weight to immediate worker purchasing power versus generating manufacturing employment and income over time, I show that countries where policy makers choose the former are more likely to experience cycles with overvaluation, current account deficits, and abrupt (postponed) devaluations.

Recent studies have revived interest in the relationship between the exchange rate and economic development. This paper develops a dynamic Ricardian model with a continuum of goods to consider the issue from a different perspective. In the short run, a devaluation can boost profits in spite of real wage rigidity. Moreover, the resulting diversification helps offset the consequences for the trade balance of higher employment and profitability. Over time, and in the presence of learning‐by‐accumulation, the initial boost to investment induced by a devaluation could enable a country to gain a permanent foothold in new sectors at a higher real wage.

Several studies have commented on the emergence of a new international monetary system in the post-Asian crisis years. The current international financial crisis has, however, put Bretton Woods II under considerable strain. This paper analyzes the sustainability of the precrisis order from an emerging country perspective. A simple framework in which agents have a choice between financial and real assets is constructed in order to explore possible consequences of the shocks that emerging economies are currently experiencing. Stock and flow implications are analyzed. Assuming that recent events would have reinforced monetary authorities.desire to maintain an adequate cushion of reserves while preventing exchange rate volatility, we find that the response to most shocks would involve running continuous current account surpluses, that is, a continuation of a crucial aspect of Bretton Woods II. Given political and economic constraints, is such a continuation feasible? A preliminary exploration raises serious doubts and skims alternatives.