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Scholars think that friendly nations adopt secrecy to avoid domestic costs and facilitate cooperation. But this article uncovers a historical puzzle. Between 1870 and 1916, over 80 percent of alliance ties were partially or completely covert. Otherwise, hidden pacts are rare. Why was secrecy prevalent in this particular period and not others? This article presents a theory of "portfolio consistency." Public agreements undermine the rank of hidden alliances. A partner willing to openly commit to another country but not to you signals the increased importance of this other relationship. States pressure their covert partners to avoid subsequent public pacts. This creates a network effect: the more secret partners a state has, the greater the incentives to maintain secrecy in later military agreements. Covert alliances have a cumulative effect. In seeking the flexibility of hidden partnerships, states can lock themselves into a rigid adherence to secrecy.

AbstractOverseas employment provides multiple socioeconomic benefits for families and communities in sending countries. But communal violence can potentially disrupt these flows, causing lasting damage to local and national economic development.Under what conditions does political violence – and particularly low‐intensity sectarian conflict – increase or decrease economic migration?This article argues that the level of militant control over local political and social institutions conditions whether individuals emigrate for work. Using statistical analysis of Pakistani data on overseas employment and political violence, it finds that attacks by transnational/Islamist militants on local political institutions substantially reduce economic migration. Attacks against non‐political targets have no significant effect, further emphasizing the importance of these bodies.

Scholars think that friendly nations adopt secrecy to avoid domestic costs and facilitate cooperation. But this article uncovers a historical puzzle. Between 1870 and 1916, over 80 percent of alliance ties were partially or completely covert. Otherwise, hidden pacts are rare. Why was secrecy prevalent in this particular period and not others? This article presents a theory of "portfolio consistency." Public agreements undermine the rank of hidden alliances. A partner willing to openly commit to another country but not to you signals the increased importance of this other relationship. States pressure their covert partners to avoid subsequent public pacts. This creates a network effect: the more secret partners a state has, the greater the incentives to maintain secrecy in later military agreements. Covert alliances have a cumulative effect. In seeking the flexibility of hidden partnerships, states can lock themselves into a rigid adherence to secrecy.

Just war theorists have had difficulty assessing the moral character of occupations, since they often fail to engage with the broader mechanisms and ethical issues of control and power inherent to that state of conflict. These challenges, however, cut to the heart of many of the just war tradition's assumptions, requiring new conceptualizations of its principles and rules for appropriate conduct. This article takes a first step in that direction, recasting the tradition to encompass a wider view of threat and violence in military occupations, using the Israel—Palestine conflict as an illustrative case.

China rarely evokes images of radical Islam, bus bombings and mosque razings. Yet all of these elements have had a distinct impact on life in China's north-western province, Xinjiang. While the Chinese government has emphasized Islamic extremism and acts of terror to convince international actors that it is confronted with an international terrorist movement, human rights organizations have pointed out the high level of dissatisfaction pervasive among Xinjiang's Uighur population. The desperation among Uighurs in Xinjiang has spawned a significant terrorist movement. Were the numerous grievances of the Uighurs addressed by Beijing, the movement would lose its limited popular support, which is currently on the rise. (Ethnopolitics)

Multinational military exercises are among the most notable demonstrations of military cooperation and intent. On average, one is initiated every 8.9 days. But it has often been argued that joint military exercises (JMEs) increase the risk of war. Using a relational contracting approach, we claim that formal military alliances mediate the effect of JMEs. Exercises and alliances serve complementary functions: The former allows targeted responses to military provocations by adversaries, while the latter provides institutional constraints on partners and establishes a partnership's overall strategic limitations. In combination, alliances dampen the conflict escalation effects of exercises, deterring adversaries while simultaneously restraining partners. We test this theory using a two-stage model on directed dyadic data of JMEs from 1973 through 2003. We find that JMEs in general do not escalate conflict, and that JMEs conducted with allies in particular reduce the probability of conflict escalation.

In support of the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security Statistics, a new federal statistical agency for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, researchers developed a detailed logic model and an organizational design framework.