Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article explores the ability of elected officials to affect the autonomy of state ethics commissions. The author examines autonomy as a function of the capacity of ethics commissions to control their finances and personnel decisions and how the presence or absence of that capacity affects whether bureaucratic structures can function independently of politics. Using data from the 2011 State Integrity Investigation, the analysis extends previous arguments concerning political actors' desire to affect ethics commissions. Findings suggest that elected officials use their positions to control the makeup of commission leadership and financial resources, with the goal of decreasing commissions' ability to act autonomously.

In this article, I examine the effects of the increased transparency and reporting requirements on the decisions of local education agencies (LEAs) to draw down federal dollars allocated to state programs in nonmission areas. Data from LEAs and program expenditures are used to develop a model detailing how transparency impacts the decisions of LEAs in two states in drawing down funds from a federal grant program. Findings suggest that rather than the theoretical expectation that managers act in an anticipatory manner, managers are more concerned with immediate financial needs.