From Vietnam's recent acceptance into the World Trade Organization to its post-Vietnam War reform and socialist ideals, this overview concisely examines the cultural, political, and economic changes currently at work in Vietnam within a historical context and then discusses the effects such changes have had on businessmen and entrepreneurs. Useful for those evaluating potential relationships with Vietnamese businesses or investments in the country's economy, this study explores matters of credit, private enterprise, monetary policy, and the role of globalization.
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In: Asia policy: a peer-reviewed journal devoted to bridging the gap between academic research and policymaking on issues related to the Asia-Pacific, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 185-189
This study focuses on the four stages of Chinese relations with Latin America between 1949 and mid-2008. Ties during the 1950s were limited but directed toward a broad cross-section of individual Latin Americans. This was abruptly reversed during the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 1960s by militant advocacy of guerrilla warfare in Latin America. From the early 1970s until the death of Mao Zedong, militant Maoism was blended with a renewed opening of relations, now to military and civilian Latin governments. The final period began with Deng Xiaoping and his reforms and continues to today. This study focuses on Sino-Latin political and economic relations in general and links to the radical governments of Cuba and Venezuela in particular and weighs the impact of this expansion on Sino-U.S. relations. It concludes with comments on how China's presence may affect political and economic developments in Latin America itself and how to hone productive cooperation among China, the United States, and Latin nations. Adapted from the source document.
This study focuses on the four stages of Chinese relations with Latin America between 1949 and mid‐2008. Ties during the 1950s were limited but directed toward a broad cross‐section of individual Latin Americans. This was abruptly reversed during the Sino‐Soviet dispute of the 1960s by militant advocacy of guerrilla warfare in Latin America. From the early 1970s until the death of Mao Zedong, militant Maoism was blended with a renewed opening of relations, now to military and civilian Latin governments. The final period began with Deng Xiaoping and his reforms and continues to today. This study focuses on Sino‐Latin political and economic relations in general and links to the radical governments of Cuba and Venezuela in particular and weighs the impact of this expansion on Sino‐U.S. relations. It concludes with comments on how China's presence may affect political and economic developments in Latin America itself and how to hone productive cooperation among China, the United States, and Latin nations.
AbstractBy a small majority, Latin Americans are disposed toward preferring democracy over other forms of government, and for now almost all leaders in the region hold office from elections not military coups. Still, most Latin Americans quite correctly do not believe democracy has generally served their interests, that is, produced the jobs, houses, food, justice, and opportunities more and more people tell pollsters they want for themselves and their families. Personal observations and many studies, by the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and others, confirm Latin America's unequaled inequalities and in many respects virtual economic stagnation as far as most people are concerned. The problem is not mainly bad individual leaders or foreign predators, as is often charged, but incompetent governance generally and the inability or refusal of Latins themselves to match their desires with the protracted effort needed to achieve their aspirations. Institutions and paternalistic thinking that go back for centuries persist in adapted forms and today are not only not producing for the majority but dragging Latin America farther and farther behind more successfully reforming countries, particularly in Asia. Latins have it in their power to change things, if they will.
In: The review of policy research: RPR ; the politics and policy of science and technology ; journal of the Science, Technology, and Environmental Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 295-310
By a small majority, Latin Americans are disposed toward preferring democracy over other forms of government, and for now almost all leaders in the region hold office from elections not military coups. Still, most Latin Americans quite correctly do not believe democracy has generally served their interests, that is, produced the jobs, houses, food, justice, and opportunities more and more people tell pollsters they want for themselves and their families. Personal observations and many studies, by the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and others, confirm Latin America's unequaled inequalities and in many respects virtual economic stagnation as far as most people are concerned. The problem is not mainly bad individual leaders or foreign predators, as is often charged, but incompetent governance generally and the inability or refusal of Latins themselves to match their desires with the protracted effort needed to achieve their aspirations. Institutions and paternalistic thinking that go back for centuries persist in adapted forms and today are not only not producing for the majority but dragging Latin America farther and farther behind more successfully reforming countries, particularly in Asia. Latins have it in their power to change things, if they will.
Market reforms began in parts of Asia after WWII & led to macroeconomic policies & governance that brought rapid & fairly evenly shared growth, with an emphasis on promoting capable civil services, community involvement, & good basic education & health. For historical & cultural reasons, reforms began decades later in most of Latin America. To bypass ossified bureaucracies, operating under largely democratic governments with elements of civil societies, Latin American reforms were under strongmen, or caudillos, who undertook macroeconomic reforms through conviction, for expediency, or both. The leaders used teams of technocrats who operated alongside & above preexisting bureaucracies. Reforms began first & went farthest in Chile. After case studies of Chile, Argentina, Peru, Mexico, & Venezuela, it is concluded that Latin American reforms will not really serve their people or be secure until, like the Asian reforms, they stress competent & honest governance, shared growth, & basic education & health. 68 References. Adapted from the source document.
ABSTRACTMost Latin American governments acknowledge the need for substantial judicial reform. This article focuses on three problems in the implementation of justice during the 1990s. The three case studies touch on four countries – Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico and the United States, although the same or similar problems can be found throughout the hemisphere.