Management buy-ins: entrepreneurship, active investors and corporate restructuring
In: Studies in finance
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In: Studies in finance
In: Local government studies, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 127-146
ISSN: 1743-9388
In: Local government studies, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 127-146
ISSN: 0300-3930
In: International journal of human resource management, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 90-111
ISSN: 1466-4399
In: Annals of public and cooperative economics, Band 68, Heft 4, S. 689-711
ISSN: 1467-8292
This paper seeks to extend our understanding of the nature and effects of privatization to the case of Austria, a relatively small economy in which management buy‐outs have been a numerically important but neglected part of the privatization programme. The study reviews the development of privatization in Austria and sets management and employee buy‐outs within this context. The paper identifies 35 privatization buy‐outs, analysing their form and industrial distribution. Evidence from detailed interviews with the 22 largest is used to analyse the effects of buy‐out on corporate change, the role of insiders and performance. Comparisons are made with the UK, where management and employee buy‐outs have also been an important part of the privatization programme.
In: Corporate governance: an international review, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 222-234
ISSN: 1467-8683
This paper examines corporate governance in management buy‐outs and buy‐ins and in particular considers the problems faced by venture capitalists as active investors. Evidence is presented based on large scale surveys and case studies. The study suggests the importance of achieving a balance between the independence of venture capitalists as monitors of management and the need for cooperation in their relationships with managers in buy‐outs and buy‐ins. The study also questions the adequacy with which financiers as active investors have taken account of the differing attributes of each type of transaction, particularly in relation to access to information and the roles of management. The costs of closely monitoring smaller investments may often exceed the benefits, which helps explain why the greater control found in buy‐ins is more likely to be indirect rather than greater board representation. The evidence suggests the need for a flexible approach to governance under which the forms adopted take account of the specific circumstances of a particular enterprise.
In: Oxford review of economic policy, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 58-69
ISSN: 1460-2121
In: Economic affairs: journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 9-13
ISSN: 1468-0270
What is the function of the market for corporate control? Mike Wright and two colleagues outline the advantages of an active market in corporate control and review the consequences of leveraged buyouts.
In: Public money & management: integrating theory and practice in public management, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 59-65
ISSN: 1467-9302
In: Business history, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 137-184
ISSN: 1743-7938
In: Oxford review of economic policy, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 1-82
ISSN: 0266-903X
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