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Realpolitik, the pursuit of vital state interests in a dangerous world that constrains state behavior, is at the heart of realist theory. All realists assume either that states engage in such behavior or, at the very least, are highly incentivized to do so by the structure of the international system. Classical realists remind us, however, that Realpolitik presupposes rational thinking, which should not be taken for granted. Some leaders act more rationally than others because they think more rationally than others. Research in cognitive psychology provides a strong foundation for classical realist claims that Realpolitik requires a commitment to objectivity and deliberation, a particular psychology that few leaders exhibit. A case study of Otto von Bismarck's role in German reunification demonstrates that rationality is the exception, rather than the norm. Even though Prussia was under enormous structural constraints that should have incentivized Realpolitik, the man who would become the Iron Chancellor was isolated because of his foreign policy views. Bismarck consistently disagreed with conservative patrons and allies at home, disagreements that can be reduced largely to his higher degree of rationality.

The Tea Party is a powerful new force in American domestic politics, but little is known about its supporters' views on foreign affairs. New survey data indicates that supporters of the Tea Party exhibit attitudes on international relations consistent with the Jacksonian tradition in American political thought but not, as some have maintained, isolationist opinions of the Jeffersonian variety. Jacksonians are supporters of a strong defense and a large military presence abroad and are opposed to Wilsonian global idealism. The article operationalizes support for these three different foreign policy traditions by connecting them to previous findings on the structure of American foreign policy. The effect of Tea Party affiliation on foreign policy attitudes is severely weakened, however, once we control for political ideology, particularly economic conservatism. As is the case in domestic politics, Tea Party sympathizers seem to be somewhat ordinary conservatives, not a completely new breed. There is a direct parallel between their domestic attitudes and their foreign policy attitudes. Their lack of support for idealistic policies abroad, their most prominent set of attitudes, is part and parcel of a lack of social solidarity indicated in their more economically libertarian position at home. Adapted from the source document.

"Countering the opposing narratives of political amorality and moral progressivism, Rathbun provides a new approach to the place of morality in international politics. This book will appeal to students and scholars of international relations and security studies, especially those interested in normative, psychological and evolutionary approaches"--

Brian Rathbun argues against the prevailing wisdom on morality in international relations, both the commonly held belief that foreign affairs is an amoral realm and the opposing concept that norms have gradually civilized an unethical world. By focusing on how states respond to being wronged rather than when they do right, Rathbun shows that morality is and always has been virtually everywhere in international relations - in the perception of threat, the persistence of conflict, the judgment of domestic audiences, and the articulation of expansionist goals. The inescapability of our moral impulses owes to their evolutionary origins in helping individuals solve recurrent problems in their anarchic environment. Through archival case studies of German foreign policy; the analysis of enormous corpora of text; and surveys of Russian, Chinese, and American publics, this book reorients how we think about the role of morality in international relations.

Scholars and citizens tend to assume that rationality guides the decision making of our leaders. Brian Rathbun suggests, however, that if we understand rationality to be a cognitive style premised on a commitment to objectivity and active deliberation, rational leaders are, in fact, the exception - not the norm. Using a unique combination of methods, including laboratory bargaining experiments, archival-based case studies, quantitative textual analysis, and high-level interviews, Rathbun questions some of our basic assumptions about rationality and leadership, with profound implications for the field of international relations. Case studies of Bismarck and Richelieu show that the rationality of realists makes them rare. An examination of Churchill and Reagan, romantics in international politics who sought to overcome obstacles in their path through force of will and personal agency, show what less rationality looks like in foreign policy making.