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ABSTRACT: Robots together with the other components of Industry 4.0 represent an important part of the recovery and resilience strategy of the Member States. In short periods of time, the labor market is affected by the dislocations caused by robotics and automation, but in the long term, employees will be reoriented through retraining and thus more jobs will be generated that will ensure a lower unemployment rate. The paper analyzes possible strategies to help the Member States pass from recovery to resilience, which means getting to a higher level than before the shock or crisis. Strategic directions are designed based on composite Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) subindicators and integrative concepts also are being approached. An example of integrative concept is autopoiesis, that metaphorical could be a solution from recovery to resilience applied on different countries refering to institutions, government by using the same strategy to selfrecover and grow from inside as an autonomous system. Other strategies are offered, the analysis of critical points seen as decisional aspects, the identification of the center of gravity and the existence of an operational plan within the strategic one. The strategic solutions that will lead to recovery and resilience, first of all, must have a vision. KEYWORDS: robots, recovery, resilience, digitalisation

Romania's membership to the North Atlantic Alliance, the need to ensure interoperability with the aeronautical combat systems of the partners, the reality of equipping the Romanian Air Force with east technology , which could no longer carry out the planned peace service enforcement missions and air defense to crisis and war, imposed on the responsible factors the decision of purchasing the first aviation structure endowed with multirole aircraft. The process was also amplified by the evolutions that took place at the eastern border of NATO, including the borders of Romania, especially after the annexation, in 2014, of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation. Of absolute complexity and novelty, the acquisition, the training of the aeronautical personnel for the operation of new combat equipment and related activities have imposed on the structures and personnel involved in this process responsibility, innovation, devotion, the first and most important and consistent program of endowment of the Romanian Army being a recognized success of the Romanian Air Force and inspirational, for the subsequent acquisition programs of the national defense.

The aim of this article is to identify differences in doctrinal projection at the level of the North Atlantic Alliance. The article has been designed as a comparative study of the doctrinal projections specific to information operations (InfoOps), mainly with regard to the doctrines and operations manuals of the United States of America, as the originator of most of these documents, NATO doctrines and domestic doctrines. On an initial examination of the three doctrinal projections, it can be observed that there are differences in the InfoOps approach, both in terms of surface elements, recognized by identifiable markers, and differences in perspective, which allow and encourage interpretation. There is therefore a need to clarify the nature of InfoOps and its correct understanding from a conceptual and practical point of view, and to achieve coherence between the doctrines for information operations of NATO member states and the allied doctrine.

Interoperability is described as the ability of member states to act together coherently and effectively to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives. In particular, interoperability allows forces, units and/or systems to operate together and use shared concepts. At the operational and tactical level, there are numerous challenges regarding interoperability, and one of these challenges consists of doctrinal differences. The purpose of this article is to identify these differences, through the brief analysis of the doctrine projections of NATO, USA and Romania. There are significant differences both in understanding the concept of information operations from a conceptual and practical point of view and in terms of these subsumed operations. Also, in order to identify one's vulnerabilities, we think that the analysis of strategies and tactics based only on a Western empirical approach is insufficient, and we aim at comparing the effectiveness of information operations from the Russian and Chinese perspectives, as well.

Scopul prezentului articol este acela de a identifica diferențele de proiecție doctrinară la nivelul Alianţei Nord-Atlantice. Articolul este conceput ca un studiu comparativ al proiecţiilor doctrinare specifice operațiilor informaționale (InfoOps) asupra cărora ne-am îndreptat atenţia: doctrinele și manualele de luptă ale Statelor Unite ale Americii, ca inițiator al majorității acestor documente ̶ doctrinele NATO și doctrinele autohtone. La o primă analiză a celor trei proiecţii doctrinare, se poate observa că există diferenţe în abordarea InfoOps, atât în ceea ce privește elementele de suprafață, recunoscute prin markeri identificabili, cât şi diferențele de perspectivă, care permit şi încurajează interpretarea. Este nevoie, aşadar, de clarificarea naturii InfoOps şi înţelegerea corectă a acestora din punct de vedere conceptual şi practic, precum şi de obţinerea unei coerenţe între doctrinele pentru operaţii informaţionale ale statelor membre NATO şi doctrina aliată.

Trăim într-o epocă în care mediul virtual este invadat cu informații variate. Societatea face eforturi tot mai mari pentru a-și găsi informațiile de care are nevoie, dar în același timp devine tot mai vulnerabilă la manipularea în masă. Mass-media ‒ gardienii care modelează sensibilitățile unei societăți ‒ se văd obligate să răzbată într-un mediu informaţional suprasaturat și contestat. În ultimii ani, specialiștii în domeniul cyber-security, precum și în științele socio-umane, discută tot mai intens despre un tip de război prin intermediul căruia se pot manipula mase mari de oameni, prin alterarea gândirii și comportamentului acestora, mințile propriilor cetățeni putând fi noul câmp de luptă. În cadrul acestui tip de război, adevărul este prima victimă. Tehnologiile viitoare oferă posibilitatea de a schimba fundamental natura umană, deschizând o ușă către progresele tehnologice, dar natura duală a acestui potențial ridică un nou set de provocări pentru securitatea societăților deoarece ar putea duce, în cele din urmă, la controlul uman prin militarizarea unor domenii care până în prezent au aparținut zonei civile. Lucrarea de față încearcă să stabilească care este importanța utilizării științelor socio-umane, precum și al neuro-științelor, în apărarea națională sau în cadrul eforturilor de război, și modul în care relațiile internaționale și războaiele sunt modelate de expertiza și tehnologia științifică în domenii ca nanotehnologia, biotehnologia, tehnologia informației, științele cognitive, precum și de neuroștiințe.

"Industrial revolutions have generated major changes in the economy, politics and military affairs throughout human history and have led to innovation in all social fields, resulting in new approaches to military affairs. Companies are transforming and preparing their transition from an environment based on technological tools (physical) to one based on social mass engineering (mainly in the virtual environment), extremely refined, which subtly combines manipulation with addiction. The industrial society, as we have known it for more than a century, has become an information society and produces major changes in society and, implicitly, in the thinking of military strategies. In this context, due to the unprecedented development of information technology, the military confrontations of the future will change their main feature, namely violence, a component that will be increasingly mitigated and replaced, gradually, with non-kinetic means: political, economic, media, psychological and informational situations. There are, today, new military doctrines and strategies, characterised by the lack of classical rules for waging a war, through the ambiguity of the enemy or through the lack of dichotomy between war and peace, which have as characteristic another way of organising and conducting the fight. The present article focuses on aspects related to non-kinetic and cognitive combat means. We consider that the research is of interest because the implications of these means on the way of waging the war and their long-term effects that have not yet been fully known. In this context, we approach the field of social engineering, starting from the first references to this concept up to the present day, emphasising its applicability in social and political sciences as well as in psychology and cyber security."

For the Romanian Air Force, the promotion of the military profession, recruitment, selection, initial training, as well as the training of aeronautical personnel represents the most complex and laborious activity, since reaching the operational level requires going through the algorithm of a process that is characterized by a relatively long duration of training, impressive costs and, last but not least, risks specific to the aeronautical environment. The trajectory of this process has as its starting point the recruitment and selection of candidates for admission to the higher and post-secondary military institutions of the Air Force, specialized in the training of specialists in military aeronautics. The final point of this path is the combat unit, where the training of the aeronautical personnel takes the form of specialization for the technique served and the achievement of the performance indices that give it the status of operational aeronautical personnel. The finality of this process is realized in the achievement of the fundamental objective for the Romanian Air Force - the provision of large units and air units with well-trained aeronautical personnel, capable of performing the entire range of aeronautical activities, which can only be achieved through the quality of staged training formative-instructive algorithm.