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This paper examines when parties listen to interest groups and adopt their input. Interest group information can help parties bolster their positions, and by taking their input into account, parties show that they are responsive to the groups' interests which can increase their appeal to their constituents. Listening to interest groups can, however, also repel voters who disagree with the groups' positions. This paper argues that party and issue-level characteristics affect whether the benefits of listening to interest groups exceed the costs. Examining more than 25,000 party-interest group observations on 88 Norwegian policy proposals and using a text reuse approach to measure interest group influence, the findings indicate that public salience, party issue emphasis, interest group coalitions, and government status affect parties' propensity to listen. This implies that interest groups can be a pertinent source of information for parties under certain circumstances which affects the link between voters and parties.

This thesis asks when and why interest groups influence political parties. I address this question in two ways: 1) by examining the organizational ties between parties and interest groups, given that party-interest group ties may constitute an important step on groups' way to influence, and 2) by more directly examining interest group influence on parties. By doing this, the thesis contributes to the literatures on interest group influence, party positions, and party-interest group ties. Paper I examines the relationship between private and public party finance and party-interest group organizational ties. The paper lends systematic support to the idea that groups and parties are more likely to maintain closer relationships today when the groups donate money. The institutional setting the actors operate in may furthermore affect ties.Paper II gives an overview of the Party-Interest Group Relationships in Contemporary Democracies (PAIRDEM) datasets, and presents descriptive results regarding the organizational ties parties and interest groups maintain today. Paper III considers the relationship between parties' goals and interest group influence on parties. I find that interest groups are more likely to perceive that they influence parties they are ideologically similar to as well as parties that are more willing to compromise on policy. Interest groups' access to parties moreover seems to be an important mechanism here. Paper IV asks whether organizational ties affect one-sided interest group influence on parties as well as mutual party-interest group influence. We find positive correlations between stronger ties and both types of influence.Paper V asks when parties listen to interest groups and adopt their input. I find that parties are more likely to do this when 1) the issue in question is less publicly salient, 2) parties emphasize the issue more than their competitors, 3) the interest group input is supported by a larger and/or more coordinated interest group coalition, and 4) parties are in opposition.

The commitment to make provision for huge numbers of asylum seekers challenges Norway's welfare state. Each year central government requests most local governments to receive a certain number of refugees. Local governments are free to accept or decline, and many are hesitant. The ensuing implementation gap stems from this central-local goal conflict and a decentralized decision-making system, embedded in an ideology of local autonomy and in local authorities seeking to accommodate state goals through feasible solutions. The focus is on the Chief Municipal Executive (CME, 'rådmann'), the head of the municipal administration who exercises agency over government affairs. How do central state instruments influence this local agent and what are the consequences for settlement decisions? Economic incentives are the most important state tools in settlement decisions. Central information strategies, government appeals and persuasion seem, how- ever, to be less effective. In line with agency theory, CMEs' sovereign assessments of the impact of state requests on local burdens and benefits are shown to be the main factor determining settlement decisions.

The commitment to make provisions for huge numbers of aylum-seekers challenges Norway's welfare state. Every year the central government requests most local governments to receive a certain number of refugees. Local governments are free to accept or decline - and many are hesitant. The ensuing implementation gap stems from this goal conflict and ineffective governance, but also reflects a decentralized decisinmaking system, embedded in an ideology of local autonomy where local authorities seek to accommodate state goals to feasable local solutions. The focus here is on the Chief Municipal Executive (rådmann) as the main manager of local government affairs. How does central governance influence local agency - and with what consequences for settlement decisions? We analyze this state-local controversy using insights from the principal-agent model.

AbstractThis article investigates participation bias in the European Commission's online consultations by focusing on issue characteristics and using a cost–benefit framework. The main assumption is that a group will choose not to participate when their participation costs exceed the expected benefits. This leads to a more biased participation pattern. We expect this to hold when the proposal discussed in a consultation is more complex, whereas the opposite is the case if the proposal is more salient. Furthermore, we expect there to be an interaction effect between complexity and salience. We test and find support for these expectations in an analysis of more than 350 consultations held between 2001 and 2012.

In many democratic societies, research has identified an increase in animosity between supporters of different political parties. While this phenomenon has been extensively examined among the general public, less research has explored the role of political elites in contributing to partisan hostility. This study aims to fill this research gap by analyzing instances where members of parliament (MPs) express negative sentiments toward representatives of opposing parties in legislative speeches. Specifically, we investigate which MPs within parties are driving elite rhetorical polarization. We hypothesize that MPs with less experience in parliament and less experience outside of party politics are more likely to contribute to polarizing speech due to stronger partisan identities. Analyzing Norwegian MPs' speeches between 1998 and 2016, we find support for these hypotheses. Our findings highlight intra-party differences in polarization and contribute new insights into the characteristics that shape polarizing rhetoric among political elites.

Organizational ties between political parties and interest groups are common in contemporary democracies, but little is known about the political effects of such ties. This article examines whether the strength of organizational ties between parties and interest groups affects the probability of (1) interest group influence on parties, (2) party influence on interest groups, and (3) mutual party–interest group influence in decision-making. Using novel interest group survey data from six democracies, we are the first to systematically examine the relationship between organizational ties and perceived and attributed influence across multiple policy areas. The findings indicate that one-sided influence is more likely when the actors have stronger ties but that such ties also increase the likelihood of influence going both ways. Close party–interest group relationships hence likely involve give-and-take across policy issues. These findings shed important new light on the role of parties and interest groups as intermediaries in democracies.

This article examines political parties' approach to trade unions and the role of private and public party finance in contemporary democracies. We suggest that both unions' direct donations and states' party finance regimes may account for variation in the strength of parties' organizational links to unions. We investigate this argument with a new data set covering parties historically aligned with trade unions and union confederations in 12 mature democracies. Our empirical analysis provides support for the hypothesis that financial contributions are positively associated with stronger organizational links but also suggests that this relationship is constrained by the level of public subsidies and state regulation of donations. The findings point to the need for more research on how private and public money affects parties' interactions with civil society actors.

This article examines political parties' approach to trade unions and the role of private and public party finance in contemporary democracies. We suggest that both unions' direct donations and states' party finance regimes may account for variation in the strength of parties' organizational links to unions. We investigate this argument with a new data set covering parties historically aligned with trade unions and union confederations in 12 mature democracies. Our empirical analysis provides support for the hypothesis that financial contributions are positively associated with stronger organizational links but also suggests that this relationship is constrained by the level of public subsidies and state regulation of donations. The findings point to the need for more research on how private and public money affects parties' interactions with civil society actors.

Few existing datasets on parties and interest groups include data from both sides and a wide variety of interest groups and parties. We contribute to filling this gap by making several interconnected new datasets publicly available. The Party-Interest Group Relationships in Contemporary Democracies (PAIRDEM) datasets include cross-national data from three different surveys of (1) central party organizations, (2) legislative party groups, and (3) interest groups. A fourth dataset based on coding of party statutes and party finance data was established together with the Political Party Database. The datasets contain novel indicators on party-group relationships in up to 21 mature democracies. In this research note, we first present the main content of the datasets and the research design. Second, we present descriptive statistics documenting the extent of organizational ties between parties and groups in contemporary democracies. Third, we illustrate more advanced usage through a simple application.

Few existing datasets on parties and interest groups include data from both sides and a wide variety of interest groups and parties. We contribute to filling this gap by making several interconnected new datasets publicly available. The PartyInterest Group Relationships in Contemporary Democracies (PAIRDEM) datasets include cross-national data from three different surveys of (1) central party organizations, (2) legislative party groups, and (3) interest groups. A fourth dataset based on coding of party statutes and party finance data was established together with the Political Party Database The datasets contain novel indicators on party-group relationships in up to 21 mature democracies. In this research note, we first present the main content of the datasets and the research design. Second, we present descriptive statistics documenting the extent of organizational ties between parties and groups in contemporary democracies. Third, we illustrate more advanced usage through a simple application.

Few existing datasets on parties and interest groups include data from both sides and a wide variety of interest groups and parties. We contribute to filling this gap by making several interconnected new datasets publicly available. The Party-Interest Group Relationships in Contemporary Democracies (PAIRDEM) datasets include cross-national data from three different surveys of (1) central party organizations, (2) legislative party groups, and (3) interest groups. A fourth dataset based on coding of party statutes and party finance data was established together with the Political Party Database. The datasets contain novel indicators on party-group relationships in up to 21 mature democracies. In this research note, we first present the main content of the datasets and the research design. Second, we present descriptive statistics documenting the extent of organizational ties between parties and groups in contemporary democracies. Third, we illustrate more advanced usage through a simple application.

Hansen, V. W., Rødland, L., Røed, M., Gall, C. L., Klüver, H, Marshall, D., Otjes, S, Pogunkte, T., Rasmussen, A, Saurugger, S., Webb, P. and Witko, C. (forthcoming) 'Introducing the Party-Interest Group Relationships in Contemporary Democracies (PAIRDEM) Datasets', Party Politics.