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The development and procurement of major weapons programs in the United States is a complex and often drawn-out process complicated by political considerations and often sharp disagreements over requirements and the merits of systems. Secretaries of Defense since Robert McNamara have sought to impose discipline on the process, with varying degrees of success. Conflicts between a Military Service and the civilian leadership are inevitable. A Service wants to develop the most advanced system to address its perceived need, whereas the Secretary of Defense must balance competing requirements across the Department of Defense. The military and the civilian leadership may also have different strategic perspectives that feed this conflict. Through the detailed analysis of three case studies—the Nuclear Surface Navy in the 1960s, the B-1 Bomber in the 1970s, and the Crusader Artillery System in the 2000s--the author explores some of the common themes and sources of friction that arise in civil-military relations concerning major weapons programs. He concludes with some thoughts on how the Secretary of Defense can anticipate and reduce these sources of friction, while retaining an environment that supports healthy debate. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1338/thumbnail.jpg

This report presents an examination of ways the Department of the Air Force can develop, employ, and integrate non-kinetic capabilities intended to influence adversaries and other actors in competition and conflict.

"The development and procurement of major weapons programs in the United States is a complex and often drawn-out process complicated by political considerations and often sharp disagreements over requirements and the merits of systems. Secretaries of Defense since Robert McNamara have sought to impose discipline on the process, with varying degrees of success. Conflicts between a Military Service and the civilian leadership are inevitable. A Service wants to develop the most advanced system to address its perceived need, whereas the Secretary of Defense must balance competing requirements across the Department of Defense. The military and the civilian leadership may also have different strategic perspectives that feed this conflict. Through the detailed analysis of three case studies -- the Nuclear Surface Navy in the 1960s, the B-1 Bomber in the 1970s, and the Crusader Artillery System in the 2000s -- the author explores some of the common themes and sources of friction that arise in civil-military relations concerning major weapons programs. He concludes with some thoughts on how the Secretary of Defense can anticipate and reduce these sources of friction, while retaining an environment that supports healthy debate."--P. [ix] ; "November 2010." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Introduction -- The nuclear navy -- The B-1 bomber -- The Crusader artillery system -- Conclusion and observations. ; "The development and procurement of major weapons programs in the United States is a complex and often drawn-out process complicated by political considerations and often sharp disagreements over requirements and the merits of systems. Secretaries of Defense since Robert McNamara have sought to impose discipline on the process, with varying degrees of success. Conflicts between a Military Service and the civilian leadership are inevitable. A Service wants to develop the most advanced system to address its perceived need, whereas the Secretary of Defense must balance competing requirements across the Department of Defense. The military and the civilian leadership may also have different strategic perspectives that feed this conflict. Through the detailed analysis of three case studies -- the Nuclear Surface Navy in the 1960s, the B-1 Bomber in the 1970s, and the Crusader Artillery System in the 2000s -- the author explores some of the common themes and sources of friction that arise in civil-military relations concerning major weapons programs. He concludes with some thoughts on how the Secretary of Defense can anticipate and reduce these sources of friction, while retaining an environment that supports healthy debate."--P. [ix] ; Mode of access: Internet.

"The development and procurement of major weapons programs in the United States is a complex and often drawn-out process complicated by political considerations and often sharp disagreements over requirements and the merits of systems. Secretaries of Defense since Robert McNamara have sought to impose discipline on the process, with varying degrees of success. Conflicts between a Military Service and the civilian leadership are inevitable. A Service wants to develop the most advanced system to address its perceived need, whereas the Secretary of Defense must balance competing requirements across the Department of Defense. The military and the civilian leadership may also have different strategic perspectives that feed this conflict. Through the detailed analysis of three case studies -- the Nuclear Surface Navy in the 1960s, the B-1 Bomber in the 1970s, and the Crusader Artillery System in the 2000s -- the author explores some of the common themes and sources of friction that arise in civil-military relations concerning major weapons programs. He concludes with some thoughts on how the Secretary of Defense can anticipate and reduce these sources of friction, while retaining an environment that supports healthy debate."--P. [ix] ; "November 2010." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 92-117) ; Introduction -- The nuclear navy -- The B-1 bomber -- The Crusader artillery system -- Conclusion and observations. ; "The development and procurement of major weapons programs in the United States is a complex and often drawn-out process complicated by political considerations and often sharp disagreements over requirements and the merits of systems. Secretaries of Defense since Robert McNamara have sought to impose discipline on the process, with varying degrees of success. Conflicts between a Military Service and the civilian leadership are inevitable. A Service wants to develop the most advanced system to address its perceived need, whereas the Secretary of Defense must balance competing requirements across the Department of Defense. The military and the civilian leadership may also have different strategic perspectives that feed this conflict. Through the detailed analysis of three case studies -- the Nuclear Surface Navy in the 1960s, the B-1 Bomber in the 1970s, and the Crusader Artillery System in the 2000s -- the author explores some of the common themes and sources of friction that arise in civil-military relations concerning major weapons programs. He concludes with some thoughts on how the Secretary of Defense can anticipate and reduce these sources of friction, while retaining an environment that supports healthy debate."--P. [ix] ; Mode of access: Internet.

The authors provide recommendations that will help the U.S. Space Force implement the guidance set forth in Space Policy Directive-5 to incentivize the commercial sector to adopt a cybersecurity strategy that will help ensure space mission assurance.

Analysts examined how different elements that acquisition supports can improve speed, flexibility, and rigor in federal cyber acquisition. This report captures the researchers' recommendations to make them available to a wider audience.

Researchers assessed the risk that eight climate hazards will pose to National Critical Functions by 2050 and 2100 under future scenarios following current and higher emissions trends.

Introduction, research methodology, and historical evolution of concepts -- Indications and warning frameworks -- RAND's scalable warning and resilience model at a glance -- SWARM step one: indentify relevant cyber adversaries -- SWARM step teo: focus all-source intelligence collection -- SWARM step three: apply a threat model -- SWARM step four: adversary emulation -- Case study: Applying SWARM to predict phishing campaigns from the North Korea-Nexus Kimsuky threat actor -- Conclusion.