Suchergebnisse

This article analyses data from the 2015 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) to investigate the differentiated political values of the middle class in China. Combining the two factors of market situation and institutional division, the article first categorizes several basic types of middle class and then identifies two kinds of political values (liberal and conservative) from the indicators of support for freedom, government satisfaction, and political voting. The results show that the middle class, as a whole, tends to be more liberal than the working class. However, the internal divisions among the sub-groups in the middle class are more obvious – the political tendency of the middle class within the redistribution system is conservative but the middle class sub-groups outside the system, especially the new middle class, have the most liberal tendencies and constitute a potential source for change in China. Thus, the middle class is not necessarily a stabilizer or a subverter of the status quo and has a heterogeneous nature shaped by the dual forces of markets and institutions. (China Q/GIGA)

AbstractThis article analyses data from the 2015 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) to investigate the differentiated political values of the middle class in China. Combining the two factors of market situation and institutional division, the article first categorizes several basic types of middle class and then identifies two kinds of political values (liberal and conservative) from the indicators of support for freedom, government satisfaction, and political voting. The results show that the middle class, as a whole, tends to be more liberal than the working class. However, the internal divisions among the sub-groups in the middle class are more obvious – the political tendency of the middle class within the redistribution system is conservative but the middle class sub-groups outside the system, especially the new middle class, have the most liberal tendencies and constitute a potential source for change in China. Thus, the middle class is not necessarily a stabilizer or a subverter of the status quo and has a heterogeneous nature shaped by the dual forces of markets and institutions.

AbstractObjectiveWe examine the political identity and its determinants of China's young generation who are increasingly emerging from new industries and platforms.MethodsUsing survey data collected in China in 2020 from a representative sample, we employ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and quantile regression models to analyze the effects of multiple factors on the political identity of emerging youth. Additionally, we employ the Shapley value decomposition method to compare the explanatory contributions of different factors. The instrumental variable method (2SLS) is also used to address the possible endogeneity between public participation and political identity.ResultsWe find that the overall political identity of emerging youth scores high, and "authority resilience" rather than "identity decline" is a more suitable term to describe the political identity of this group. Educational enlightenment does not dissolve political identity; the higher the economic benefits and the stronger the sense of external political efficacy, the greater the political identity of China's emerging youth. Young people who are willing to participate in public affairs but lack access to the channels to do so have a lower degree of political identity.ConclusionGovernance performance theory and institutional environment theory have more explanatory power than culturalism for understanding the political identity of emerging youth. Although postmaterialistic values prevail among the young generations, they are unlikely to challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese regime in the short term.

Uncertainty triggers negative psychological responses, while positive institutional evaluations elevate the sense of control in individuals and satisfy their need for structure and order. Data from the 2015 Chinese Social Survey (CSS) (N = 4,605) demonstrated that objective uncertainty negatively predicted the happiness of young people (aged 18–45 years). However, this negative relationship was attenuated among those who evaluated the institutional system (e.g., social security, local government effectiveness, and trust in government) positively; in other words, positive institutional evaluation may have protected people's happiness from the threat of uncertainty. In addition, participants from different age groups evaluated the institutional system differently. The first generation born after the Chinese economic reform, which includes young people born in the 1980s (aged 26–35 years), had unique experiences compared to the preceding (aged 36–45 years, born in the 1970s) and succeeding (aged 18–25 years, born in the 1990s) generations. Among the three age groups, young people born in the 1980s held the least positive evaluation of the institutional system. The institutional evaluation also showed the weakest moderating effect on this group's happiness.