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Some complain that either the right to freedom of speech or expression or people's freedom is being restricted in recent times by calls for no platforming certain individuals. This paper aims to argue that such complaints are misplaced. The right to freedom of speech, will be argued, is best understood as a right against governments and social censorship does not restrict or infringe on this right. First, I will clarify the ways in which this right can be understood, namely either as a Hohfeldian liberty or an immunity. The former can be held against other people but does not correlate with a duty that they refrain from criticising the content of any speech. So demands for refraining from expressing certain opinions are not restrictions of the right to freedom of speech but rather demands for self-censorship, which is not a restriction of our freedom of expression, even if we may feel unfree to say things. The latter is held against a government and is usually a specific instance of freedom of expression, which is freedom of the press. But nobody thinks that the freedom of the press should be unrestricted. There are laws against libel, slander, defamation as well as complex professional ethics standards that journalists must comply with and I take it that a democratic society would not want to do away with those. So, again, it is just a misconception that the freedom of the press should be unlimited and that the press should be immune from the powers of the state. I then consider the claim that no platforming diminishes empirical (rather than deontic) freedom. I argue that this claim does not withstand scrutiny if we adopt a negative conception of freedom. No platforming may diminish freedom of choice but, inasmuch as this is undesirable, it should be compared to the freedom of choice of the members of communities offended or harmed by the speech in question.

One challenge in contemporary political philosophy is to reconcile groups' claims for rights and collective self-determination with a liberal commitment to the priority of individuals' rights and well-being. A solution to this puzzle may rest on a justification of group rights based on shared individual interests. This presupposes the collective conception of group rights, which does not entail that a group has to be conceived of as a distinct entity, with an independent moral standing. Such a strategy would thus not lead to conflicts between the rights of a group and those of its individual members. This article argues that this strategy does not succeed in justifying genuine group rights. Shared interests cannot ground rights held by a group qua group, especially the kind of rights that national or cultural groups demand. The conclusion of this argument is that the interest theorist has to embrace a view of groups as distinct entities in order to ascribe them rights qua group. So the upshot of this article is that communitarian or full-blown nationalist justifications of collective rights may be more coherent than some liberal attempts although probably less plausible and more problematic from a normative point of view. Adapted from the source document.

One challenge in contemporary political philosophy is to reconcile groups' claims for rights and collective self-determination with a liberal commitment to the priority of individuals' rights and well-being. A solution to this puzzle may rest on a justification of group rights based on shared individual interests. This presupposes the collective conception of group rights, which does not entail that a group has to be conceived of as a distinct entity, with an independent moral standing. Such a strategy would thus not lead to conflicts between the rights of a group and those of its individual members. This article argues that this strategy does not succeed in justifying genuine group rights. Shared interests cannot ground rights held by a group qua group, especially the kind of rights that national or cultural groups demand. The conclusion of this argument is that the interest theorist has to embrace a view of groups as distinct entities in order to ascribe them rights qua group. So the upshot of this article is that communitarian or full-blown nationalist justifications of collective rights may be more coherent than some liberal attempts although probably less plausible and more problematic from a normative point of view.

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS -- INTRODUCTION: HEALTH INEQUALITY AND GLOBAL REDISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE -- Part 1 A Right to Equal Health? -- Chapter 1 IS THERE A HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH? -- Chapter 2 WHAT'S WRONG WITH GLOBAL HEALTH INEQUALITIES? -- Chapter 3 ECOLOGICAL SUBJECTS, 'ETHICAL PLACEMAKING' AND GLOBAL HEALTH EQUITY -- Chapter 4 HEALTH INEQUALITIES, CAPABILITIES AND GLOBAL JUSTICE -- Part 2 Who is Responsible for Remedying Global Health Inequality? -- Chapter 5 RE-EXAMINING THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS: BEHIND THE DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL HEALTH -- Chapter 6 GLOBAL HEALTH AND RESPONSIBILITY -- Chapter 7 OUTLINING THE GLOBAL DUTIES OF JUSTICE OWED TO WOMEN LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA -- Part 3 Measuring Health and Health Outcomes -- Chapter 8 MEASURING GLOBAL HEALTH -- Chapter 9 EXPLORING A SUFFICIENCY VIEW OF HEALTH EQUITY -- Chapter 10 RATING EFFORTS TO EXTEND ACCESS ON ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: INCREASING GLOBAL HEALTH IMPACT -- Part 4 Borders and Health -- Chapter 11 JUSTICE AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES: STRUCTURED HEALTH VULNERABILITIES AND NATURAL DISASTERS -- Chapter 12 'ILLEGAL' MIGRANTS AND ACCESS TO PUBLIC HEALTH: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH -- Chapter 13 MEDICAL MIGRATION BETWEEN THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT -- Chapter 14 HEALTHCARE MIGRATION, VULNERABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY: THE CASE OF MALAWI -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX