Best practices for organizing experiments with farmers
Best practices for organizing experiments with farmers. 15. EAAE Congress "Towards Sustainable Agri-Food Systems: Balancing between Markets and Society"
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Best practices for organizing experiments with farmers. 15. EAAE Congress "Towards Sustainable Agri-Food Systems: Balancing between Markets and Society"
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Best practices for organizing experiments with farmers. 15. EAAE Congress "Towards Sustainable Agri-Food Systems: Balancing between Markets and Society"
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Best practices for organizing experiments with farmers. 15. EAAE Congress "Towards Sustainable Agri-Food Systems: Balancing between Markets and Society"
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In: Revue économique, Band 57, Heft 3, S. 593
ISSN: 1950-6694
In: Revue économique, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 403
ISSN: 1950-6694
In: Revue économique, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 403-414
ISSN: 1950-6694
How to choose the best format within the portfolio of economic experiments? Going from lab to field. Workshop "Economic experiments for EU agricultural policy evaluation: methodological challenges"
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How to choose the best format within the portfolio of economic experiments? Going from lab to field. Workshop "Economic experiments for EU agricultural policy evaluation: methodological challenges"
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How to choose the best format within the portfolio of economic experiments? Going from lab to field. Workshop "Economic experiments for EU agricultural policy evaluation: methodological challenges"
BASE
How to choose the best format within the portfolio of economic experiments? Going from lab to field. Workshop "Economic experiments for EU agricultural policy evaluation: methodological challenges"
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In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 78, Heft 2, S. 287-306
ISSN: 1573-1502
SSRN
Nearly all Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) offer stable annual payments over theduration of the contract. Yet AES are often intended to be a transition tool, designed totrigger changes in farming practices rather than to support them indefinitely. A decreasingsequence of payments thus appears particularly attractive as a reward structure for AES.The standard discounted utility model supports this notion by predicting that individualsshould prefer a decreasing sequence of payments if the total sum of outcomes is con-stant. Nevertheless, the literature shows that numerous mechanisms, such as increasingproductivity, anticipatory pleasure, and loss aversion, can, by contrast, incline individualsto favor an increasing sequence of payments. To understand the preferences of farmersfor different payment sequences, we propose a review of the mechanisms highlighted bythe literature in psychology and economics. We then test farmers' preferences for stable,increasing or decreasing payments through a choice experiment (CE) survey. In this sur-vey, farmers are offered hypothetical contracts rewarding the planting of cover crops. Toreduce hypothetical bias, the choice cards were designed following repeated interactionswith local stakeholders. One hundred twenty-three French farmers, about 15% of thosecontacted, responded to the survey. Overall, farmers do not present a clear willingnessto depart from the usual stable payments. Nevertheless, 17% declare a preference for in-creasing sequences of payment. Moreover, we find a significant rejection of decreasingpayments by farmers with a lower discount rate or farmers more willing to take risks thanthe median farmer, contradicting the discounted utility model
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Nearly all Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) offer stable annual payments over theduration of the contract. Yet AES are often intended to be a transition tool, designed totrigger changes in farming practices rather than to support them indefinitely. A decreasingsequence of payments thus appears particularly attractive as a reward structure for AES.The standard discounted utility model supports this notion by predicting that individualsshould prefer a decreasing sequence of payments if the total sum of outcomes is con-stant. Nevertheless, the literature shows that numerous mechanisms, such as increasingproductivity, anticipatory pleasure, and loss aversion, can, by contrast, incline individualsto favor an increasing sequence of payments. To understand the preferences of farmersfor different payment sequences, we propose a review of the mechanisms highlighted bythe literature in psychology and economics. We then test farmers' preferences for stable,increasing or decreasing payments through a choice experiment (CE) survey. In this sur-vey, farmers are offered hypothetical contracts rewarding the planting of cover crops. Toreduce hypothetical bias, the choice cards were designed following repeated interactionswith local stakeholders. One hundred twenty-three French farmers, about 15% of thosecontacted, responded to the survey. Overall, farmers do not present a clear willingnessto depart from the usual stable payments. Nevertheless, 17% declare a preference for in-creasing sequences of payment. Moreover, we find a significant rejection of decreasingpayments by farmers with a lower discount rate or farmers more willing to take risks thanthe median farmer, contradicting the discounted utility model
BASE
International audience ; Nearly all Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) offer farmers stable annual payments over the duration of the contract. Yet AES are often intended to be a transition tool, thus decreasing payment sequences would appear particularly attractive for farmers. The standard discounted utility model supports this notion by predicting that individuals will prefer a decreasing sequence of payments if the total sum of outcomes is constant. Nevertheless, the literature shows that numerous mechanisms, such as increasing productivity, anticipatory pleasure and loss aversion can incline farmers to favor an increasing sequence of payments. To understand what drives farmers' preferences for different payment sequences, we propose a review of the mechanisms highlighted by the literature in psychology and economics. We then analyze farmers' preferences for stable, increasing or decreasing payments through a choice experiment (CE) survey of 123 French farmers, about 15% of those contacted. Overall, farmers do not present a clear willingness to depart from the usual stable payments. Moreover, we find a significant aversion to decreasing payments in farmers with a lower discount rate and in those more willing to take risks than the median farmer, contradicting the discounted utility model.
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