Suchergebnisse

House "drop-off" (voting for President but not for the U.S. House) has increased in the 1968-1980 period to the point that about 1 of every 11 on-year voters neglects to cast a House ballot. The increase is surprising, because many developments (e.g., fewer uncontested House seats, more third-party choices, and so on) would suggest declining, rather than increasing, drop-off. The competitiveness of the House campaign is the best predictor of drop-off, but most of the other key factors reflect characteristics of the district and the ballot, rather than the facets of the House campaign. Although the increased drop-off could have affected only a few House outcomes, it is likely responsible for part of the House incumbency advantage. Circumstantial evidence comes from a comparison of 1964 and 1980 drop-off, from a more pronounced House incumbency edge in on-year than in off-year elections, and from drop-off not increasing in Senate elections.

Recent Senate elections have seen a strong pro-Republican bias, resulting from inroads in the small population states overrepresented in the Senate and from lean victory margins. The bias allows the GOP to capture a majority of the seats with less than a majority of the aggregate Senate vote (1978-1980) and to exceed the historical norm when the Democrats win a landslide (1982). Although this bias will probably continue, the increased competitiveness and responsiveness of Senate elections may see the GOP alternate between the threadbare majorities of the 97th and the 98th Congresses and (when the Democrats can string together several landslides) very small minorities.