Suchergebnisse

The idea of the police as a "good order" from the Polizeiwissenschaft of absolutism was developed in the biopolitical model of caring for the population of the Modern era, engaged in ensuring safety and well-being. Being a product of mass society, the modern state has focused on influencing public opinion. In the XIX–XX centuries, there was a counter-movement of police supervision and art which gave rise to 'police aesthetics'. Cinematography was an effective means of forming a desirable image of the Soviet militia in the post-war period of normalization of public life. By contributing to the Soviet myth of developed socialism, militia cinema contributed to a screen-to-life transfer of a new norm of trust between representatives of power and citizens. This constructivist cinema involved the viewer in the cinematic reality by likening them to the main character, a militiaman who acts as a moral guide. In addition to forming the image of the 'familial militia', intellectual militia cinema—with its focus on professionalism—is actively developing. The most popular version of the latter is militia cinema that thematizes the moral rightness of militia officers fighting crime in the name of Soviet citizens. Involvement in the cinematic reality through assimilation, novelty, memory, and imagination included the romanticization of the historical events of the revolution. Militia cinema was inverted during the years of the perestroika. It exploited the effect of novelty associated with the viewer's immersion in emerging market relations. The viewer's interest was focused on the wrong, criminal, side of public life. Crime is romanticized, the militia is stigmatized. From constructing the myth of cooperation between the government and the population, militia cinema moves on to deconstructing the myth, achieving an effect of denigration. The fashion for American cinema brings elements of action, thriller, horror. The viewer is no longer included in the imperious project of transforming reality; they are attracted by the illusion, the spectacle. The latest police cinema, overcoming total deconstructionism, is busy reconstructing the spirit of Soviet militia cinema in modern settings. Oscillating between the intention to generate positive images of the police and the demonstration of the "truth of life", modern police cinema contains the natal shoots of a new cinema in which the image of the police is important for the normalization of public life.

The article shows that the problem of immigration occupies one of the central places in the program documents of European right-wing populist parties. Right-wing populists proceed from the fact that many Muslim immigrants in European countries form the so-called "parallel communities" with their own social and legal norms and a low degree of cultural integration into the host society - the nation. "Outsiders" not only do not seek to integrate into local communities, but also do not want to maintain any relations with non-Muslims of the host countries. With immigrants, right-wing populists associate the deterioration in the quality of life of indigenous people, the growth of crime and unemployment, and an additional burden on the social support systems of the population. At the same time, fearing to alienate moderate voters, right-wing populists do not oppose immigrants whose civil status has been settled and who have integrated into the host societies, becoming their organic part. The author of the article shows that the nutrient medium of populist propaganda is fear - an important tool for social mobilization. Right-wing populists give concrete form to public fears by pointing out to "frightened voters" the real or perceived dangers posed by immigrants. Such, for example, as the loss of national identity by the peoples of Europe, the destruction of the stability and well-being of indigenous Europeans. The result was the emergence and growth of a group of "frightened voters" ready to give up democratic convictions and oriented towards a homogeneous national community as the highest value. Right-wing populist parties offer two ways to solve the "immigration issue" in European countries. First, by tightening the national immigration policy (up to bullet immigration). Populists believe that the bureaucratic structures of the European Union have unlawfully secured extremely broad powers in the sphere of regulating immigration. Therefore, demands are being made to return to national states the right to determine the principles of immigration policy on their territory. The range of approaches to the content of national immigration policy among populists is quite wide: from the complete closure of borders for all immigrants to the establishment of strict border controls and the issuance of entry permits to individuals on a limited range of grounds. These grounds primarily include the need for skilled labor from non-European countries. European right-wing populists demand that all immigrants who have legal status in host countries integrate into the local society, adapt to its culture and way of life. Populists see another way to solve the "immigration issue" as "getting rid of" illegal immigrants, both by encouraging voluntary return migration and by forcibly deporting illegal immigrants. The article concludes that the political program of the right-wing populist parties was a response to the request of a large and socially heterogeneous group of European voters, covered by protest moods.

The discourse of political theology developed by Schmitt makes it possible to identify a secular religion in Marxism. Marxism is aimed at achieving an "earthly paradise". In the Soviet project, based on the "dictatorship of the worldview" (Berdyaev), its own political theology is being formed, including apophatic and cataphatic elements. The apophatic content is connected with the totalization of the denial of the ideals, laws, and order of the old world. Hobbes sees in the state a Leviathan - a powerful mortal god, whom God is able to catch and tame at any moment. Taking the side of the Behemoth in the fight against Leviathan, the revolutionary forces are focused on the negative ontological connection that arises during the collapse of the state between Leviathan and God, whose place in the revolutionary consciousness is occupied by the laws of history. The apophatic theology of the Soviet project is built in the logic of increased attention to revolutionary upheavals, punishing Leviathan for unworthy behavior. As a result, the Soviet revolutionary project is deconstructing and destructive in nature. Revolutionary forces, personifying righteous anger, radicalize the fight against the discovered "social evil", entering an area of the escalation of violence. A necessary condition for building a "new world" is the consistent destruction of the old one "to the foundations". However, at the moment of gaining power, the revolutionary forces abandon the apophatic and enter the cataphatic path. The main dogma for social construction is the position of communism as the inevitable future of human history. Blind faith in the inevitability of communism is ill-suited to see what God, or the laws of history, allows Leviathan to do. The struggle against the dehumanizing essence of capitalism gradually contributes to the construction of an equally dehumanizing society (Berdyaev) - an ideological, bureaucratic, planned-distributive total state. Rampant communal forces (Zinoviev) create new hierarchies and a new social division. Ideology takes frozen "hypernormal" forms that do not correspond to reality. In the end, the mismatch of social and ideological projects during the "performative shift" (Yurchak) entails the collapse of the USSR, illustrating the new revelation of the divine pacification of Leviathan.

The article reveals the evolution of legal regulation of the procedure for creating public organizations in Russia in the second half of the 19th century. It is established that the main criterion for the legality of public organizations in Russia was the presence of a charter approved by the state authority. Legislative regulation of the creation of private initiative societies was reduced to determining the list of state authorities authorized to approve the charters of new societies. Through the publication of a wide range of secondary legislation, the state authority established the requirements for the content of statutory norms and determined the procedure for their approval. The author found that in the second half of the 19th century there was a decentralization of the mechanism for creating private initiative societies and simplification of the administrative licensing procedure.

The article shows that the Chinese company Ant Financial is developing a social credit system named Sesame Credit going beyond the traditional credit scoring mechanism on this way. Sesame Credit aims to form "civilized behavior" of citizens as an instrument of social management and control. In the late of the 2010s some of Sesame Credit's technologies and information resources have been integrated into a large-scale state system of social credit which is still in its infancy.

The article is devoted to a policy document that defines the main directions and principles of creating a social credit system in China. It is shown that the reform plan and the ongoing changes are quite consistent with the Chinese bureaucratic traditions of coercion and paternalism, and are associated with the use of a social regulator that forms the appropriate behavioral incentives, such as reputation. Ultimately, the new model of social governance is aimed at ensuring social and political stability in China and proactively addressing the development problems of Chinese society.

The importance of human capital and human development for understanding economics and social relations has repeatedly been proven since the time of Adam Smith. Theories on human capital and human development were conceptualized in their modern form in the USA in the 1960's to 1980's. However, in recent decades they have been seriously criticized in scientific literature, primarily due to issues pertaining to how they approach measurement. In this article a critical revision of the main approaches towards evaluating human capital in modern social sciences is conducted. New strategies for measuring human capital and human development include not only a "quantitative" indicator (number of years spent receiving formal education), but also an indicator showing the quality of acquired knowledge and skills. Such approaches provide a possibility to observe the improvement or degradation of human capital outside of conventional formal education, which allows perceiving human capital as embedded in the processes of local social, economic and historical development. This historical rootedness of human capital and human development seems to be of utmost importance for fluid societies in a state of crisis. The prospects for sociologization of the concepts of human capital and human development as well as the potential of life-course sociology for their analysis are discussed. It is suggested to view human capital through a cohort approach lens. The discussion outlines research strategies for studying human capital and human development within the proposed logic.

From the moment when wide spread of large scale assessments in sociology and economics began, the most commonly used indicators of peoples' qualifications are the number of years spent in education and the possession of a high school/college/university diploma. But what if these formal indicators are unreliable under certain conditions and do not reflect actual literacy and competency of people? This article, drawing on data from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), questions accuracy of the basic educational indicators in Russia. There is a linear relationship between the possession of a formal graduation diploma and the measurement of PIAAC literacy of the able-bodied population in OECD countries, including the Eastern European ones. However, the analysis shows that in Russia there is an inconsistency between literacy and formal educational status. This fact in itself casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal education indicators in Russia. The social implications resulting from this inconsistency become apparent through an international comparison of research results. These ill effects have been documented in the areas of employment, education and social reproduction and in the social self-awareness of the Russian people.

In the paper Russian results of the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competency (PIAAC) are analyzed and compared to the data from the OECD countries. In the focus of the research is the concept of "participation in society" proposed by the developers of the PIAAC. The results show that "social inclusion" and "success" measured in the PIAAC through peoples' individual achievements are not always connected with high level of competence in Russia. There is a large proportion of people in the group of respondents with the lowest level of literacy, who are "included" and "successful" (at least according to formal criteria). This distinguishes Russia from the OECD countries with developed economies.

It is common in social sciences to measure human capital by using the single key indicator: number of years individuals spend on their formal education. This article clashes with this classical approach. With the support of the data from the Program for International Assessment of Adult Competence (PIAAC) it is shown that the deep socio-economic transformation in Russia at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries seriously affected measured in PIAAC skills (competences) of Russian respondents, while the average time spent on getting education in crisis, pre- and post-crisis periods remained approximately the same. As a result, the average level of measured skills among generations in our country and in the OECD countries differs significantly. The intergenerational difference in skills in Russian society cannot be explained by the number of years spent on education. It is proposed to look at the institution and the process of education as a historical one associated with historical events and bearing the imprint of these events.

In many countries, including Russia, the COVID-19 epidemic became a catalyst for the technological, "digital" renewal of the school educational process. This renewal occurred rapidly and, in some respects, chaotically, therefore it was described in literature using a special term — "emergency teaching". Teachers resisting change is sometimes seen as the main reason for the stability and conservatism of schools, as well as for the failed attempts to introduce innovations. Drawing a parallel between modern teachers and Luddites, it is important to assess not only resistance to technological change, but also the social consequences of these changes for the school and for teachers. This article is based on the materials of a long-term observation of Russian school teachers, implemented using qualitative research logic during the time of the most active spread of COVID in 2020–2022. The study revealed the difficulties that teachers face in integrating digital practices into the emergency educational process, as well as their fears related to prospects of a crisis in the profession of teaching. One component of this looming crisis is the expansion of external formal control, as well as the teachers themselves losing control, with the prospect (and fear) of losing autonomy and the teaching profession losing its creative element.