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AbstractThis article explains why there is important variation in the degree of concentration of legislative specialization across legislative parties. Greater concentration of legislative specialization leads parties to concentrate their legislative efforts on a smaller set of policy jurisdictions. Through enhancing their concentration of legislative specialization in certain policy areas, parties might more clearly signal their policy concerns and interests to voters. This study argues and shows that party size alters the concentration of legislative specialization. In particular, I find that a U-shaped curve defines the relationship between party size and the degree of concentration of legislative specialization: niche parties and the largest parties choose higher levels of concentration of legislative specialization.

AbstractAlthough numerous scholars have analyzed the effects of natural resource extraction at the national level, few have explored it systematically at the local level. Focusing on Peru, where both mining production and local social protests have greatly increased in recent years and where a new tax has required mining companies to transfer revenue to subnational governments, this study explores the resource curse at the local level. In particular, why do protests arise mostly in the areas of natural resource extraction? Employing subnational data for Peru for the period 2004–9 and LAPOP survey data from 2010, the research confirms previous findings that social conflict is provoked by both the negative externalities of mining and the revenues from the new tax. The article further demonstrates that local bureaucratic capacity is a significant independent variable. Greater subnational bureaucratic capacity can ameliorate the pernicious societal effects of a local resource curse.

AbstractThis article helps understand why locations close to strategic infrastructure to transport illegal drugs (seaports, airports, highways, and US ports of entry along the Mexico-US border) or to increase income (pipelines) experience different levels of violence due to DTOs operations. Our theory breaks down the impact of the geographical distance to these facilities on violence into two effects. The first effect is produced by the level of (violent) competition among DTOs, measured by the number of DTOs employing violence. We report that greater proximity to the U.S. ports of entry along the Mexico-US border, ports, and airports furthers the number of competitors, and such increase boosts violence. The second effect shapes the intensity of competition among DTOs. Reductions in the costs of excluding competing DTOs from using the facility could trigger greater confrontation among DTOs. We confirm the importance of this second effect in relation to ports and the U.S. ports of entry along the Mexico-US border.

AbstractThis article investigates the relationship between levels of party institutionalization and individual-level partisan mobilization. Levels of party institutionalization have been linked to macro-level outcomes such as party system stability, but little is known about the micro-level underpinnings of such patterns. This article investigates one set of mechanisms through which party institutionalization might affect electoral outcomes. Specifically, we ask how routinization and value infusion – two central dimensions of party institutionalization – shape partisans' political mobilization. We investigate these relationships by matching data on individual-level behaviour (taken from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2014 wave) with data on party attributes commonly associated with levels of institutionalization (taken from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project – DALP). We find that while value infusion encourages relatively greater participation from non-member supporters, party routinization depresses non-member participation but may mobilize otherwise inactive members. These findings suggest that to understand the effects of party institutionalization on a macro-level phenomenon such as electoral volatility, it may be necessary to study how parties institutionalize, rather than just asking how much they institutionalize.

AbstractPolitical economists have argued that the design of political institutions bears important consequences for the quality of public policy, especially in areas like the privatization and regulation of utilities. Our study looks at how variations in key institutional traits of executive and legislative branches (specifically presidents' legislative powers, presidents' prerogatives to designate the director of the regulatory agency, and legislative fragmentation) affect investment in Latin American telecommunications, a critical sector for economic development. Institutional factors influence how easily executives and important political (legislative) parties can alter policies related to the telecommunications sector. We find that resolute institutional designs foster investment in the sector, but only under private ownership. For state‐owned firms, decisive institutional designs have better effects on investment.Related ArticlesMontes de Oca Barrera, and Laura Beatriz. 2019. "Persistent Exclusion in Mexico: Regulatory Governance as an Imperfect Project of Political Modernization."Politics & Policy47 (1): 127‐151.https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12291Moreno, Erika, and Richard C. Witmer. 2015. "Where Capacity and Incentives Meet: Presidential Decree Authority and Property Rights in Latin America."Politics & Policy43 (3): 315‐346.https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12118Wise, Carol, and Cintia Quiliconi. 2007. "China's Surge in Latin American Markets: Policy Challenges and Responses."Politics & Policy35 (3): 410‐438.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2007.00067.x

Reports of party membership have documented steep declines in formal enrollment in many countries, but numbers alone tell us little about the systemic causes or likely implications of such drops. Existing cross-national surveys can help illuminate the extent and consequences of these changes. Unfortunately, they are difficult to use for this purpose because differences in question wording and institutional differences in the meaning of party membership produce unstable results. This paper proposes to overcome these obstacles by using behavioral measures of party membership in survey-based studies of party membership. We demonstrate that such measures produce results which are more consistent across surveys and therefore more meaningful. We then illustrate their utility by using a behaviorally-qualified measure to study how party membership decline has affected parties' ability to mobilize grassroots partisan participation. Our analysis also shows that even though reported party membership declined from the 1990s to the 2000s, there was surprisingly little change in this decade in the number of politically active partisans.