In this paper, I analyze the impact of the extension of the ECB s collateral framework on securities sales. In addition, I evaluate the impact of different macroeconomic and bank-specific characteristics on banks selling behavior. At this, I distinguish between healthy banks and banks rescued from the German government hypothesizing that distressed banks manage sales of their assets differently. My analysis is based on quantile regressions for panel data containing securities holdings of 27 German banks, which allows an assessment of extremely large sales. Such selling behavior could cause a collapse of prices and lead to fire sales adversely impacting other financial institutions. I find clear evidence that the ECB s collateral framework has a stabilizing impact on sales of assets, especially for impaired banks and during the crisis the relationship is significant.
We test if unconventional monetary policy instruments influence the competitive conduct of banks. Between q2:2010 and q1:2012, the ECB absorbed €218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Using detailed security holdings data at the bank level, we show that banks exposed to this unexpected (loose) policy shock mildly gained local loan and deposit market shares. Shifts in market shares are driven by banks that increased SMP security holdings during the lifetime of the program and that hold the largest relative SMP portfolio shares. Holding other securities from periphery countries that were not part of the SMP amplifies the positive market share responses. Monopolistic rents approximated by Lerner indices are lower for SMP banks, suggesting a role of the SMP to re-distribute market power differentially, but not necessarily banking profits.
We analyze the relation between market-based credit risk interconnectedness among banks during the crisis and the associated balance sheet linkages via funding and securities holdings. For identification, we use a proprietary dataset that has the funding positions of banks at the bank-to-bank level for 2006-13 in conjunction with investments of banks at the security level and the credit register from Germany. We find asymmetries both cross-sectionally and over time: when banks face difficulties to raise funding, the interbank lending a↵ects market-based bank interconnectedness. Moreover, banks with investments in securities related to troubled classes have a higher credit risk interconnectedness. Overall, our results suggest that market-based measures of interdependence can serve well as risk monitoring tools in the absence of disaggregated high-frequency bank fundamental data.
In this paper, we describe the results for the section "Stress Testing Methodology forKazakh Banking System" which is part of the "Development of an Early Warning Systemfor Kazakhstan" project. The participating Kazakh institutions are the National Bank ofKazakhstan (NBRK), the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) and the National AnalyticalCentre of the Government and the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NAC). In this section,we apply different methodologies for developing stress testing tools for the Kazakhbanking system: the "bottom-up" and "top-down" approaches. The "bottom-up" approachis based on questionnaires we have transmitted to Kazakh banks asking them to calculatetheir own risk positions under stress. The collected results and the analyses show thatbanks tend to underestimate the decline in real estate prices and to overestimate currencydevaluation. In the "top-down" approach, we apply methodologies for portfolio andmacro stress tests to raw data collected by FSA and estimate the impact of the externalmacroeconomic shocks on the expected losses of financial institutions. In the portfoliostress test, the change in the expected losses under stress ranges between 34 percent and86 percent relative to the unconditional expected losses. In the macro stress test, we findan average change of 26 percent in the ratio of bad loans to total loans under stressscenario 1 and an average change of 80 percent under scenario 2 relative to the baselinescenario.
Over the past few years the CDS market's role has evolved from mostly providing default protection towards credit risk trading. The first-ever credit event in a developed country's sovereign CDS has further highlighted the importance of the CDS market from a macro-prudential perspective. Developments in the European sovereign CDS market are a part of the major structural shift in euro sovereign debt: in the market's view, there has been a significant shift from sovereign debt as a (default-free) risk-free benchmark (i.e. bearing interest rate risk only) to sovereign debt as a credit risk asset. Therefore, a significant repricing of the entire asset category has taken place, with major implications ranging from asset allocation to risk management. This implies that some policy issues are not necessarily and exclusively related to the CDS market, but are part of broader developments in the EU financial system. This Occasional Paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the CDS market from a macroprudential perspective. In order to so, a wide range of analytical approaches is applied: Structural analysis of the EU CDS market: description of the market structure, key segments, concentration and evolution over time. Network analysis of bilateral CDS exposures: description of the structure and resilience of the network at an aggregate level as well as of sub-samples. In particular, analysis is conducted on: (i) the aggregated CDS network; (ii) various sub-networks, such as the sovereign CDS network; and (iii) networks for particular CDS reference entities. In order to carry out this analysis, we applied the established literature on interbank and payment systems networks to the CDS exposures network. "Super-spreader" analysis: identification of key "too interconnected to fail" market participants, their activities in the CDS market and their risk-bearing capacity. Scenario analysis of sovereign credit risk: the impact of sovereign credit events on the EU banking system and their potential spillovers. Domino effects in the CDS market: estimation of default chain scenarios for major participants in the CDS market; again, following the literature on interbank networks, we analysed the network impact of the collapse of a major market participant. Comparison of market- and exposure-based assessments of contagion: systemic risk rankings based on market price estimates (e.g. CoVaR) are compared with the rankings obtained using confidential DTCC exposure data in order to understand to what extent market participants are aware of who is a systemically relevant trader in the CDS market and whether these measures of systemic risk are consistent.
