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Motivation: Cross-country growth regressions indicate that institutions are important for growth. Some institutions are created, protected and enforced by the government — they are the institutions of state. The most important for economic growth are: economic freedom and protection of property rights, political freedom (or democracy), quality of governance and the rule of law. The changes that took place after 1989 in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe were not only political but also economic. The post-socialist transition was, above all, a change of the institutions of state. It was a kind of the so-called 'quasi-natural experiment'. Therefore, my intention is to answer the question: how the institutions of state affect economic growth in transition countries.Aim: The aim is to identify the impact state institutions had on the economic growth in transition countries during the financial crisis of 2007–2010.Results: In the first part of this article I review the literature and present hypothesis about dependency of economic growth and institutions during the financial crisis in transition countries. In the relevant literature there is a consensus that without an appropriate institutional background, market incentives do not lead to optimal resource allocation. Institutions have a particularly crucial impact in the case of post-socialist countries which have undergone political and economic transition. A significant and positive impact on economic growth rate is exercised by such institutions as: protection of property rights and political stabilization, government efficiency and rule of law. The experiences of transition countries confirm also the significance of economic freedom for economic situation.

Motivation: Cross-country growth regressions indicate that institutions are important for growth. Some institutions are created, protected and enforced by the government — they are the institutions of state. The most important for economic growth are: economic freedom and protection of property rights, political freedom (or democracy), quality of governance and the rule of law. Institutions are especially important in transition countries. Two questions arise: were institutions important for economic growth in transition countries during the financial crisis? What happened to the institutions of state during the financial crisis?Aim: The aim of the second part of this article is to verify two hypothesis about institutions and economic growth in transition countries, which were put forward in the first part of this article. In order to estimate the relationship between institutions and economic growth in transition countries during the crisis, a cross-sectional regression was conducted. Additionally the Granger causality test was conducted.Results: The obtained results indicate that during the recession, in countries were before the crisis the institutions were worse, the pace of the economic growth was greater (hypothesis 1 should be rejected). In order to verify hypothesis 2 that the economic growth contributes to changes in state institutions in such a way that the faster the pace of growth the greater the improvement in state institutions a cross-sectional regression was used and the Granger causality test was conducted. Obtained results do not confirm the hypothesis 2. The estimates of parameters were in line with the expectations but statistically insignificant.

Motivation: Cross-country growth regressions indicate that institutions are important for growth. Some institutions are created, protected and enforced by the government — they are the institutions of state. The most important for economic growth are: economic freedom and protection of property rights, political freedom (or democracy), quality of governance and the rule of law. The changes that took place after 1989 in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe were not only political but also economic. The post-socialist transition was, above all, a change of the institutions of state. It was a kind of the so-called 'quasi-natural experiment'. Therefore, my intention is to answer the question: how the institutions of state affect economic growth in transition countries.Aim: The aim is to identify the impact state institutions had on the economic growth in transition countries during the financial crisis of 2007–2010.Results: In the first part of this article I review the literature and present hypothesis about dependency of economic growth and institutions during the financial crisis in transition countries. In the relevant literature there is a consensus that without an appropriate institutional background, market incentives do not lead to optimal resource allocation. Institutions have a particularly crucial impact in the case of post-socialist countries which have undergone political and economic transition. A significant and positive impact on economic growth rate is exercised by such institutions as: protection of property rights and political stabilization, government efficiency and rule of law. The experiences of transition countries confirm also the significance of economic freedom for economic situation.

Motivation: Cross-country growth regressions indicate that institutions are important for growth. Some institutions are created, protected and enforced by the government — they are the institutions of state. The most important for economic growth are: economic freedom and protection of property rights, political freedom (or democracy), quality of governance and the rule of law. Institutions are especially important in transition countries. Two questions arise: were institutions important for economic growth in transition countries during the financial crisis? What happened to the institutions of state during the financial crisis?Aim: The aim of the second part of this article is to verify two hypothesis about institutions and economic growth in transition countries, which were put forward in the first part of this article. In order to estimate the relationship between institutions and economic growth in transition countries during the crisis, a cross-sectional regression was conducted. Additionally the Granger causality test was conducted.Results: The obtained results indicate that during the recession, in countries were before the crisis the institutions were worse, the pace of the economic growth was greater (hypothesis 1 should be rejected). In order to verify hypothesis 2 that the economic growth contributes to changes in state institutions in such a way that the faster the pace of growth the greater the improvement in state institutions a cross-sectional regression was used and the Granger causality test was conducted. Obtained results do not confirm the hypothesis 2. The estimates of parameters were in line with the expectations but statistically insignificant.

Motivation: economic literature indicates that differences in the inequality levels among modern countries can be attributed to many factors or processes such as: economic performance, natural resources endowments, demographical structure or institutional framework. It seems to be important to emphasize that in the case of post-socialist countries where many predetermined trajectories of inequalities were adopted policies and institutions played an important role in shaping inequality.Aim: in this context the question about the role of political freedom — as one of the key aspects of institutional framework — for the levels of inequality in these countries seems to be especially important. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the role of different political institutions adopted in post-socialist countries for the levels of income inequalities observed among them.Results: the obtained results indicate that the post-socialist countries which managed to create more inclusive political institutions experience lower inequalities in the distribution of disposable income.

Motivation: economic literature indicates that differences in the inequality levels among modern countries can be attributed to many factors or processes such as: economic performance, natural resources endowments, demographical structure or institutional framework. It seems to be important to emphasize that in the case of post-socialist countries where many predetermined trajectories of inequalities were adopted policies and institutions played an important role in shaping inequality.Aim: in this context the question about the role of political freedom — as one of the key aspects of institutional framework — for the levels of inequality in these countries seems to be especially important. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the role of different political institutions adopted in post-socialist countries for the levels of income inequalities observed among them.Results: the obtained results indicate that the post-socialist countries which managed to create more inclusive political institutions experience lower inequalities in the distribution of disposable income.

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Purpose – The article looks at Thorstein Veblen's views on economics and the role of institutions in the economy. The aim of the article is to reconstruct, based on literature, Veblen's views on economics as a science and the concept and role of institutions in the economy. Research method – Critical analysis and synthesis of source literature were used as a basic research method to prepare this paper. Results – Veblen believes that economics should be an evolutionary science. As such, it should focus on examining the evolution of institutions and their impact on society and the economy. There are no natural laws or tendency towards equilibrium, but there is constant evolution, shaped by the interplay of institutions, technological progress and human activities. Originality / value / implications / recommendations – Based on a critical analysis and synthesis of Veblen's works, his views on economics and the role of institutions are presented. Veblen's conclusions and recommendations should be interesting, especially because of the criticism that has been levelled at mainstream economics since the financial crisis of 2008–2009 and given the fourth industrial revolution.

This article discusses political state capture in the context of party patronage. Evidence of this is delivered from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the rotations of members of their management and supervisory boards. In this case, it is deemed that an interest group, which consists of politicians and representatives in the government administration, decides about the appointment and dismissal of board members through the corporate governance of SOEs and ownership policy of the state. We analyzed the scale and intensity of rotations in Poland of about twelve thousand joint-stock companies in the years 2001–2017 according to their ownership structure. We show that changes of managers and supervisory board members in state-owned enterprises are higher than in private companies and are related to political elections. We estimated that on average three months after a new government is formed, a peak of changes in the composition of boards is observed, though they are earlier in the case of a supervisory board. We conclude that this can be regarded as an example of state capture by politicians.

The aim of this report is to present and evaluate the changes which have taken place in institutions of 28 transition countries after 1989. Institutions are here understood as formal rules, including procedural and regulatory institutional solutions determining the economic and political structure of a country. Bearing this in mind, the report provides an analysis of the political system (democracy or dictatorship) and the efficiency of the state institutions, i.e. whether they ensure economic freedom and good governance. Also institutional solutions created by states were analysed, with focus on two areas particularly important for the economy: the labour market and the banking sector. ; Publication with support of the National Science Centre, NCN, grant no. 2011/01/B/HS4/00802, titled: "State in relation to economic freedom. Theory and practice of transition". ; Michał Pilc