Suchergebnisse

Mislukking van Turkse migrantenjongeren op school wordt vaak toegeschreven aan culturele waardenverschillen : de traditionele Turkse cultuur zou groepsgericht zijn en individuele prestaties ontmoedigen. Om de psychologische betekenis van groepsgerichtheid en prestatiemotivatie bij Turkse migrantenjongeren te onderzoeken, werden hun motivationele keuzen in belangrijke levensdomeinen vergeleken met de keuzen van Belgische jongeren en Turkse jongeren in Turkije, rekening houdend met sociale klasse. Vanuit onze interesse in cultuurverandering en sociale mobiliteit, werden Turkse migrantenjongeren vergeleken met moderne Turkse jongeren in Istanbul. Cross-cultureel werden motivationele conflicten gevonden tussen groepsloyaliteit en autonomie en tussen individuele prestatie en sociaal contact. Voorkeur voorgroepsloyaliteit samen met individuele prestatie in het Turkse werkethos toonde een synthese aan van groepsgerichte en individualistische waarden. Vanuit het Turkse werkethos wordt een sociale-promotiemodel voorgesteld voor Turkse migrantenjongeren.

Media depicted Turkish Gezi Park protests as a clash between secularists and Islamists within a majority-Muslim country. Extending a social identity approach to protests this study aims (a) to distinguish the protest participants in terms of their opinion-based group memberships (b) to investigate how their religious identification and their group membership were associated with democratic attitudes. Six hundred and fifty highly educated urban young adult participants were surveyed during the protest. Latent class analysis of participants' political concerns and online and offline actions yielded four distinct opinion-based groups labeled liberals secularists moderates and conservatives. Looking at the intersection of the participants' group identities with their Muslim identification we observed that the higher conservatives' and moderates' religious identification the less they endorsed democratic attitudes whereas religious identification made little or no difference in liberals' and secularists' democratic attitudes. Our findings of distinct groups among protest participants in a majority-Muslim country challenge an essentialist understanding of religion as a homogeneous social identity.

How inclusive are European national identities of Muslim minorities and how can we explain cross-cultural variation in inclusiveness? To address these questions, we draw on large-scale school-based surveys of Muslim minority and non-Muslim majority and other minority youth in five European countries (Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey [CILS]; Belgium, England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden). Our double comparison of national identification across groups and countries reveals that national identities are less strongly endorsed by all minorities compared with majority youth, but national identification is lowest among Muslims. This descriptive evidence resonates with public concerns about the insufficient inclusion of immigrant minorities in general, and Muslims in particular, in European national identities. In addition, significant country variation in group differences in identification suggest that some national identities are more inclusive of Muslims than others. Taking an intergroup relations approach to the inclusiveness of national identities for Muslims, we establish that beyond religious commitment, positive intergroup contact (majority friendship) plays a major role in explaining differences in national identification in multigroup multilevel mediation models, whereas experiences of discrimination in school do not contribute to this explanation. Our comparative findings thus establish contextual variation in the inclusiveness of intergroup relations and European national identities for Muslim minorities.

Media depicted Turkish Gezi Park protests as a clash between secularists and Islamists within a majority-Muslim country. Extending a social identity approach to protests, this study aims (a) to distinguish the protest participants in terms of their opinion-based group memberships, (b) to investigate how their religious identification and their group membership were associated with democratic attitudes. Six hundred and fifty highly educated urban young adult participants were surveyed during the protest. Latent class analysis of participants' political concerns and online and offline actions yielded four distinct opinion-based groups labeled "liberals," "secularists," "moderates," and "conservatives." Looking at the intersection of the participants' group identities with their Muslim identification, we observed that the higher conservatives' and moderates' religious identification, the less they endorsed democratic attitudes, whereas religious identification made little or no difference in liberals' and secularists' democratic attitudes. Our findings of distinct groups among protest participants in a majority-Muslim country challenge an essentialist understanding of religion as a homogeneous social identity.

Drawing on large‐scale comparative surveys across nine sociopolitical contexts, we address the question when and why ethno‐religious and city or national identities of European‐born Muslims are in conflict. We argue that the sociopolitical context makes the difference between identity compatibility or conflict and that conflict arises from perceived discrimination and related negative feelings towards the national majority. Using multigroup structural equation modelling, we examine how Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in five European cities combine their civic membership of the city and country of residence—as common identities shared with the national majority—with distinct ethnic and religious identities. In all sociopolitical contexts, participants combined significant city and national identities with strong ethnic and religious identifications. Yet, identification patterns varied between contexts from conflict (negatively correlated minority and civic identities) over compartmentalization (zero correlations) to compatibility (positive correlations). Muslims who perceived more personal discrimination were more committed to their ethnic and religious identities while simultaneously dis‐identifying from their country and city. Across cities, discrimination experiences and negative majority‐group evaluations explained away identity conflict.