Suchergebnisse

Mislukking van Turkse migrantenjongeren op school wordt vaak toegeschreven aan culturele waardenverschillen : de traditionele Turkse cultuur zou groepsgericht zijn en individuele prestaties ontmoedigen. Om de psychologische betekenis van groepsgerichtheid en prestatiemotivatie bij Turkse migrantenjongeren te onderzoeken, werden hun motivationele keuzen in belangrijke levensdomeinen vergeleken met de keuzen van Belgische jongeren en Turkse jongeren in Turkije, rekening houdend met sociale klasse. Vanuit onze interesse in cultuurverandering en sociale mobiliteit, werden Turkse migrantenjongeren vergeleken met moderne Turkse jongeren in Istanbul. Cross-cultureel werden motivationele conflicten gevonden tussen groepsloyaliteit en autonomie en tussen individuele prestatie en sociaal contact. Voorkeur voorgroepsloyaliteit samen met individuele prestatie in het Turkse werkethos toonde een synthese aan van groepsgerichte en individualistische waarden. Vanuit het Turkse werkethos wordt een sociale-promotiemodel voorgesteld voor Turkse migrantenjongeren.

Abstract
When is migrants' socio-economic attainment associated with enhanced national belonging to their residence country? Drawing on a large-scale survey, we compare migrants from the same 10 origin countries across Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. We exploit this double comparison across origin groups and residence countries to contextualize mixed findings of positive, negative, and null associations between migrants' socio-economic attainment and national belonging in earlier research. We introduce the notion of ethnic boundaries to situate when migrants' socio-economic attainment and belonging are positively or negatively associated. We examine how migrants' socio-economic attainment interacts with contextual variation in ethnic boundaries and with individual-level variation in perceptions of ethnic boundaries based on perceived group discrimination. Multi-group structural equation models show that migrants' socio-economic attainment is often decoupled from national belonging. However, they also reveal crucial contextual variation as same-origin migrants can succeed socio-economically with or without feeling belonging in different residence countries. At the individual level, perceived group discrimination conditions this association, so that socio-economic attainment translates into more national belonging only when perceptions of discrimination are low. Our comparative findings of contingent national belonging thereby challenge existing assumptions that associations between socio-economic attainment and national belonging are linear and that ethnic boundaries in European migration contexts are rigid.

Media depicted Turkish Gezi Park protests as a clash between secularists and Islamists within a majority-Muslim country. Extending a social identity approach to protests, this study aims (a) to distinguish the protest participants in terms of their opinion-based group memberships, (b) to investigate how their religious identification and their group membership were associated with democratic attitudes. Six hundred and fifty highly educated urban young adult participants were surveyed during the protest. Latent class analysis of participants' political concerns and online and offline actions yielded four distinct opinion-based groups labeled "liberals," "secularists," "moderates," and "conservatives." Looking at the intersection of the participants' group identities with their Muslim identification, we observed that the higher conservatives' and moderates' religious identification, the less they endorsed democratic attitudes, whereas religious identification made little or no difference in liberals' and secularists' democratic attitudes. Our findings of distinct groups among protest participants in a majority-Muslim country challenge an essentialist understanding of religion as a homogeneous social identity.

Media depicted Turkish Gezi Park protests as a clash between secularists and Islamists within a majority-Muslim country. Extending a social identity approach to protests this study aims (a) to distinguish the protest participants in terms of their opinion-based group memberships (b) to investigate how their religious identification and their group membership were associated with democratic attitudes. Six hundred and fifty highly educated urban young adult participants were surveyed during the protest. Latent class analysis of participants' political concerns and online and offline actions yielded four distinct opinion-based groups labeled liberals secularists moderates and conservatives. Looking at the intersection of the participants' group identities with their Muslim identification we observed that the higher conservatives' and moderates' religious identification the less they endorsed democratic attitudes whereas religious identification made little or no difference in liberals' and secularists' democratic attitudes. Our findings of distinct groups among protest participants in a majority-Muslim country challenge an essentialist understanding of religion as a homogeneous social identity.

How inclusive are European national identities of Muslim minorities and how can we explain cross-cultural variation in inclusiveness? To address these questions, we draw on large-scale school-based surveys of Muslim minority and non-Muslim majority and other minority youth in five European countries (Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey [CILS]; Belgium, England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden). Our double comparison of national identification across groups and countries reveals that national identities are less strongly endorsed by all minorities compared with majority youth, but national identification is lowest among Muslims. This descriptive evidence resonates with public concerns about the insufficient inclusion of immigrant minorities in general, and Muslims in particular, in European national identities. In addition, significant country variation in group differences in identification suggest that some national identities are more inclusive of Muslims than others. Taking an intergroup relations approach to the inclusiveness of national identities for Muslims, we establish that beyond religious commitment, positive intergroup contact (majority friendship) plays a major role in explaining differences in national identification in multigroup multilevel mediation models, whereas experiences of discrimination in school do not contribute to this explanation. Our comparative findings thus establish contextual variation in the inclusiveness of intergroup relations and European national identities for Muslim minorities.

Media depicted Turkish Gezi Park protests as a clash between secularists and Islamists within a majority-Muslim country. Extending a social identity approach to protests, this study aims (a) to distinguish the protest participants in terms of their opinion-based group memberships, (b) to investigate how their religious identification and their group membership were associated with democratic attitudes. Six hundred and fifty highly educated urban young adult participants were surveyed during the protest. Latent class analysis of participants' political concerns and online and offline actions yielded four distinct opinion-based groups labeled "liberals," "secularists," "moderates," and "conservatives." Looking at the intersection of the participants' group identities with their Muslim identification, we observed that the higher conservatives' and moderates' religious identification, the less they endorsed democratic attitudes, whereas religious identification made little or no difference in liberals' and secularists' democratic attitudes. Our findings of distinct groups among protest participants in a majority-Muslim country challenge an essentialist understanding of religion as a homogeneous social identity.