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Situated within the debate on terrorism risk and security, this book investigates the role of private companies in counter-terrorism policies. With case studies on airports, airlines, ports and food production companies it challenges the modern understandings of national security and corporate risk.

Several US think tanks and newspapers have described the current security situation in Ukraine as marking a new world order – a post-post Cold War – in which Russia and China have entered the scene as major powers, and where the EU's internal power relations are consolidated and strengthened. However, the description of this new reality of great power rivalry is only part of the picture that emerges. The fact of the matter is that our ideas about how to combat threats and who is responsible for this fight have fundamentally changed. Today's geopolitics are not only fought by states, within the framework of diplomacy and military institutions, but also by Danish and other Western companies. This article examines what characterizes the role of Danish companies in Danish security politics and what this development means for our understanding of security politics in the coming years.

Flere amerikanske tænketanke og aviser har beskrevet den nuværende sikkerhedspolitiske situation i Ukraine som en markering af en ny verdensorden – en post-post kold krig – hvor Rusland og Kina for alvor er trådt ind på scenen som stormagter, og hvor EU's interne magtrelationer konsolideres og styrkes. Beskrivelsen af denne nye virkelighed af stormagtsrivalisering er dog kun en del af det billede, som tegner sig. For sagen er den, at vores idéer om, hvordan trusler skal bekæmpes, og hvem der har ansvaret for denne bekæmpelse, er fundamentalt forandret. Dagens geopolitik kæmpes nemlig ikke kun af stater, indenfor rammerne af diplomatiet og de militære institutioner, men også af private virksomheder. Denne artikel undersøger, hvad der kendetegner de danske virksomheders rolle i dansk og international sikkerhedspolitik og kommer med bud på, hvad denne udvikling betyder for vores forståelse af den kommende sikkerhedspolitiske æra.

The academic environments of risk analysis and security studies had hardly 'spoken' to one another until recently. The two fields of study were defined within different academic disciplines: security studies a matter for International Relations (IR), and risk studies a matter for sociology, economics and the natural sciences. Increased focus on catastrophic events (terrorism, climate change, etc.) seems to have given the fields of security studies and risk analysis a common empirical theme and highlighted the need for a common research agenda. This article explores the intersection between these two fields of study, as it investigates how the 'old' disciplinary debates on risk have been translated 'into' security studies -- to predict, criticize or evaluate the current political practice of security. Such analysis provides a much-needed overview of the risk debates within security studies and brings out the limits of this debate in light of the broader and much more historically settled risk debates within sociology, economics and anthropology. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

The academic environments of risk analysis and security studies had hardly 'spoken' to one another until recently. The two fields of study were defined within different academic disciplines: security studies a matter for International Relations (IR), and risk studies a matter for sociology, economics and the natural sciences. Increased focus on catastrophic events (terrorism, climate change, etc.) seems to have given the fields of security studies and risk analysis a common empirical theme and highlighted the need for a common research agenda. This article explores the intersection between these two fields of study, as it investigates how the 'old' disciplinary debates on risk have been translated 'into' security studies — to predict, criticize or evaluate the current political practice of security. Such analysis provides a much-needed overview of the risk debates within security studies and brings out the limits of this debate in light of the broader and much more historically settled risk debates within sociology, economics and anthropology.

PurposeBuilding on the steps to war model, this paper seeks to examine the impact that territorial Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) have on the time it takes a dyad to go to war after it experiences its first MID.Design/methodology/approachA model common to epidemiological research, the hazard model, is employed to examine the dyadic relationship from the time of the first MID forward. This is an improvement to dyadic analysis, as most research examines the characteristics of individual MIDs in isolation.FindingsDyads with a history of territorial MIDs go to war much more quickly than dyads without a history of territorial MIDs. Future research should explore the relationship between territory, war, and power status to test the assertion that minor power states engage in power politics behavior less frequently.Practical implicationsConflict resolution measures need to be employed more quickly when states have unresolved territorial issues. Mediation generally does not occur quickly, which may explain why territorial issues are less likely to be referred to mediators and less successfully mediated. The results presented herein highlight the need for flexible, quick responses to certain crises and the need to settle borders and other territorial disputes permanently to avoid war.Originality/valueThe paper tests a critical component of the steps to war model and examines the assertion that the historical relationship between states affects conflict decisions.