The equivalence of price and quantity competition with incentive scheme commitment
In: Discussion paper 1224
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In: Discussion paper 1224
In: Journal of Retailing, Band 93, Heft 4
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In: Journal of international economics, Band 66, Heft 1, S. 215-231
ISSN: 0022-1996
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Working paper
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Working paper
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 391-415
ISSN: 1756-2171
In many competitive environments, players need to commit either to a specific goal they will achieve (an output target) or to the resources they are willing to expend in pursuit of that goal (an input budget). We model this situation as a two‐stage game where players may compete either by setting input and letting their output follow from the environment ("leading input"), or by setting output and letting the input levels required to support the output targets follow ("leading output"). We show that when each player's output is increasing (decreasing) in his rival's input, leading input (output) dominates leading output (input).
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 284
ISSN: 1756-2171