Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn 1990, 30 per cent of Indonesian population had no access to improved drinking water source. Almost 65 per cent lacked access to improved sanitation—and almost 40 per cent defecate in the open. One of the Millennium Development Goals' objectives is to halve these numbers of disadvantaged by 2015. We explore the recent progress using World Health Organization/United Nations Children Fund report and the Indonesia's Socio‐Economic Survey. We conclude that the country still face a great challenge to meet the targets, especially on sanitation. We next illustrate the importance of these facilities by estimating their impact on diarrhoea incidence. We find that the relative importance of sanitation is higher than that of water. A household with 'unimproved' drinking water source is about 12 per cent more likely to have diarrhoea than that otherwise. Lacking of improved sanitation, on the other hand, makes the household member about 23–27 per cent more likely to suffer from it.

AbstractThe global COVID‐19 vaccination has been marred by the problem of inequity. Low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs), including Indonesia, must overcome global and local barriers to provide doses to their population. Due to a lack of domestic R&D capability, Indonesia relied on global vaccine producers that are subject to the whims of their own governments. Ensuring equitable access domestically was also a challenge as public sector resources were limited. Using the four dimensions of vaccine access to examine Indonesia's COVID‐19 inoculation campaign reveals gaps in the government's perception of vaccination inequity. While the administration fervently advocates for global vaccination equity, local barriers received minimal attention. Indonesia's case highlights how domestic political dynamics can stymie a global effort and that resolving vaccination inequity requires lowering both global and local barriers. Finally, LMICs should also consider including private sector resources in their pandemic response to complement their limited public sector resources.

For the majority of Indonesians, rice is a must in every meal. So important is rice that much of Indonesia's food security lies in this commodity. The government has intervened extensively and monopolised rice markets for decades, yet, Indonesians continue to be met with expensive rice prices at markets, and farmers struggle to build decent livelihoods for themselves. In this paper we discuss how the Indonesian government should explore the feasibility of solutions such as a commodity futures market to stabilise prices and support farmers to get a fair return on their harvests.

We explore the ups and downs of trade protectionism in Indonesia since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. The key constraints to unilateral trade reform include exchange rate factors, the political economy of consumer-producer behaviour, institutional complexity and global pressures. We conclude that trade reform is likely to face difficulties, with protectionism on the rise again, but that, during the temporary halt in the World Trade Organization's Doha Round of trade negotiations, Indonesia may be able to use regional and international engagement to counterbalance rising protectionism.

Recent political developments are slowing reforms. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the finance ministry find themselves entrapped in legal inquiries and political wrangling that seem intended to weaken their reforming zeal. KPK's effectiveness has been undermined by legislative changes and the arrests of three of its commissioners. Meanwhile, the costly bail-out of a small bank has provided an opportunity for attacks on leading reformers - Vice President Boediono and the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati. The president's diffident stance in both instances has played into the hands of the opposition and, although key reformers are likely to remain in office, the political imbroglio has nonetheless eroded confidence in the government. Year-on-year GDP growth recovered strongly to 5.4% in the fourth quarter of 2009. Government spending has been the key driver, while household spending slowed and investment remained low. Both exports and imports have returned to modest growth. Although 2009 ended with low inflation, Bank Indonesia (BI) has set its target inflation rate for 2010 at double the rate it achieved in November. BI is likely to bow to populist demands to lower nominal interest rates rather than raising them somewhat to prevent inflation accelerating, even though its real policy rate has been consistent with significant acceleration of GDP growth. The 2009 budget outcomes confirm that the fiscal stimulus in response to the global financial crisis has been less than hoped for. As for 2010, high world oil prices will imply huge subsidies, given that the government is unwilling to increase domestic fuel and electricity prices commensurately. The president announced that virtually all the government's 'first 100 days' program targets have been met. However, half of the 'action plans' amounted to nothing more than issuing or announcing new regulations, plans, blueprints, guidelines, recommendations or policies, or simply preparing drafts of these. No real progress has been made in relation to the most urgent reforms, particularly on energy subsidies and labour market regulation. Realising that the whole population would benefit in net terms, the previous government signed the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) in November 2004. But just when the agreement was to take effect, strong resistance from business and parliamentarians emerged, leading to the government's decision to re-negotiate many tariffs with China. This is disappointing: failing to uphold its commitments under this long-standing agreement makes Indonesia appear unreliable as an economic partner.

Recent political developments are slowing reforms. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the finance ministry find themselves entrapped in legal inquiries and political wrangling that seem intended to weaken their reforming zeal. KPK's effectiveness has been undermined by legislative changes and the arrests of three of its commissioners. Meanwhile, the costly bail-out of a small bank has provided an opportunity for attacks on leading reformers - Vice President Boediono and the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati. The president's diffident stance in both instances has played into the hands of the opposition and, although key reformers are likely to remain in office, the political imbroglio has nonetheless eroded confidence in the government. Year-on-year GDP growth recovered strongly to 5.4% in the fourth quarter of 2009. Government spending has been the key driver, while household spending slowed and investment remained low. Both exports and imports have returned to modest growth. Although 2009 ended with low inflation, Bank Indonesia (BI) has set its target inflation rate for 2010 at double the rate it achieved in November. BI is likely to bow to populist demands to lower nominal interest rates rather than raising them somewhat to prevent inflation accelerating, even though its real policy rate has been consistent with significant acceleration of GDP growth. The 2009 budget outcomes confirm that the fiscal stimulus in response to the global financial crisis has been less than hoped for. As for 2010, high world oil prices will imply huge subsidies, given that the government is unwilling to increase domestic fuel and electricity prices commensurately. The president announced that virtually all the government's 'first 100 days' program targets have been met. However, half of the 'action plans' amounted to nothing more than issuing or announcing new regulations, plans, blueprints, guidelines, recommendations or policies, or simply preparing drafts of these. No real progress has been made in relation to the most urgent reforms, particularly on energy subsidies and labour market regulation. Realising that the whole population would benefit in net terms, the previous government signed the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) in November 2004. But just when the agreement was to take effect, strong resistance from business and parliamentarians emerged, leading to the government's decision to re-negotiate many tariffs with China. This is disappointing: failing to uphold its commitments under this long-standing agreement makes Indonesia appear unreliable as an economic partner.

We explore the ups and downs of trade protectionism in Indonesia since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. The key constraints to unilateral trade reform include exchange rate factors, the political economy of consumer-producer behaviour, institutional complexity and global pressures. We conclude that trade reform is likely to face difficulties, with protectionism on the rise again, but that, during the temporary halt in the World Trade Organization's Doha Round of trade negotiations, Indonesia may be able to use regional and international engagement to counterbalance rising protectionism.

The implementation of Large Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) to prevent further spreading of Covid-19 has disrupted food production and distribution chains across Indonesia. The government is facing the difficult task of balancing the need to enforce physical distancing measures with maintaining food security where industry stakeholders are expressing challenges from increasing operational and distribution restrictions. CIPS' Mitigating Food Supply Chain Disruptions amidst COVID-19 Restrictions Policy Brief outlines recommended measures that can be taken by Indonesian policymakers to mitigate the risks of disruption on food distribution and consumer access to food supplies. The Brief includes an outline on food price volatility experienced before the crisis, as well as Indonesia's existing logistical challenges that are contributing factors to Indonesia's overall food security.

Much of the existing investment climate literature promotes a rule-based 'good governance'approach, in which less advanced economies are advised to adopt orthodox, OECD-type practices in order to facilitate higher investment and growth. Although credible

ABSTRACTThere is little doubt that protecting property rights, reducing corruption, and improving public services are desirable long-term objectives for all countries. But are such institutional prescriptions sufficient, or even necessary, to achieve investment and growth? By exploring the political economy of the cities of Solo and Manado in Indonesia, this article shows that relationship-based, rather than rule-based, cooperation between government leaders and local firms can provide an effective mechanism to boost investment and improve local investment climates. Our findings challenge the conventional wisdom that impartial rule-based economic governance is a precondition for investment, although it suggests that the creation of such institutions may make growth more sustainable and equitable in the medium and long term.

Much of the existing investment climate literature promotes a rule-based 'good governance'approach, in which less advanced economies are advised to adopt orthodox, OECD-type practices in order to facilitate higher investment and growth. Although credible