Suchergebnisse

Nurmi has analysed a number of voting procedures with respect to various criteria. It has been pointed out that acceptability voting not only fares as well as approval voting under Nurmi's type of analysis but also may be more intuitively appealing to voters.

Nurmi has analysed a number of voting procedures with respect to various criteria. The purpose of this Comment is to extend Nurmi's analysis to include the so-called social utility method of candidate selection. This method assumes that each voter has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function defined over all candidates (i.e., that, roughly speaking, each voter can assign a cardinal rating to each candidate); then the winning candidate is the one with the greatest utility total.

This Comment proposes a new procedure for selecting a single winner in a multicandidate election. This procedure may be viewed as an offspeing of two other procedures which have been recently analysed in this journal.

AbstractThe problem of amalgamating individual preferences to form a group or social choice has been the subject of much discussion and controversy. This paper describes an approach to the problem which, it is argued, should be followed in certain situations. The argument in favor of the approach involves applying a theorem of Goodman and Markowitz [6] in a context somewhat different from theirs.