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Correction to: Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 669-704
ISSN: 2153-0793
AbstractAn important aspect of network dynamics that has been missing from our understanding of network dynamics in various applied settings is the influence of strategic behavior in determining equilibrium network dynamics. Our main objective hears to say what we can regarding the emergence of stable club networks—and therefore, stable coalition structures—based on the stability properties of strategically determined equilibrium network formation dynamics. Because club networks are layered networks, our work here can be thought of as a first work on the strategic dynamics of layered networks. In addition to constructing a discounted stochastic game model (i.e., a DSG model) of club network formation, (1) we show that our DSG of network formation possesses a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in players' membership-action strategies; (2) we identify the assumptions on primitives which ensure that the induced equilibrium Markov process of layered club network formation satisfies the Tweedie Stability Conditions (Tweedie in Stoch Processes Their Appl 92:345–354) and (3) we show that, as a consequence, the equilibrium Markov network formation process generates a unique decomposition of the set of state-network pairs into a transient set together with finitely many basins of attraction. Moreover, we show that if there is a basin containing a vio set (a visited infinitely often set) of club networks sufficiently close together, then the coalition structures across club networks in the vio set will be the same (i.e., closeness across networks in a vio set leads to invariance in coalition structure across networks in a vio set).
Layered Networks, Equilibrium Dynamics, and Stable Coalitions
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 636-668
ISSN: 2153-0793
AbstractAn important aspect of network dynamics that has been missing from our understanding of network dynamics in various applied settings is the influence of strategic behavior in determining equilibrium network dynamics. Our main objective hear to say what we can regarding the emergence of stable club networks—and therefore, stable coalition structures—based on the stability properties of strategically determined equilibrium network formation dynamics. Because club networks are layered networks, our work here can be thought of as a first work on the strategic dynamics of layered networks. In addition to constructing a discounted stochastic game model (i.e., a DSG model) of club network formation, (1) we show that our DSG of network formation possesses a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in players' membership-action strategies; (2) we identify the assumptions on primitives which ensure that the induced equilibrium Markov process of layered club network formation satisfies the Tweedie Stability Conditions (Tweedie in Stoch Process Appl 92:345–354, 2001) and (3) we show that, as a consequence, the equilibrium Markov network formation process generates a unique decomposition of the set of state-network pairs into a transient set together with finitely many basins of attraction. Moreover, we show that if there is a basin containing a vio set (a visited infinitely often set) of club networks sufficiently close together, then the coalition structures across club networks in the vio set will be the same (i.e., closeness across networks in a vio set leads to invariance in coalition structure across networks in a vio set).
The use of agent-based modelling to investigate tax compliance
In: Economics of governance, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 143-164
ISSN: 1435-8131
Social networks and occupational choice: The endogenous formation of attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance
In: Journal of economic psychology, Band 40, S. 134-146
ISSN: 0167-4870