Suchergebnisse

This article revisits key works on the management of common-pool resources under common property arrangements, in order to elicit a broader notion of collective ownership for analysing institutional arrangements that govern the use of large-scale environmental resources such as biodiversity and atmospheric sinks. The article proposes a model for analysing the institutional design of governance solutions which draws attention to 1) tiers and levels, 2) organisation of generic governance functions, and 3) formulation of specific institutional rules. The article exemplifies these analytical solutions by examining the emerging governance framework for global atmospheric sinks. The article indicates how crucial parts of the institutional framework for governing atmospheric sinks are still missing, a shortcoming which maintains the ''tragedy of the commons'' in their use. The article suggests that a workable governance solution for global atmospheric sinks has to 1) cap the use of atmospheric sinks; 2) provide for a more equitable benefit sharing; 3) provide for compensation of climate change impacts and assistance for adaptation to climate change impacts; and 4) create institutional solutions for enhancing participation in environmental decisions in order to guarantee progress in and legitimacy of the governance framework.

This paper examines the conceptual revisions needed to extend the new institutional approach to environmental governance from its current local and international domains to new areas of application, such as national environmental and natural resource use policies. The article argues that environmental governance is best understood as the resolution of environmental conflicts through the establishment, reaffirmation or change of environmental governance institutions. This understanding suggests that the choice of environmental governance institutions is a matter of social justice rather than economic efficiency, demanding greater emphasis on public participation as the foundation of their political legitimacy. The paper also suggests a more encompassing way to understand environmental governance institutions to make space for state-centred governance solutions as types of formal collective ownership not unlike common property. The article demonstrates how institutional analysis can benefit from looking more closely at the three-tier structure, organization of generic governance functions and formulation of institutional rules as key aspects of the institutional design of governance solutions.

The paper investigates the role of justice in protected areas governance. The paper argues that protected areas governance faces a need to justify itself for the involved and affected interest groups in order to guarantee its legitimacy and effectiveness. The legitimacy of governance solutions is argued to rest on both distributive and procedural justice. On one hand, the distribution of beneficial and adverse consequences of protected areas governance must be justifiable and justified. On the other hand, decision-making regarding protected areas has to satisfy expectations regarding procedural justice. The paper exemplifies these arguments by analysing the experiences in implementing the European Union's Habitats Directive. The paper demonstrates how the lack of attention to distributive and procedural justice has resulted in conflicts which have delayed the implementation of the directive and have undermined its effectiveness.