Suchergebnisse

Intro -- List of Illustrations -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. A Theory of Alliance Treaty Negotiation Outcomes -- 2. Measuring War Planning and Negotiation Outcomes -- 3. Analyzing Alliance Treaty Negotiation Outcomes -- 4. A Key Nonagreement -- 5. An Important Agreement -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: The Fragility of Alliance Diplomacy -- 1. A Theory of Alliance Treaty Negotiation Outcomes -- 2. Measuring War Planning and Negotiation Outcomes -- 3. Analyzing Alliance Treaty Negotiation Outcomes -- 4. A Key Nonagreement: The 1901 Anglo-German Negotiations -- 5. An Important Agreement: The 1948-49 North Atlantic Treaty Negotiations -- Conclusion: Negotiations and the Future of Alliance Studies -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Since at least Cicero, we have known that "money is the sinew of war." Is it possible for a political economy of security (PES) subfield to contribute knowledge beyond Cicero's claim? This article aims to delineate the boundaries of a PES subfield by using the classic "guns versus butter" trade-off to define the existing literature within the subfield. Thinking seriously about this trade-off, including conditions under which a trade-off may not exist, raises a host of questions. The two most direct questions are: How does consuming "guns" influence the consumption of "butter"? And how does using "guns" influence the consumption of "butter"?

War is expensive-troops must be equipped and weapons must be procured. When the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns' credibility problem more difficult, central banks enhance a government's ability to borrow. By being the sole direct purchaser of government debt, the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender. This increases lenders' confidence that the government will be punished in case of default, making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest. The sovereign, dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank, has an incentive to retain the bank. Data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign's borrowing costs, particularly during times of war. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWar is expensive—troops must be equipped and weapons must be procured. When the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns' credibility problem more difficult, central banks enhance a government's ability to borrow. By being the sole direct purchaser of government debt, the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender. This increases lenders' confidence that the government will be punished in case of default, making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest. The sovereign, dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank, has an incentive to retain the bank. Data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign's borrowing costs, particularly during times of war.

Can issue linkage, the combining of multiple issues into a single agreement, enhance the credibility of an agreement? I use the alliance relations of buffer states (states located between two recently or currently warring rivals) to test the claim that issue linkage enhances compliance with treaty obligations. The alliance relations of buffer states create a "hard case" for treaty compliance because, by being prone to invasion and occupation, buffer states have difficulties inducing states to remain committed to an alliance agreement. Hence, if linkage provisions can enhance the credibility of alliance commitments for buffer states, then linkage provisions should improve treaty compliance in nearly any context. I find that buffer states in alliances with trade provisions experience fewer opportunistic violations of the alliance terms, avoid occupation and invasion at a higher rate, and experience fewer third-party attacks than buffer states in other alliance arrangements. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]