Suchergebnisse

In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.

In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.

Political realism is the major theoretic tradition in IR. But in contrast to the ever-gro­wing variety of realist theories, one meets growing difficulties while trying to define the realistic approach to international politics. Contemporary theorizing in the name of "realism" marks the retreat from the basic assumptions inherent to the original tra­dition. This process has its immanent logic and important implications, and therefore must be analysed on its own terms.The task of this paper is to reveal the relation between the core principles of the original tradition of realism and new theories of realism after the Cold War. In the first part, the works of historically most influential classical realists are examined. Careful analysis of the main descriptive and prescriptive elements in the theories of Thucydi­des, Machiavelli and Hobbes enables to reveal three common descriptive principles: (I) the object of realism is politics – the never-ending and diversiform struggle for power, rooted in man's will to power. (II) Political agents behave under Athenian thesis: power boosts their necessity to dominate. (III) Political outcomes are hardly predictable and eventually develop under the scenario of tragedy. The principles of pure realism deny the worth of abstract prescriptive reasoning. In the XXth century, these same principles were perfectly reflected in theories of Carr and Morgenthau. They both restored the old tradition and made it relevant in the age of "total" wars and nuclear weapons.In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing stan­dard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice. ; Straipsnyje analizuojama politinio realizmo samprata tarptautinių santykių disciplinoje. Remiantis žymiausių klasikinės tradicijos mąstytojų darbais, išgryninami pastovieji realizmo principai. Jų atžvilgiu atliekamas kritinis realizmo teorijų kaitos po Šaltojo karo tyrimas. Parodoma, kad vyksta tendencinga ir kryptinga teorinė transformacija: naujos realistinėmis vadinamos teorijos vis labiau prieštarauja ilgaamžiam realistiniam požiūriui į tarptautinę politiką. Pasitelkus skirtingų "realistinių" JAV užsienio politikos po Šaltojo karo aiškinimų pavyzdžius, atskleidžiamos kontroversiškos teorinės ir praktinės realizmo sampratos pokyčių implikacijos.

In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.

The article seeks to explore the conception of realism in the discipline of International Relations. First, the works of the founding figures of realism are examined to extract the core set of principles intrinsic to the classical tradition. In the light of these timeless principles a research is done about the changing (mis)conceptions of realism in IR after the Cold War. The findings reveal that the latest 'realist' theories tend to break away from the genuine realistic approach to international politics. The comparison of typical 'realistic' explanations of the US foreign policy after the Cold War uncovers significant theoretical and practical implications of the recent biased thinking in the name of 'realism'. Adapted from the source document.

In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing standard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.

Political realism is the major theoretic tradition in IR. But in contrast to the ever-gro­wing variety of realist theories, one meets growing difficulties while trying to define the realistic approach to international politics. Contemporary theorizing in the name of "realism" marks the retreat from the basic assumptions inherent to the original tra­dition. This process has its immanent logic and important implications, and therefore must be analysed on its own terms.The task of this paper is to reveal the relation between the core principles of the original tradition of realism and new theories of realism after the Cold War. In the first part, the works of historically most influential classical realists are examined. Careful analysis of the main descriptive and prescriptive elements in the theories of Thucydi­des, Machiavelli and Hobbes enables to reveal three common descriptive principles: (I) the object of realism is politics – the never-ending and diversiform struggle for power, rooted in man's will to power. (II) Political agents behave under Athenian thesis: power boosts their necessity to dominate. (III) Political outcomes are hardly predictable and eventually develop under the scenario of tragedy. The principles of pure realism deny the worth of abstract prescriptive reasoning. In the XXth century, these same principles were perfectly reflected in theories of Carr and Morgenthau. They both restored the old tradition and made it relevant in the age of "total" wars and nuclear weapons.In the second part, misconceptions of realism after the Cold War are analysed. It is shown that the shifts in content of contemporary realist theories are path-dependent and rooted in "Waltz paradox". The paradox led to three different modes of realist enterprise: (i) conservative reaction; (ii) "middle way"; and (iii) radical reaction. These stages purport the gradually increasing deviation from the original descriptive principles of realism. Conservative reaction is based on a false assumption that states can follow rational winning strategies. Middle-way "realists" (mis)treat the political struggle for power only as an outgrowth of specific circumstances. More and more of them follow the liberal agenda, trying to find and neutralise the "irrational factors", and thereby secure the rational (universally acceptable) political outcomes. Finally, radical reaction means reconstruction of realism as an entirely prescriptive discourse and moral guidelines for peaceful accommodation and liberal political order. The implications of these theoretical changes are exemplitied by discussing stan­dard "realistic" explanations of US foreign policy after the Cold War. It is shown that none of today's "realist" approaches is realistic enough to grasp the operation of the principles once known to realism. The findings of this research challenge the false truths about the relation between political realism, scientific IR enterprise and political practice.