Suchergebnisse

Thema: Problemlage und Ressourcen von Familien in einem Krisengebiet am Beispiel von Neukölln-Nord Die vorliegende Arbeit geht der Frage nach, was Familien dazu bewegt, in einem Bezirk in Berlin, der als Krisengebiet bezeichnet wird, wohnen zu bleiben oder abzuwandern. Ferner ist hinsichtlich derjenigen Familien, die wohnen bleiben, gefragt, welche Gründe diese zum Verbleib in Neukölln-Nord bewegt hat. Was erwarten diese Familien für sich und ihre Kinder? Welche Ressourcen können sie mobilisieren, um ihre persönlichen Präferenzen und Lebensvorstellungen sowie diejenigen ihrer Kinder in diesem Bezirk zu realisieren? Die Arbeit orientiert sich in theoretischer Hinsicht an angelsächsischen Autoren wie Brooks-Gunn. Sie und ihr Forscherteam wenden Colemans Theorie des Sozialkapitals und den sozialökologischen Ansatz von Urie Bronfenbrenner an und untersuchen auf dieser Grundlage die Kontexte von Familien und Kindern. Mit Hilfe qualitativer Interviews und eines Netzwerkfragebogens werden Familien typologisiert. Herausgebildet haben sich vier Typen: die Zufriedenen, die wohnen bleiben; die Unzufriedenen, die abwandern; die Nicht-Ganz-Glücklichen, die aber grundsätzlich den Wunsch haben, wegzuziehen und der aktive Neuköllner, der sich einmischt und für seinen persönlichen Bedarf engagiert. Bezogen auf die ausführliche Beschreibung der Merkmale dieser vier Typen konnte die Frage beantwortet werden, ob die Zufriedenheit der Eltern ausschließlich vom Umfang ihrer Ressourcen, d.h. von ihrem sozialen Kapital abhängt. Das Ergebnis ist, dass eher andere Faktoren als Art und Umfang des elterlichen Sozialkapitals bei der Frage, wohnen zu bleiben oder weg zu ziehen, eine Rolle gespielt haben. Abschließend werden Ausblicke und Anregungen darüber gegeben, wie eine Politik aussehen könnte, die Belange von Familien in einem Problembezirk wie Neukölln-Nord ernst nimmt und dazu führt, dass Eltern wohnen bleiben bzw. wieder zurückkehren. ; Topic: Problem situation and resources of families in an area of crisis, exemplified by Neukölln-North This dissertation is investigating the question why people remain living in a district of Berlin, that is considered a social hot spot or why they move away. Furthermore, - looking at the families who don''t leave - there is the question of their reasons for staying in Neukölln-North. What do these families expect for themselves and their children? Which resources can they mobilize in order to put into effect their personal preferences and conception of life as well as those of their children in this borough. Theoretically this thesis follows the concepts of Anglo-Saxon authors like Brooks-Gunn. She and her team implement Coleman''s theory of social capital and the socio economic approach of Urie Bronfenbrenner and examine on this foundation the contexts of family and children. Backed by qualitative interviews and a network questionnaire they categorize families. Thus 4 types have emerged: the contend families; the dissatisfied ones, that migrate; the not-so-happy ones, who plan to move away and the active inhabitants of Neukölln, who interfere and campaign for their personal needs. In reference to the detailed description of the characteristics of these 4 types the question could be answered if the parent''s contentment depends solely on the extent of their resources, meaning their social capital. The result is that rather different criteria than sort and extent of the parental social capital played a role in the decision of moving away or staying. Concluding there will be given perspectives and suggestions about the right kind of politics, that takes seriously the needs of families in social hot spots like Neukölln-Nord and eventually leads to the stay or return of parents.

In commons situations, what one user takes affect the other users' opportunities. Game-theoretical analysis predicts an overuse of the resource for a large and relevant class of these situations. Past empirical research however appears to show that individuals in a commons situation often establish institutions more or less adequate to handling the problem. This paper reports on an experimental investigation of how (costly and partial) monitoring and sanctioning of offenders affects the incentive structure and the behavior of commoners. The central finding is that even though controls and sanctions shift the Nash-equilibrium to a more favourable outcome, subjects tend not to reach the level of welfare of this equilibrium in practice. This suggests that the potential increase of efficiency by means of monitoring and inspection has to be judged very carefully; policy recommendations based on the assumption that adequate inspection and sanctions will force people to behave better are highly questionable.

In face-to-face bargaining, one usuallyfinds a large variety of actions that are not explainable and sometimes not even compatible with the usual rationality assunmptions of the actors. It is widely accepted that bounded rationality approaches are more appropriate for such settings. Most bounds to rationality refer to how the situation and the partners are perceived by the actor Two crucial components of such a perception and judgment are conceptualized as processing aspirations and the socialfield. Ostmann reported on the use of the socialfield concept and on afirst trial to explain bargaining results by aspirations and the socialfield; Another paper explored aspiration processing in a more detailed way. This article deals with questions of how nonstandard measures for the socialfield concept can be used successfully to explain or predict fundamental processes in face-to-face-bargaining.