Suchergebnisse

BACKGROUND: Nigeria became the first sub Saharan African country to record a case of COVID-19 after an imported case from Italy was confirmed on February 27, 2020. Moving averages and the Epidemic Evaluation Indices (EEI) are two important but complementary methods useful in monitoring epidemic trends, they can also serve as a useful guide for policy makers and inform the timing of decisions on preventive measures. The objectives of this paper are to graphically depict the trends of new COVID-19 cases nationally and in two key States (Lagos and Kano) and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) using the moving averages and the EEI. In addition, we examined the effects of government's public health interventions on the spread of COVID-19 and appraise the progress made so far in addressing the challenges of COVID-19 in Nigeria. METHODS: We used data on new cases of COVID-19 from public sources released by the Nigeria Center for Disease Control (NCDC) from the 27(th) February 2020, when the first case was recorded, to 11(th) May, 2020, one week after the lockdowns in Lagos and the FCT were lifted. We computed moving averages of various orders, the log transformations of the moving averages and then the EEIs of new COVID-19 cases for Nigeria as a whole, and then for two of the most affected states i.e. Lagos and Kano, as well as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Then, we plotted graphs to depict these indices and show the epidemic trends for COVID-19 in each scenario. RESULTS: Nationally, the number of new cases of COVID-19 showed an initial gradual rise from the first reported case on the 27(th) February 2020. However, by the second week in April, these numbers began to show a relatively sharper increase and this trend has continued till date. Similar trends were observed in Lagos state and the FCT. The rate of growth of the logarithm-transformed moving average in the period leading to, and including the lockdowns reduced by a factor of 0.65. This suggests that the policies put in place by the government including ...

ObjectivesTo assess diagnostic mycology capacity and available fungal diagnostic services of microbiology laboratories in eight tertiary hospitals in Nigeria and one in Ghana.MethodsOn-site audits were performed in the microbiology laboratories of nine tertiary hospitals using a structured observation checklist.ResultsA total of nine tertiary hospitals' laboratories in Nigeria and Ghana were assessed between June 2022 and December 2023. The majority of audited laboratories lacked basic infrastructure and materials needed for fungal diagnostic testing, with less than half of the labs having a dedicated mycology bench, space or room, 3/9 (33.3%), appropriate bench workflow 1/9 (11.1%), functional biosafety cabinet type two 2/9 (22.2%), dedicated incubators 3/9 (33.3%), standard operating procedures 1/9 (11.1%), mycology atlases 2/9 (22.2%). Trained laboratory personnel for mycology were also lacking with only one of the laboratories 1/9 (11.1%) observed to have a designated trained personnel for the mycology bench.ConclusionThe audit revealed deficits in basic infrastructure, material resources, dedicated human resources, and laboratory capacity to detect serious fungal infections.

IntroductionPre‐treatment HIV drug resistance (PDR) is an increasing problem in sub‐Saharan Africa. Children are an especially vulnerable population to develop PDR given that paediatric second‐line treatment options are limited. Although monitoring of PDR is important, data on the paediatric prevalence in sub‐Saharan Africa and its consequences for treatment outcomes are scarce. We designed a prospective paediatric cohort study to document the prevalence of PDR and its effect on subsequent treatment failure in Nigeria, the country with the second highest number of HIV‐infected children in the world.MethodsHIV‐1‐infected children ≤12 years, who had not been exposed to drugs for the prevention of mother‐to‐child transmission (PMTCT), were enrolled between 2012 and 2013, and followed up for 24 months in Lagos, Nigeria. Pre‐antiretroviral treatment (ART) population‐based pol genotypic testing and six‐monthly viral load (VL) testing were performed. Logistic regression analysis was used to assess the effect of PDR (World Health Organization (WHO) list for transmitted drug resistance) on subsequent treatment failure (two consecutive VL measurements >1000 cps/ml or death).ResultsOf the total 82 PMTCT‐naïve children, 13 (15.9%) had PDR. All 13 children harboured non‐nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI) mutations, of whom seven also had nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor resistance. After 24 months, 33% had experienced treatment failure. Treatment failure was associated with PDR and a higher log VL before treatment initiation (adjusted odds ratio (aOR) 7.53 (95%CI 1.61–35.15) and 2.85 (95%CI 1.04–7.78), respectively).DiscussionPDR was present in one out of six Nigerian children. These high numbers corroborate with recent findings in other African countries. The presence of PDR was relevant as it was the strongest predictor of first‐line treatment failure.ConclusionsOur findings stress the importance of implementing fully active regimens in children living with HIV. This includes the implementation of protease inhibitor (PI)‐based first‐line ART, as is recommended by the WHO for all HIV‐infected children <3 years of age. Overcoming practical barriers to implement PI‐based regimens is essential to ensure optimal treatment for HIV‐infected children in sub‐Saharan Africa. In countries where individual VL or resistance testing is not possible, more attention should be given to paediatric PDR surveys.

Background: Lagos state is the industrial nerve centre of Nigeria and was the epicentre of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Nigeria as it is now for the current Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak. This paper describes how the lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak in 2014 informed the emergency preparedness of the State ahead of the COVID-19 outbreak and guided response. Discussion: Following the Ebola outbreak in 2014, the Lagos State government provided governance by developing a policy on emergency preparedness and biosecurity and provided oversight and coordination of emergency preparedness strategies. Capacities for emergency response were strengthened by training key staff, developing a robust surveillance system, and setting up a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory and biobank. Resource provision, in terms of finances and trained personnel for emergencies was prioritized by the government. With the onset of COVID-19, Lagos state was able to respond promptly to the outbreak using the centralized Incident Command Structure and the key activities of the Emergency Operations Centre. Contributory to effective response were partnerships with the private sectors, community engagement and political commitment. Conclusion: Using the lessons learned from the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Lagos State had gradually prepared its healthcare system for a pandemic such as COVID-19. The State needs to continue to expand its preparedness to be more resilient and future proof to respond to disease outbreaks. Looking beyond intra-state gains, lessons and identified best practices from the past and present should be shared with other states and countries.

Background Lagos state is the industrial nerve centre of Nigeria and was the epicentre of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Nigeria as it is now for the current Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak. This paper describes how the lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak in 2014 informed the emergency preparedness of the State ahead of the COVID-19 outbreak and guided response. Discussion Following the Ebola outbreak in 2014, the Lagos State government provided governance by developing a policy on emergency preparedness and biosecurity and provided oversight and coordination of emergency preparedness strategies. Capacities for emergency response were strengthened by training key staff, developing a robust surveillance system, and setting up a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory and biobank. Resource provision, in terms of finances and trained personnel for emergencies was prioritized by the government. With the onset of COVID-19, Lagos state was able to respond promptly to the outbreak using the centralized Incident Command Structure and the key activities of the Emergency Operations Centre. Contributory to effective response were partnerships with the private sectors, community engagement and political commitment. Conclusion Using the lessons learned from the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Lagos State had gradually prepared its healthcare system for a pandemic such as COVID-19. The State needs to continue to expand its preparedness to be more resilient and future proof to respond to disease outbreaks. Looking beyond intra-state gains, lessons and identified best practices from the past and present should be shared with other states and countries.