Suchergebnisse

Papers 1,3,4 and 5 of the thesis are not available in Munin: 1. Onyango, P. O.: 'Re-configuring Poverty: The Wickedness Perspective', African Journal of Tropical Hydrobiology and Fisheries (2009), 12, 37-46. Available at http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajthf/article/view/58032 3. Onyango, P. O. and S. Jentoft: 'Assessing poverty in small-scale fisheries in Lake Victoria, Tanzania', Fish and Fisheries (2010), 11, 250-263. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-2979.2010.00378.x 4. Onyango, P. O.: 'Occupation of last resort? Small-scale fishing in Lake Victoria, Tanzania', In Jentoft S. and A. Eide (Eds.). Poverty Mosaics: Realities and Prospects in Small-Scale Fisheries (2011) Springer Verlag. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1582-0_6 5. Onyango, P. O. and S. Jentoft.: 'Climbing the Hill: Poverty Alleviation, Gender Relationships, and Women's Social Entrepreneurship in Lake Victoria, Tanzania' (accepted paper in Maritime studies) ; The pursuit of a world without poverty is without doubt among the leading global challenges not only for governments but also the poor themselves. This challenge is also in small-scale fishing communities where poverty is persistent and has become a thorny issue to the poor as well as governing actors. Strategies have been formulated and implemented but the results have not been up to the expectations. Why haven't these strategies yielded expected results? This is the central question of this thesis. This study seeks to understand why poverty persists despite the good instruments that have been directed at its alleviation. It examines poverty through studying the underlying factors that determine relationships between and among the many variables that make poverty a multidimensional problem. It argues that the persistent poverty in small-scale fishing communities in Lake Victoria Tanzania finds explanation in the manner in which poverty and its challenges have been understood and addressed. By using Kooiman's and Jentoft's (2009) 'meta-governance' perspective, the study discusses how differences in, what people consider as important (values), what they believe is morally mandatory to do (norms) and what should direct behaviour or action (principles), explain the persistent poverty in fishing communities. The study shows that there is inconsistency in the way poor fishers', riparian to the Lake and governing actors in Tanzania understand poverty in the fishing communities and how to confront it. This inconsistency exists at the meta-governance level i.e. with regards to values, norms and principles. The study proposes that to alleviate poverty, a solution to this difference should be sought from a governance mechanism that addresses the dissimilarity. This must be a process which provides governing actors and the poor opportunities to interact in order to influence policy.

Abstract In fisheries, alleviating poverty sometimes requires strategies that are inherently in conflict. When aiming to develop a fishery as a means to reduce poverty, its common pool resource basis might be undermined, resulting in greater poverty. But poverty in fisheries is also linked to, or a part of deeper social issues and processes, for instance, the marginalization and exclusion of certain communities. Poverty also has many factors— income, health, literacy, gender, power, security, etc.—all of which make poverty alleviation a particularly "wicked problem" that would require a broad process of political, social and institutional reform. In other words, poverty alleviation is not only an issue of sustainable resource management but also one of societal governance. Drawing from research in small-scale fisheries communities in Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Bangladesh, this paper describes how fishing people cope with poverty. The paper discusses what the governance implications are for alleviating poverty at individual, household and community levels, and argue that both the definition of poverty and poverty alleviation in small-scale fisheries must be rooted in real life experiences.

Abstract In fisheries, alleviating poverty sometimes requires strategies that are inherently in conflict. When aiming to develop a fishery as a means to reduce poverty, its common pool resource basis might be undermined, resulting in greater poverty. But poverty in fisheries is also linked to, or a part of deeper social issues and processes, for instance, the marginalization and exclusion of certain communities. Poverty also has many factors— income, health, literacy, gender, power, security, etc.—all of which make poverty alleviation a particularly "wicked problem" that would require a broad process of political, social and institutional reform. In other words, poverty alleviation is not only an issue of sustainable resource management but also one of societal governance. Drawing from research in small-scale fisheries communities in Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Bangladesh, this paper describes how fishing people cope with poverty. The paper discusses what the governance implications are for alleviating poverty at individual, household and community levels, and argue that both the definition of poverty and poverty alleviation in small-scale fisheries must be rooted in real life experiences.

Links between corruption and illegal practices within fisheries are recognised in existing literature but little reference has been made to how these interconnected practices affect the performance and legitimacy of fisheries co-management. Research in the three countries bordering Lake Victoria, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, demonstrated that corruption is systemic and that members of all stakeholder groups – fishers, fisheries officers, police and the judiciary - are implicated. It was confirmed that corruption is strongly linked to illegalities and that corruption in this context should be viewed as a collection action problem, with fishers reluctant to invest in legal gears and methods when they perceive illegalities and corruption to be prevalent. It was also found that corrupt practices linked to illegalities discourages local level fisheries management structures – the Beach Management Units – from enforcing regulations and contributes to a lack of trust between fishers and government. Linked corruption and illegal fisheries practices were therefore found to be undermining the performance and legitimacy of co-management. The article concludes that whilst co-management offers opportunities for collusive corruption through collaborative arrangements, any management system will be susceptible to the harmful effects of corruption where it is systemic and is not formally recognised or appropriately addressed. Greater official recognition of the links between corruption and illegalities, and a range of appropriate actions taken to this collective action problem, is essential if co-management is to have a chance of success.