Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- The importance of warfare -- Europe's urban rise -- Evaluating the safe harbor effect -- Evaluating the warfare-to-wealth effect -- Warfare to wealth in comparative perspective -- Epilogue

AbstractWe study convergence and divergence dynamics in a sample of euro area countries by assembling an extensive dataset that contains information on public spending and policy outcomes in a variety of areas of government intervention including education, health, and civil justice from the early 1990s. We also focus on other important determinants of a country's economic performance such as the level of regulation of product and labor markets, as well as the trust in political institutions, quality of governance, and inequality. Results show that despite divergent economic growth in the euro periphery countries after the 2010–2012 sovereign debt crisis, the quality of services and level of regulation did not deteriorate or indeed improved, increasing convergence with the core euro countries. However, the euro area sovereign debt crisis dramatically worsened citizens' perceptions of quality of governance, as well as the level of social trust. This calls in question the future political viability of the EMU project and asks for reform.

We study convergence and divergence dynamics in a sample of EMU countries by assembling an extensive dataset that contains information on public spending and policy outcomes in a variety of areas of government intervention including education, health, and civil justice from the early 1990s. We also focus on other important determinants of a country's economic performance such as the level of regulation of product and labor markets, as well as the trust in political institutions, quality of governance and inequality. Results show that despite divergent economic growth in the Euro periphery countries after the 2011-13 Euro crisis, the quality of services and level of regulation did not deteriorate or indeed improved, increasing convergence with the core Euro countries. However, the debt crisis dramatically worsened citizens' perceptions of quality of governance as well as the level of social trust. The very different approach followed with the Covid crisis might have mitigated the problem, but the Euro project has still shaky foundations. This calls in question its future political viability and asks for reform.

Historical warfare in Europe inflicted numerous costs on rural populations. To reduce such costs, rural populations relocated behind the relative safety of urban fortifications. We argue that war-related urbanization had positive consequences for long-run regional economic development. We geocode the locations of more than 600 conflicts in early modern Europe. We find a positive and significant relationship between historical conflict exposure and regional economic development today. Our results are robust to a wide range of econometric techniques, alternative samples, and economic outcomes. Human capital accumulation stands out as one channel through which war-related urbanization translated into regional economic development. Our results highlight the military origins of Europe's wealthy urban belt

We show that the consequences of historical warfare for state development differ for Sub-Saharan Africa. We identify the locations of more than 1,500 conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Europe from 1400 to 1799. We find that historical warfare predicts common-interest states defined by high fiscal capacity and low civil conflict across much of the OldWorld. For Sub-Saharan Africa, historical warfare predicts special-interest states defined by high fiscal capacity and high civil conflict. Our results offer new evidence about where and when "war makes states."

We investigate how technology has influenced the size of armies. During the nineteenth century, the development of the railroad made it possible to field and support mass armies, significantly increasing the observed size of military forces. During the late twentieth century, further advances in technology made it possible to deliver explosive force from a distance and with precision, making mass armies less desirable. We find support for our technological account using a new data set covering thirteen great powers between 1600 and 2000. We find little evidence that the French Revolution was a watershed in terms of levels of mobilization.

We investigate how technology has influenced the size of armies. During the nineteenth century the development of the railroad made it possible to field and support mass armies, significantly increasing the observed size of military forces. During the late twentieth century further advances in technology made it possible to deliver explosive force from a distance and with precision, making mass armies less desirable. We find strong support for our technological account using a new data set covering thirteen great powers between 1600 and 2000. Contrary to what is so often suggested, we find little evidence that the French Revolution was a watershed in terms of levels of mobilization.

AbstractTwo important puzzles characterize the development of pre-modern Eurasian polities. First, most rulers convened councils of nobles, but only European monarchs expanded them to create parliaments. Second, war was common throughout Eurasia, but only in Europe did it correlate with the formation of parliaments. We advance a new argument about the emergence of parliaments that accounts for both stylized facts while integrating the literature highlighting the rulers' need to finance wars with that emphasizing the importance of the medieval communal revolution. Using novel data, we document a 'no communes, no parliaments' rule: monarchs established parliaments only after they had fostered the creation of self-governing towns (aka communes). We also show that war was a significant predictor of parliamentary births across medieval Europe – but only during a window of opportunity that opened after a polity had experienced the communal revolution.