Suchergebnisse

Introduction: What is grand strategy? -- The great powers -- The grand strategies of rising powers -- The grand strategies of status quo powers I -- The grand strategies of status quo powers II -- The grand strategies of declining powers -- Great powers' grand strategies today and tomorrow.

"What is grand strategy and what is it good for? What are great powers, and which states are great powers today? What are the grand strategies available to great powers? What are the conditions under which a certain strategy is suitable and when should it be rejected? What are the factors affecting the success or failure of a given grand strategy? The present volume provides answers to these questions by introducing a typology of great power grand strategies, as strategies of rising, status quo, and declining powers, as well as through historical illustration of each type. The reader is thus exposed to strategies such as divide and conquer; biding your time; opportunity strike; primacy; semi-detachment; concert; or appeasement through the experiences of leaders such as Bismarck, Peter the Great, Metternich, Deng Xiaoping, Neville Chamberlain, or Stalin. This analysis is then brought to bear on present developments in the grand strategies of the United States, China, and Russia. The volume should be of interest to both the academic and foreign-policy making communities, and in particular to students of international relations, diplomacy, history, and current international affairs"--

"As the dominant state in the post-Cold War era, strategists assumed the United States would practice a restrained foreign marked by sparing use of force, multilateral diplomacy, and a reduction of military commitments abroad. However, the United States chose precisely the opposite course--one marked by assertiveness, foreign intervention, and unilateral action. US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era argues that the reason for this lack of restraint originates from the United States' need to maintain prestige as an effective international leader in the face of recalcitrant and free-riding actors. Onea concludes that recommendations of restraint are not wrong, but rather unfeasible due to the constant need for securing US prestige in the eyes of the world"--

Abstract
Recent scholarship often dismisses entrapment, arguing that there are hardly any identifiable cases; and that powerful states (protectors) can sidestep it by narrowing the treaty conditions under which they have to intervene to defend their weaker allies (protégés). Consequently, alliances and partnerships are nearly always considered risk-free assets. However, this paper argues that several types of entrapment are present. The paper is foremost concerned with classic entrapment, a type referring to a purposeful effort by the protégé to drag the protector into a conflict serving primarily the protégé's interests. The protégé entraps the protector by placing itself deliberately in danger of defeat and by manipulating the protector's domestic audience costs. Classic entrapment is likely to succeed under two conditions: (a) when the protégé's allegiance confers the protector an advantage in a competition against other powerful states; and (b) in informal arrangements, in which there is no clear cut-off point to the protector's commitment. The paper provides an illustration in the Ottoman Empire's entrapment of Britain in the crisis preceding the Crimean War. The conclusion considers classic entrapment's feasibility in present world politics, particularly in the context of Taiwan.

AbstractThe article examines when and how often great powers are likely to follow a grand strategy of restraint and whether there is any evidence that they have ever done so. The question has considerable implications for the ongoing US grand strategy debate. Restraint refers to the practice of self-discipline in the use of force for self-defence or for addressing massive power imbalances; and in extending security commitments to foreign political actors. The first part of the article examines statistics in the last two hundred years on great power involvement in wars and disputes as well as on their commitments to alliances and dependencies. The second part considers whether two seeming cases of the dominant power scaling down its international involvement – Ming China withdrawal from naval mastery in the fifteenth century and Victorian Britain splendid isolation – represent instances of genuine restraint.

This article investigates the role of status considerations in the response of dominant powers to the rise of emergent states. Accordingly, the hypothesis explored is that dominant actors are prone to fear that they will lose their upper rank, and, due to this status anxiety, resist the efforts of emergent powers to match or surpass them. The article begins by explaining why political actors deem status important and puts forward a theory of status anxiety in world politics. The more pronounced is this anxiety across status dimensions (economic and military capabilities as well as prestige), the higher the likelihood of conflict. This argument is then tested against competing theories of dominant power behaviour in two cases: the relations between France and Britain from the 1740s to Napoleon and those between Britain and Germany from the 1880s to World War One. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article investigates the role of status considerations in the response of dominant powers to the rise of emergent states. Accordingly, the hypothesis explored is that dominant actors are prone to fear that they will lose their upper rank, and, due to this status anxiety, resist the efforts of emergent powers to match or surpass them. The article begins by explaining why political actors deem status important and puts forward a theory of status anxiety in world politics. The more pronounced is this anxiety across status dimensions (economic and military capabilities as well as prestige), the higher the likelihood of conflict. This argument is then tested against competing theories of dominant power behaviour in two cases: the relations between France and Britain from the 1740s to Napoleon and those between Britain and Germany from the 1880s to World War One.

This paper tests the explanatory power of the main strands of neoclassical realism in accounting for US foreign policy after the Cold War. According to the emphasis they place on the relevance of structural versus non-structural variables in foreign policy making, three schools can be identified. The first school restricts the role of non-structural factors to accounting for anomalous behavior; the second school argues that non-structural variables should also be included in order to understand the policy's timing and style, and, in times of security plenty, its content; while the third school contends that it is international structural factors, i.e. a state's strategic interactions with other polities, that shape most foreign policy. Following the test of their forecasts versus the historical record, the third school emerges as providing the most accurate account and as the most promising avenue of research for neoclassical realism.