Tribute to James A. Thurber
In: Congress & the presidency, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 12-13
ISSN: 1944-1053
37 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Congress & the presidency, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 12-13
ISSN: 1944-1053
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 46, Heft 3, S. 485-487
ISSN: 1537-5935
During the 1950s, Isaiah Berlin wrote a famous essay entitled "The Hedgehog and the Fox." The point behind the title is that the hedgehog knows one big thing and the fox knows many things. From this distinction, Berlin suggests there are two intellectual types: one who relates everything to a single idea and the other who explores a diversity of ideas. It is difficult and unrealistic to pigeonhole Fisher as one or the other intellectual type. The reality is that Fisher combines both types. My sense is that Fisher's wide diversity of scholarly and policy-influencing accomplishments, and his skepticism of conventional wisdom, put him in Berlin's second category rather than first. However, my position at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) also prompts me to say, on the other hand, one big idea has animated Fisher's contributions to the academic and political/legislative worlds. That idea is highlighted in the title of one of his plethora of publications:Defending Congress and the Constitution(2011). Of course, when you write about the Congress and the Constitution, you analyze—like Berlin's fox—a host of interrelated ideas and relationships: history, law, the presidency, the judiciary, and more.
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 46, Heft 3, S. 485-487
ISSN: 0030-8269, 1049-0965
This report discusses the House amendment "tree", which is a chart that depicts the maximum number and types of amendments that may be offered to a measure before any amendment is voted upon.
BASE
This report discuses about Hold in brief. It is divided in four categories: (I) Background, (II) Potency of Holds, (III) Types of Holds and (IV) Calls for change.
BASE
The Senate has responsibilities under both Article I (outlining legislative prerogatives) and Article II of the Constitution. As a result, the upper body handles legislative and executive business differently. This report discusses the Senate's lawmaking responsibilities under Article I; executive business, which consists of treaties and nominations.
BASE
This report describes the amending process in the Senate, which provides lawmakers with an opportunity to make changes in the text of a measure (or pending amendment) during its consideration.
BASE
This report discusses the committee rules for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which stipulates that, insofar as practicable, "proceedings of the Committee will be conducted without resort to the formalities of parliamentary procedure."
BASE
In: American political science review, Band 90, Heft 3, S. 662-662
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 104, Heft 2, S. 346-347
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 466, Heft 1, S. 193-205
ISSN: 1552-3349
Congress is a fragmented, decentralized, and undisciplined institution. These essential qualities constitute both its strength and its weakness. On the one hand, Congress's fragmentation, as manifested by features such as bicameralism and collegial decision making, promote its representative and oversight roles. On the other hand, Congress has a difficult time getting its policymaking act together because it lacks sufficient integrative mechanisms, such as party and procedural devices, that would aggregate issues and interests. Throughout congressional history, the themes of integration and fragmentation have warred against each other with the forces of dispersal typically being victorious. This article's objective is to highlight certain complexities and anomalies in structural and procedural changes designed to constrain or impose order on Congress's diffused power. Two recent developments—committee modernization and renewed interest in oversight of administrative activities—provide the case material for the analysis.
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 466, S. 193-205
ISSN: 0002-7162
In committee realignment and oversight administrative activities.
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Heft 466, S. 193-205
ISSN: 0002-7162
World Affairs Online
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 411, S. 75-86
ISSN: 0002-7162
Although equal in power, the nat'l House & Senate differ in more ways than they are similar. They differ in size, rules & procedures, policy biases, customs & traditions, terms of office, constitutional responsibilities, constituencies & in numerous other ways. Moreover, each chamber is jealous of its powers & prerogatives & generally suspicious of the other body. Despite their diff's, the 2 houses must still work together if policy recommendations are to be enacted into law. 2 principal legislative devices serve to join senators & representatives together on matters of common concern: conference committees & joint committees. In this analysis, 2 important aspects of conference procedure are explored: the conferee selection process & the question of who wins in conference, the House or the Senate. Joint committees, although used since the First Congress, are viewed negatively by many members. Given both the variety & uses of joint committees, it is worth identifying some of the factors which facilitate their creation. Finally, 2 principal suggestions are offered to better facilitate interhouse cooperation--more contact between respective party leaders of each house & the development of parallel committee jurisdictions. Of course, the goal of interhouse cooperation needs to be balanced against the requirement that each house present & defend diff & conflicting points of vew on the issues of the day. HA.
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 411, Heft 1, S. 75-86
ISSN: 1552-3349
Although equal in power, the national House and Senate differ in more ways than they are similar. They differ in size, rules and procedures, policy biases, customs and traditions, terms of office, constitutional responsibilities, constituencies and in numerous other ways. Moreover, each chamber is jealous of its powers and prerogatives and generally suspicious of the other body. Despite their differences, the two houses must still work together if policy recommendations are to be enacted into law. Two principal legislative devices serve to join senators and representatives together on matters of common concern: conference committees and joint committees. In this analysis, two important aspects of conference procedure are explored: the conferee selection process and the question of who wins in conference, the House or the Senate. Joint committees, although used since the First Congress, are viewed negatively by many members. Given both the variety and uses of joint committees, it is worth identifying some of the factors which facilitate their creation. Finally, two principal suggestions are offered to better facilitate interhouse cooperation—more contact between respective party leaders of each house and the development of parallel committee jurisdictions. Of course, the goal of interhouse cooperation needs to be balanced against the requirement that each house present and defend different and conflicting points of view on the issues of the day.