Suchergebnisse

AbstractUtilities worldwide have followed the natural monopoly model for more than a century. This has started to change in recent decades. Electricity systems have become complex, as interactions between participants become multidimensional. This article examines the knowledge problem in an increasingly complex electricity system. I argue that increasing complexity in the electricity system necessitates reconsideration of the regulatory tariff model for utilities.

Abstract:This paper discusses the place of 'tacit knowledge' in Hayek's writings. How did Hayek understand tacit knowledge? How did his understanding change through time? I address these questions and follow the change in Hayek's works from skills and techniques of thought in the 1930s to the use of 'tacit knowledge' in the1960s. Hayek uses Polanyi's concept in many writings, but remains short of approving its implications. The paper emphasizes that while Hayek was quite aware of the differences between tacit knowing and knowing-how, he was not keen to stress the divergence. In the end, I offer some potential explanations for this preference.

1 The Rule of Law in the Historical Context -- 2 The Institutional Change: Historical Background -- 3 Fundamental economic indicators of the Ottoman Economy -- 4 A comparison with European societies under the State Finance -- 5 Tax -farming contracts -- 6 Law and economics of tax-farming contracts -- 7 Prisoner's Dilemma as a tool to analyze tax-farming institutions -- 8 Commitment Problems and the Law Enforcement -- 9 A comparison with France -- 10 Concluding Remarks. .

The Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey brings together leading international scholars and experts on Turkey and regulatory reform to provide essential information on the recent Turkish experience and its relation to competition policy. After the 1980 liberalization reform, Turkey tried to introduce competition in many industries, but network industries have remained as monopolies. At the end of the 1990s, regulatory reform was initiated and independent regulatory agencies have been established by the government. Comprehensive discussions of these network industries, in particular airlines, electricity, natural gas, telecommunications and environment regulations, are offered. The contributors inquire how economic theory and historical analyses can enlighten the character of market processes and the role for government action in these industries, and the contributions shed light on the very recent changes in the regulatory structure and important legal cases that shape the future of regulated industries. This book discusses these issues in an international perspective and relates the Turkish experience to other similar countries, such as in Eastern Europe and Central America. This book serves as a useful guide to those who want to understand major changes in Turkey and regulatory reforms in other emerging markets, making it of interest to researchers and PhD students concerned with regulatory economics, the Turkish economy, and economic policy in emerging markets.

This study explores how certain institutional dimensions influence entrepreneurial allocations in Nigeria and its sectorial heterogeneity. We apply unconditional fixed-effect Tobit regression estimators on a combined dataset extracted from various sources over the period 2011-2015. Our findings suggest that property rights and oil rents strongly encourage young entrepreneurs to be innovative, while a number of business procedures and the rule of law discourage them from being innovative. The findings suggest that some of the institutions are complementary to one another in improving entrepreneurial innovativeness. Interactions between them are positive and significant. Sectorial results reveal that property rights, government effectiveness and oil rents significantly enhance entrepreneurial innovativeness, whereas government size reduces innovativeness among young entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector. In the IT sector, property rights, control of corruption, regulatory quality and government effectiveness increase entrepreneurial innovativeness. Government size, business procedures and the rule of law reduce innovativeness. Overall, the institutions appear to have stronger and bigger effects in the IT sector than they do in the manufacturing sector. Policy implications include the need for institutional reforms targeting productive entrepreneurship to focus more on making business regulation and procedures more competition-friendly and less cumbersome and strengthening the quality of anti-graft and property right institutions.

This paper discusses the regulation of the Istanbul taxicab market and its consequences. While price and entry regulations are common to many taxi markets, there are significant differences in their institutional frameworks. We examine the problems of the Istanbul market and offer recommendations to improve its efficiency.

Electricity markets have undergone regulatory reforms since the early 1980s around the world. Technical analyses of these reforms usually pay lip service to the influence of politics over regulatory processes. Existing studies examine certain aspects of the market such as demand pricing and efficiency and they touch upon political issues only passingly when economic models cannot provide sufficient explanation This approach problematically takes politics as an ad hoc variable. This study shows that electricity is intrinsically a 'political good' and argues that any meaningful reform effort should take institutions as the starting point rather than a residual. The argument that politics has to be an endogenous variable in any model aspiring to explain behavior in electricity markets is demonstrated in the paper. The evidence for the political good character of electricity is found by examining the Turkish regulatory reform for Which it is argued that there is not a satisfactory relationship between expected and realized gains. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.