Suchergebnisse

The aim of this study is to define and further the understanding of the practice of lobbying as it manifests in the participants' interactions with each other and to identify its specific conditions (rules, standards, traits). A research overview shows that lobbying as a political phenomenon is well researched, but that the action per se tends to been taken for granted as 'talking'. Communication between lobbyists and politicians has predominantly been reconstructed as transmission, informationexchange. The study addresses this deficiency by applying an ethnographic method, shadowing, and by focussing on the micro-level of lobbying as a socio-political phenomenon. Lobbying is researched in moments of interaction between interest representatives and representatives of the political system, i.e. MEPs and their assistants. Seven lobbyists and politicians in Brussels have been shadowed for one week each; a further 34 interviews were conducted. The analytical strategy was to infer from the actors' impression management (Goffman). The study is informed by a neo-institutional perspective. It assumes that cognitive, normative, and regulative structures provide meaning to social behavior, and that these resources are identifiable. Goffman's concept of team and the distinction between frontstage and backstage emerged as central categories. My results suggest that the small world of the EU's capital results in a sense of 'us in Brussels' shared by lobbyists, politicians and assistants alike. Lobbying-interaction in frontstage-mode is governed by strict conventions; ignorance or transgression are sanctioned as unprofessional. The key result, however, is that lobbyists actively work towards engagement on other terms. Lobbyists employ various strategies and build relations with politicians in order to create moments of backstage-interaction. In backstage-mode, lobbyists not only gain access to soft information, but can negotiate ways of working together with politicians in pursuit of different, but partly overlapping agendas.

Lobbyists are working in an ambivalent atmosphere. In Brussels, lobbying is an activity occupying about 20 000 people on a daily basis. They are trying to influence the legislative outcomes from the work of the about 15 000 politicians and employees of the EU institutions (Coen 2007). On one hand the lobbyists are wanted and needed by the politicians and their civil servants. Previous research tells about the lobbyists as the "merchants of information" (Milbrath 1960) providing resources to an understaffed EU-adminstration. Pieczka also points to that the lobbyists are providing the politicians with knowledge: "… the key resource – political influence – consisting of knowledge of the political processes and personalities as well as an ability to read the prevailing political climate, policy initiatives, and the ebb and flow of power through political networks" (Pieczka 2006:325). On the other hand, the lobbyists' legitimacy is under a continous discussion regarding ominousity, unfair play and even bribing to achieve wished outcomes of the legislative work (see for example Moloney 2007). Since a few years lobbyists in Brussels need (in theory it is voluntary) to register and account for their lobbying budgets. With the inspiration of Goffman studying the moments and their men rather than the men and their moments (1967) this paper applies an interactional perspective on lobbying. Even though there are a lot of research made on lobbying in Brussels (see for example Beyer et al. 2010, Michalowitz 2007, Coen 2007, McGrath 2005 & 2009, Harris & Fleisher 2005) there is very few research exploring and analysing lobbying on a microlevel. This paper pulls lobbying research into the tradition within Media and Communication studies with ethnographic studies on practices and mechanisms steering these practices (for example Gaye Tuchman 1978). Following this perspective, the author has made seven weeks of participatory observations in Brussels. S/he has been shadowing lobbyists, MEP:s and their assistants and followed them in their daily work, one week per person. In addition about 40 interviews have been made. The results of the study show self-expectations and expectations from the interaction partner and how these expectations are negotiated and communicationed in the concrete meetings. The lobbyists are pursuing different strategies and tactics that are accounted for in the paper. ReferencesBeyers, J., Eising, R. & Maloney, W.A. (red.) (2010). Interest group politics in Europe: lessons from EU studies and comparative politics. London: Routledge.Coen, D. (red.) (2007). EU lobbying: empirical and theoretical studies. London: Routledge.Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: essays in face-to-face behavior. Chicago: Aldine.Tuchman, G. (1978). Making news: a study in the construction of reality. New York: Free P.Harris, Phil & Fleischer, Craig, S. (ed. ) (2005) Handbook of Public Affairs. London: SAGE Publications.McGrath, C. (2005). Lobbying in Washington, London, And Brussels: The Persuasive Communication of Political Issues. Lewiston, N.Y., Edwin Mellen Press.McGrath, C. (red.) (2009). Interest groups and lobbying in Europe: essays on trade, environment, leglislation, and economic development. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen.Michalowitz, I. (2007). Lobbying in der EU. Wien: Facultas.Moloney, K. (2006). Rethinking public relations: PR propaganda and democracy. (2. ed.) Routledge: London.Pieczka, M. "Paradigms, systems theory and Public Relations" in L'Etang, J. & Pieczka, M. (red.) (2006). Public relations: critical debates and contemporary practice. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. P. 333-358.