Personal attributes and institutions: gender and the behavior of public employees. why gender matters to not only "Gendered Policy Area"
In: Journal of public administration research and theory, Band 25, Heft 4
ISSN: 1053-1858
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In: Journal of public administration research and theory, Band 25, Heft 4
ISSN: 1053-1858
In: Journal of public administration research and theory, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 1005-1029
ISSN: 1477-9803
In: Law & Policy, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 428-462
SSRN
In: Politica: tidsskrift for politisk videnskab, Band 41, Heft 4, S. 468-475
ISSN: 0105-0710
In: Law & policy, Band 29, Heft 2, S. 257-283
ISSN: 1467-9930
Regulatory studies have traditionally focused on external political and administrative factors when explaining the behavior of regulatory inspectors. This is, however, only one part of the story about regulatory behavior. To understand the behavior of street‐level bureaucrats such as regulatory inspectors, it is essential to look not only at external political and administrative factors but also at the very interaction between the bureaucrat and the client. By focusing on differential treatment of regulated firms by inspectors and the explanatory power of the interaction between inspector and firm, the article shows that variation in the level of communication between inspector and regulatee helps to explain variation in regulatory leniency. The higher the level of communication, the more lenient is the inspector.
In: Public administration: an international journal, Band 84, Heft 4, S. 861-889
ISSN: 1467-9299
Traditional studies of street‐level bureaucrats see the bureaucrat's behaviour as a kind of self‐defence – a way to minimize negative aspects of the job and thereby job frustration. I argue – and empirically show – that it is equally relevant to consider at least part of street‐level bureaucrat behaviour as positively motivated – as a way of maximizing job satisfaction. Behavioural mechanisms such as coping are not just a way to avoid frustration, but also a way to gain satisfaction. This becomes clear when we attempt to explain differential treatment among regulated companies.
In: Law & policy, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 395-416
ISSN: 1467-9930
For decades there has been a trend in regulatory studies to advocate a responsive, tit‐for‐tat, regulatory strategy. However, most of the prominent arguments for this strategy are theoretical and few have tested its effectiveness. Even less tested has been whether or not regulatory inspectors manage to react responsively to the "conduct" of regulatees. By distinguishing between five different kinds of responsiveness, the present article tests these different kinds of responsiveness in four different regulatory areas, using data about more than 2,500 legal breaches. The empirical analyses show that regulatory inspectors manage to act responsively, but only to a small degree and not necessarily in the way that the theories of responsive and tit‐for‐tat regulation recommend. Furthermore, the analyses show large differences between the four regulatory areas suggesting that future studies should focus on the role of formal and informal institutional settings in creating responsiveness. If we want to design regulatory agencies that are able to regulate responsively we need to know what kind of institutional settings promote responsiveness.
In: Scandinavian political studies, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 349-375
ISSN: 1467-9477
Based on data disclosing differential treatment of regulated companies, this article shows that it is important to look at the implementation phase as well as the political decision‐making phase when one talks about distribution of power in Western democracies. Doing so gives a more nuanced picture of the distribution of power. However, explaining differential treatment throughout the implementation phase with variation in the possession of different power resources gives a more or less kaleidoscopic picture and calls for a complex theory of power. Local economic strength, networks, knowledge and organizational similarity do lead to more lenient regulatory inspection, but the effect depends on whether the company is public or private. Therefore, to have power and influence, one must possess the right resources, understand how to use them and be able to handle the fact that people might expect something different from you than they expect from others – not because of what you do, but because of who you are.
In: Scandinavian political studies: SPS ; a journal, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 349-376
ISSN: 0080-6757
SSRN
In: Law & policy, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 428-462
ISSN: 1467-9930
This article develops theoretical understanding of the motives of business firms and their managers for compliance. First, we develop a typology to conceptualize and measure business motives relevant to compliance behavior. We distinguish between three categories of motives: economic, social, and normative. We hypothesize, however, that business firms and their managers do not divide into types motivated exclusively by singular priorities. We expect each firm to hold a constellation of plural motives. Moreover, we expect that economic and social motives are more alike between regulatees within the same regulatory regime than normative motives. Second, we conduct a preliminary test of the plausibility of our typology of motives and our theory of constellations of plural motives using data from a survey of the thousand biggest companies in Australia. Finally, we conclude that the path from fundamental interests or motives to behavior is filled with constraints and contingent factors at the individual, organizational, and structural levels.
In: Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Band 34, Heft 4
SSRN
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 377-426
ISSN: 1930-7969
A number of countries, including Australia, have recently drastically increased the sanctions available for cartel conduct, on the assumption that businesses make decisions about their regulatory compliance behavior on the basis of self-interested calculations about the costs and gains of that behavior. Policymakers often assume that higher sanctions will automatically mean greater deterrence and therefore more compliance. This article sets out a more holistic model of calculative thinking about the costs and gains of compliance and noncompliance. We go on to test this model using data about business firms' compliance management responses to Australia's competition and consumer protection law. We find that enforcement probability is more important than sanction severity, that business belief in the positive business case for compliance is also important, and that fundamental firm characteristics (size, resources, and management style) are also significantly and independently related to compliance management behavior. We conclude that higher sanctions on their own are unlikely to lead to higher compliance with Australian competition and consumer protection law.
In: Griffith Law Review, Band 20, S. 91
SSRN
In: Administration & society, Band 41, Heft 1, S. 3-37
ISSN: 1552-3039