In: Canadian journal of economics and political science: the journal of the Canadian Political Science Association = Revue canadienne d'économique et de science politique, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 589-590
In: Canadian journal of economics and political science: the journal of the Canadian Political Science Association = Revue canadienne d'économique et de science politique, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 413-427
The Radcliffe Committee was appointed by Treasury Minute in May, 1957, "to inquire into the working of the monetary and credit system … [of the United Kingdom], … and to make recommendations." It held eighty-eight meetings, collected three volumes of written evidence and one volume of evidence given orally, compiled new statistical information, and finally on July 30, 1959, presented a unanimous report to the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury. The public saw the Report three weeks later.The prestigious composition of the Committee and the controversial ground which it was required to investigate alone ensured widespread attention for the Report. But the virtual flood of detailed comment emanating from academic economists and financial journalists in the United Kingdom is not entirely explained by this; nor even by the Committee's controversial views on matters of monetary theory and central banking practice. Because the views of the Committee on monetary policy and theory are not always fully developed, and in some instances appear to be ambiguous and contradictory, the Report offers limitless opportunities for articles on "What Radcliffe Really Meant," including, of course, analyses of the essential deficiencies of the interpretations suggested. Unfortunately, the Report is such that the views of the Committee are easily misinterpreted, a danger of which this writer is aware, but one which he may not have succeeded in avoiding in every instance.
In: Canadian journal of economics and political science: the journal of the Canadian Political Science Association = Revue canadienne d'économique et de science politique, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 595-595
In: Canadian journal of economics and political science: the journal of the Canadian Political Science Association = Revue canadienne d'économique et de science politique, Band 24, Heft 3, S. 332-344
There is little doubt that the Bank of Canada and Canadian monetary policy have been subjected to more public criticism since 1954 than at any other time since the Bank began operations in 1935. The force and the persistence of the criticism may in part be explained by a coincidence of events which included a move toward severe monetary restraint, a change of governor at the Bank of Canada, two national elections, and a change in government. Public criticism has for the most part concerned itself with the degree of monetary restraint or monetary ease in the economy generally and in specific sectors, with the timing of changes in policy and with the appropriateness of policy in the light of economic conditions. This paper will let those matters rest. Rather it will try to determine whether in a more fundamental sense the Bank's operations are in some respects open to criticism.There would appear to be four important aspects to the Bank of Canada's approach to central banking: the Bank's interpretation of its role in the allocation of capital; its conception of the mechanism by which monetary policy becomes effective and of the bounds within which monetary management must operate; its method of making quantitative monetary controls more effective; and its emphasis on the use of moral suasion. The third section will include an examination of the new Bank Rate.
In: Canadian journal of economics and political science: the journal of the Canadian Political Science Association = Revue canadienne d'économique et de science politique, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 568-569
In: Canadian journal of economics and political science: the journal of the Canadian Political Science Association = Revue canadienne d'économique et de science politique, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 131-132